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My dissertation contributes to a central and ongoing debate in the philosophy of 
perception concerning the fundamental nature of perceptual states. Such states include 
cases like seeing, hearing, or tasting, as well as cases of merely seeming to see, hear,  or 
taste. A central question concerning these states arises in light of misperceptual 
phenomena. While a commonsensical picture of perceptual states construes them as 
simply  relating us to the external and mind independent world’s objects, some 
misperceptual cases suggest that  these states fall short of such world contact. The result  is 
that perceptual states are either thought to fundamentally consist in a highest common 
factor that falls short of perceptual contact with the world, or are thought to be disjunctive 
in nature, with some cases involving perceptual contact, and others receiving a different 
analysis. Contrary  to these views, I argue that no misperceptual cases compromise 
perceptual contact with the world’s objects, and so perceptual starts are to be thought in 
terms of relations to the external and mind-independent world. I call this view I defend 
Pure Relationalism, and the view of misperceptual cases that makes pure relationalism 
possible Illusionism.
 To better understand the difficulty  confronting the pure relationalist view one 
needs to understand the way in which cases of misperception compromise the 
commonsensical view of perceptual states. Traditionally such cases decompose into two 
basic types, the case of illusions, and the case of hallucinations. We can see an example 
of an illusion (the Zöllner lines) below:
Illusions are such that an object itself is perceived (in this case, seen), but the object 
appears in a way at odds with the way it is. For instance the Zöllner lines appear 
nonparallel but are in fact parallel. These cases present a first challenge to relational 
views, they require an explanation of how things can appear other than they are when 
perceptual states only involve a relation to the thing perceived.
 A more difficult problem arises in the case of hallucinations. These cases are more 
radical, and range from the mundane to the extraordinary. A simple example is an 
afterimage that appears in one's visual field after looking directly  at a bright source of 
light like the sun. A more elaborate hallucination (had by  a blind Charles Bonnet 
Syndrome patient) is described below:
“People in Eastern dress!” she exclaimed. “In drapes, walking up and down stairs!...a 
man who turns towards me and smiles, but he has huge teeth on one side of his mouth … 
this horse (not a pretty horse, a drudgery  horse) with a harness, dragging snow away! ... I 
see a lot of children; they’re walking up and down stairs. They wear bright colors … like 
Eastern dress.”
What distinguishes hallucinatory cases is that they are states with a sensory character but 
without an obvious relation to any object in the world. Unlike illusions, these cases on the 
face of it do not involve the object appearing in a misleading way, but instead involve a 
“mere appearance”, an appearance without any object to do the appearing. As such 
hallucinations pose a difficult  challenge for any view that maintains that  perceptual states 
always involve relations to objects. 
 Current views of perceptual states accept the idea that hallucinations are unlike 
illusions in involving mere appearances, and the result  is two views that currently 
dominate the literature. On the one hand there are intentionalist views which argue that 
perceptual states are fundamentally  characterizable as states that mentally  represent the 
world to be a certain way. These views solve the problem of hallucinations by denying 
that all perceptual states require a relation to a worldly object. On the other hand there are 
disjunctive relationalist views that seek to preserve the relationality  of perceptual states, 
but do so in a more limited fashion. These views reject a common core to all perceptual 
states. Instead, such states are disjunctive in the sense that some (the veridical cases) are 
relational, while others (the misperceptual cases, in particular hallucinations) are to be 
characterized as fundamentally different. 
 Unlike these views, I argue that we should reject the idea that hallucinations do 
not involve a worldly object  appearing, and as such I take hallucinations to be just as 
relational as veridical and illusory states. While this seems implausible on the face of it, I 
argue that careful attention to actual and hypothetical cases of hallucination reveals that 
they  are relational. As such I maintain that hallucinations can be assimilated to the case of 
illusions, and this is the view I call illusionism. I defend illusionism in two steps. First, I 
show that  no arguments establish that hallucinations are not constituted by the properties 
of the objects surrounding the hallucinator, and second, I argue that these properties can 
be used to constitute nonexistent objects through the phenomena of perceiving-in. The 
result is that hallucinations involve perceptual relations to objects in the world, but the 
objects of hallucination can be nonexistent in the sense that they are merely objects that 
are depicted in existing objects. As such, my view is that hallucinations are in an 
important sense images much like paintings and movies. 
 The view I defend comes with various upshots. First, it  suggests that a particular 
conception of the mind is mistaken, or at least not motivated by  cases of perception. This 
is the representational view of the mind, on which the function of brain processing is to 
replicate or represent external information from the world internally. In contrast to this 
view, the view I defend suggests that brain processing merely makes transparent the 
world’s features, it does not replicate them. This view makes my view congenial to other 
nonrepresentational views such as enactive views of the mind. A second upshot of the 
view is that it  endorses the idea that there is a unity to perceptual states and to 
misperceptual states. Since illusions and hallucinations are not fundamentally  different, 
there is a unity to cases of misperception. This is not to say  that all cases are alike. Indeed 
I maintain that there are many interesting differences between different cases, but no 
differences that are systematic and establish the dualistic division between illusions and 
hallucinations. In addition, since illusions are themselves not fundamentally different 
from veridical perceptual states, then veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory cases fall on a 
single spectrum. This means that there is a certain unity to perceptual cases, they are all 
cases involve perceptual relations to the external and mind-independent world. A final 
upshot is that my view forges a connection between images or depictions, such as those 
that we consider art objects, and hallucinations. This connection has been briefly 
suggested in the past (two examples are Wollheim 2003 and Sartre 2012) but not 
elaborated upon. My discussion fills this gap, and in so doing provides a means to test 
this idea in actual hallucinatory  contexts, for instance, those that might occur in 
psychiatric cases.  
 In what follows the argument described here divides as follows. In the first 
chapter I start with an elaboration on the central notion of perceptual contact, which 
describes the optimal case in which perceptual states simply relate us to the world. In the 
second chapter, I complicate the perceptual contact relation by  posing two challenges to 
the idea that  perceptual contact sufficiently  constrains the phenomenology of perception. 
In answering these two challenges I set the stage for the solution that will emerge for 
cases of misperception. In the third chapter, I turn to the case of hallucinations and 
articulate the problem more fully, as well as some possible ways of resolving it. In the 
fourth chapter I propose my illusionist solution, considering some attempts at providing 
such a view in the literature, and supplementing these with my own fleshed out view. In 
the fifth and final chapter, I turn to the objections that may be raised against the view, and 
I argue that none of them are persuasive. In doing so I describe further features of the 
view, in particular the phenomena of perceiving in. 
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 Relationalism is the view that perceptual states, which include states of seeing, 
hearing, touching, etc, and states of seeming to see, hear, touch, etc, are to be 
characterized as fundamentally involving perceptual contact with the particular, material, 
and mind-independent objects of the external world (henceforth, worldly objects).1 It  is 
because perceptual states put us in perceptual contact with objects that we are able to 
consciously  experience objects, as well as refer, know, and interact with them. 
Relationalism puts a strong emphasis on the role of worldly objects and our relation to 
them in perceptual states. But this raises two worries about the phenomenological 
adequacy of the view since it is not clear that one can individuate perceptual states by 
appeal to their objects. On the one hand, objects seem to cut across phenomenal 
characters2  making them insufficient for an adequate characterization of a state's 
phenomenology. On the other hand, some perceptual states seem to have a phenomenal 
character but no object, and this makes that  objects are also unnecessary for 
characterizing perceptual states. 
 The aim of this project is to argue that contrary to appearances, relationalism has 
adequate responses to these problems. In this introduction I start  with some background 
on the relational view. First  I will discuss the view's historical and contemporary context, 
then elaborate on some of the view's recent motivations, and finally turn to the problems 
1
1 I elaborate further on what relationalism amounts to in the first chapter.
2 I define phenomenal characters more fully in chapter 1, but roughly phenomenal character refers to the way things seem from the first-person perspective of the 
subject undergoing an experience.
that structure the chapters that follow. Without further ado, we turn to the first  of these 
tasks.  
1 Relationalism in Context
 Philosophy has long been interested in the nature of perception, and as it so 
happens misperception has always had a central role to play in how we understood 
perception. This has been particularly so since Descartes' Meditations, though the 
concern with perception and misperception goes back to at least Plato's Theaetetus. 
Descartes’ project, however, is of particular significance because Descartes began with 
skepticism, and the discussion that emerged out of his starting point largely  structures 
contemporary  philosophical thought on perception. In his attempt to find a firm 
foundation for knowledge, Descartes thought that the best method involved calling into 
question the possibility  of certainty  altogether. This he did by invoking three skeptical 
hypotheses that he took to undermine the foundations of all human knowledge. Descartes' 
observations did not aim at undermining perception alone, they  were also meant to call 
into question mathematical and other a priori knowledge. Despite this, Cartesian 
skepticism did begin with doubting perception, which Descartes took to be the most 
intuitive first  source of human knowledge. "Surely whatever I had admitted until now as 
most true I received from the senses or through the senses", Descartes writes.
 Today when we think about the Cartesian approach in the context of 
understanding perception we see that the way Descartes addressed perception is, in an 
important sense, secondary. Descartes' first question concerned the role of perception 
2
with respect to knowledge, but it is reasonable to think that a prior question concerns the 
nature of perception itself. It is the way perception is that tells us about  its role with 
respect to knowledge, not vice versa. This is not to say  that Descartes' investigation left 
out all commitments on this prior question. Indeed his skepticism got off the ground 
through such a commitment. Descartes' worry was about how our minds can put us in 
touch with external reality.3 By posing this worry Descartes had already assumed that no 
feature of the mind essentially involves a connection to external or mind-independent 
reality, and this of course entails, on the plausible assumption that perception is a function 
of the mind, that perception does not essentially  involve such a connection. The objects 
of perception are not essentially worldly objects, and so perceptual experience or 
perceptual states4 come apart from the world they purport to be of. This made Cartesian 
skepticism coherent: on the one hand mental representations were sufficient for things to 
appear thus and so, and on the other the world and its structure were unnecessary for such 
representations. This meant the mind has no real purchase on the world or its structure, 
and this is what worried Descartes.
 But an anti-Cartesian trend followed in the philosophy of perception, of which 
relationalism is the latest iteration. This trend has its first roots in George Berkeley  and 
later Thomas Reid, and on the view endorsed by these philosophers and the many  that 
3
3 This is clear in the Meditations, but has also been widely argued. For instance, in McDowell 1998 (Essay 11: Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space).
4  In this introduction I use the terms perception, perceptual experience, and perceptual states interchangeably. In the first chapter I draw distinctions between 
these.
followed them,5 perceptual experience simply cannot be severed from the world and the 
way it is. This is because to perceive is simply to be related to the world itself 
perceptually, it is neither to represent it  in a way that may  or may not reflect how it  is, nor 
is it  to represent it regardless of whether or not it is. This trend takes its motivations from 
various places. It is partly anti-skeptical (for instance, as it  occurs in John McDowell's 
work e.g. 1998), partly  motivated by  issues concerning reference (as in the work of 
Hilary  Putnam 1981 and John Campbell 2002), partly by phenomenology (as in 
Heidegger's Being and Time), and partly by an affinity and favoring of the verdict of 
commonsense (as it was with Reid 1983). 
 But as is usually the case, to take an opposite position often leads to incurring the 
opposite costs, and the anti-Cartesian trend has been haunted by the case of 
misperception which for the Cartesians was the safest ground. Descartes found a resting 
point at the beginning of the Meditations which involved nothing more than the 
representer and her representations, but for anti-Cartesians who take perceptual states to 
essentially  relate us to the world, there is no question of being able to rest, as Descartes 
did, amidst mere appearances or representations. Instead anti-Cartesians find themselves 
confronted by the task of explaining how Descartes' first-person resting ground, which 
today  we describe using the notion of phenomenal character, could essentially relate us to 
the world. On the one hand this requires explaining how relations to the world give an 
adequate characterization of phenomenal character. On the other, this requires 
4
5 To name a few: there have been various proponents of anti-Cartesian views of perception within the phenomenological tradition, in particular Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, and more recently Dan Zahavi. In the early analytic and the pragmatic traditions there are philosophers who are sympathetic to anti-Cartesian 
views in general even if not specifically with respect to perception, for instance Gilbert Ryle and Richard Rorty. And more recently there are the works of Hilary 
Putnam and John McDowell that take up the anti-Cartesian trend.
confronting the problematic possibility of misperception. Misperceptions are problematic 
because minimally they mislead us, and minimally, they are capable of doing so 
radically. We can be altogether deceived with respect to the world's nature. If perception 
is just  a relation to the world, it is hard to see how this sort of misperception is possible. 
The most obvious explanation returns us to Cartesianism. On it, we follow Descartes in 
saying that experience need not  involve perceptual contact with objects, at least in 
misperceptual cases. But even if this limits the scope of the mind/world separation to 
misperception, it still shows that perceptual states are not fundamentally world-involving.
 At this point we might turn to an assessment of the other options available to the 
anti-Cartesian, but doing so would be premature. This is because we need to consider a 
final possibility, namely, that the dichotomy between Cartesian and anti-Cartesian views 
is mistaken. This is an increasingly  reasonable hypothesis. For one thing, contemporary 
philosophy has largely  abandoned Cartesian dualism which supplemented and made 
plausible the radical separation between mind and world. So even if today there are views 
that accept the possibility  of appearances or representations severed from the world, they 
do not do so in the manner that Descartes did. For another, the views currently carrying 
the banners of Cartesianism and anti-Cartesianism in perception, the intentional and 
relational view respectively, have come a long way. They have developed various ways of 
accommodating the good-making features of the opposite view, and some have argued 
that hybrid views are possible.6 The result is that it is no longer possible or plausible to 
5
6 For instance, Schellenberg 2010, Tye 2011, McDowell 2013, and Dorsch 2013 all argue that we can have views that are both intentionalist and relationalist.
see the two families of views as diametrically opposed, nor to see one view as clearly 
preferable to the other.
 One reason for thinking that the current iterations of the Cartesian and anti-
Cartesian views are not different is that it is very hard to pin down the specific difference 
between the views. The literature on relationalism and intentionalism (sometimes 
representationalism) is extremely large and unwieldy, and it precludes any quick and easy 
categorization. This is radically  unlike the straightforward opposition (described above) 
between Cartesian and anti-Cartesian views. One might think the question concerns the 
acceptability of representational content.7 But some relational views have accepted such 
contents, e.g. Bill Brewer (2006), Matthew Kennedy (2013), and myself in the present 
work. And anyway, intentionalists disagree amongst themselves about the nature and role 
of contents. For instance Adam Pautz (2010) and Susanna Siegel (2012) disagree on 
whether perceptual experiences are relations to a content; and Michael Tye (2011) and 
Susanna Schellenberg (2010) disagree on whether contents are Russellian or Fregean. 
 Another thought is that the views differ on whether perceptual states are 
disjunctive or not. For instance Pautz (2011) structures his discussion around 
disjunctivism's opposition to intentionalism. But there are philosophers who are best 
described as disjunctive intentionalists, e.g. McDowell (1994) and Tye (2011), and 
philosophers who are best described as nondisjunctive relationalists, e.g. Johnston (2004). 
A final thought returns to the Cartesian roots by  construing the differences as that 
between views on which perceptual states depend on worldly objects or not. But some 
6
7 For Instance, Susanna Siegel’s 2012 discussion focuses on whether relationalist views can or must accept perceptual contents.
intentionalists like Tye (2011) and Schellenberg (2010) follow relationalists in accepting 
object dependence, and some relationalists like Kennedy (2009), Genone (2013), and 
myself (in the present work) have argued that object dependence is insufficient for 
relationalism. So what  differentiates the current descendants of Cartesian and anti-
Cartesian views of perception?
 One way to make sense of the debate between relationalism and 
representationalism, and the way I adopt, can be understood in light of the following 
question: do we perceive the world because we represent it, or do we represent the world 
because we perceive it? Intentionalists accept the first disjunct, relationalists the second. 
In this construal I am following an idea articulated by  the relationalist John Campbell 
(2002) who takes the central disagreement to be about the explanatory role of perception. 
He writes
We are not to take the intentional character of experience as a given; rather, 
experience of objects has to be what explains our ability to think about objects. 
That means that we cannot view experience of objects as a way of grasping 
thoughts about objects. Experience of objects has to be something more primitive 
than the ability  to think about objects, in terms of which the ability to think about 
objects can be explained.8
The idea expressed by Campbell is that relationalism gives our perceptual experiences of 
objects a founding role with respect to intentional capacities like the capacity  to think 
about the objects of the external world. As such, one can say  that the heart of the 
disagreement concerns Brentano’s thesis, which claims that what characterizes all mental 
phenomena is intentionality or the mind’s capacity to “direct” itself upon or be about 
7
8 Campbell 2002 p.122
objects that are external to the mental act itself, whether or not they exist.9  For 
relationalists, intentionality, which is operative in those cases in which we represent the 
world, is taken to be derivative in the sense of depending on a more fundamental capacity 
to perceptually experience the world's objects. This is what explains why relationalists 
often downplay the role of perceptual contents, why they adopt disjunctivism, and why 
they  often emphasize object dependence. Perceptual contents are unnecessary  insofar as 
perceptual states are not primarily intentional, but rather ground intentionality. 
Disjunctivism is attractive because it allows relationalism to put aside those cases that 
seem to establish that perception is intentional. And object dependence is needed because 
perception is unlike intentional states which do not require the actual, real, or worldly 
presence of the object. So relationalists, but not  intentionalists, take being perceptually 
related to the world to explain how we can come to have world-directed thought, talk, 
memory, and so on.
 Intentionalists, by contrast, reverse this order of grounding. Committing to 
Brentano’s thesis (which is not to say  they are necessarily motivated by  its 
preservation)10, they  argue that  perceptual experience successfully conveys the idea of 
mind-independent world because such experience is intentional. Our perceptual access to 
the world is thus grounded in the sui generis intentionality of the mind. Indeed in many 
cases intentionalism is explicitly introduced by  analogy to other intentional attitudes like 
belief. For instance this is the route Siegel (2012) takes in introducing her version of 
8
9 This is to say that I take intentionality to allow for what Brentano called “intentional inexistence”, namely that the object of a mental act may exist only within 
the act, even though it is not identical with it.
10 Intentionalism has many benefits to motivate it. For more, see the works on perception by Adam Pautz, Susanna Schellenberg, and Susanna Siegel (most of 
which are cited here).
intentionalism, “the content view”. She writes “the content view can be refined into a 
proposal that finds the following similarity between visual experiences and beliefs: like 
beliefs, maps, and newspapers, visual experiences have contents….According to the 
proposal, experiences are the kinds of states that can be accurate, and their contents are 
conditions under which they  have their status”11. My claim is that this is not a mere 
analogy. It is rather a metaphysical commitment to a common representational or 
intentional core between perceptual experiences, beliefs, and other intentional states. 
 Taking this to be the central contention of intentionalism helps us understand the 
appeal to perceptual contents, and why object dependence and disjunctivism are often not 
emphasized. Since perception is intentional, it depend on mental contents being conveyed 
to the subject having the experience. This content represents the world as mind-
independent, giving us the capacity to experience, think, and talk about such worldly 
objects whether or not they are they are there. With the content being sufficient for 
experience, there is no need to appeal to disjunctivism by way of excluding problematic 
cases that do not  depend on worldly objects. And this is because the worldly objects 
themselves are unnecessary, all that is needed are the contents (although as I noted above, 
the contents themselves might be object-dependent). So for intentionalists, it is 
intentionality or representations that are basic, not perception. Perception is just one way 
in which intentionality is manifest; it is one amongst many world-directed psychological 
attitudes rather than being their ground. 
9
11 Siegel 2012 p.30
2 The Commonsense Appeal of Relationalism
Provided that we can make sense of the distinction between the contemporary Cartesian 
and anti-Cartesian views of perception - intentionalism and relationalism - why  should 
we prefer relationalism?12 While there is no easy way of declaring one view definitively 
better than the other, many philosophers, including some intentionalists like Adam Pautz 
(2011), have thought that relationalism is the view most appealing from the perspective 
of commonsense.13 But how should we understand the verdict of commonsense? 
 The world around us is littered with objects that exist, and which in most cases do 
not depend on us in any  way. Intuitively, we think that  these very objects are the objects 
of perception, they are what populate our “perceptual world”. Intuitively, as a “faculty  of 
the mind”, perception simply  reveals the world to us, it puts us in perceptual contact with 
the world’s objects. The commonsense explanation is that in perceiving the objects, the 
objects seem (from a first-person point of view) a particular way  to us. Because they do, 
we can refer to them and know things about them. As an example, consider the following 
question-answer pairs
“Is the phone ringing?” - “Yes, I heard it”
“Is that block really solid?” - “No, I just touched it”
“Are you sure there are three electrons?” - “Yes, I just  looked at the computer 
reading”
10
12 The literature on which view we should side with is extremely large and I do not try to deal with all of it here. But for some good discussions, see Campbell 
2002, Fish 2008, and Brewer 2011 on behalf of relationalists, and Pautz 2010, Schellenberg 2011, and Siegel 2012 on behalf of intentionalists.
13 Perhaps most famously, Reid 1983 argued that the philosophy of his time seemed opposed to commonsense when it came to perception, and he himself chose 
to side with commonsense which gave relationalism the derogatory label of naïve realism.
Despite the difference in these pairs - that they  appeal to different sense modalities, and 
that the last case is indirect - it is uncontroversial (at least if one is not a skeptic) that each 
answer satisfies its question. The questions ask about the way  the world is, and the 
answers given satisfy the question by appeal to what was seen, heard, or touched.
 Is intentionalism’s position worse with respect to commonsense? Not clearly. To 
appeal to commonsense, intentionalism needs to give a central role to the world’s objects. 
This can be done in several ways. Intentionalists can accept externalism about contents, 
and in so doing make the contents object involving. Intentionalists can also accept 
singular contents, and this would mean that particular worldly objects are essential to the 
content. But this alone is not enough. Intentionalists do not just need to involve specific 
worldly objects, they also need to relate those objects to the state in the right way. The 
state must involve the object because it  is that very worldly object that appears to the 
perceiver and allows her to learn about it. Can intentionalism procure this intuitive 
feature?
 On the face of it the answer is yes. To see this we need to first see that 
intentionalists can make the referential and epistemic significance of the state dependent 
on the state’s phenomenology, and the state’s phenomenology dependent on the object. 
The first step is possible if one adopts a phenomenology-first intentionalist view. On this 
type of view, when something is perceived, there is a conscious and first-person 
experience of the way that thing is. On the basis of this conscious access, the object can 
be referred to and known. 
11
 The second step  seems possible initially. This is because the state’s phenomenal 
character can depend on the object of the state. But here a central distinction is needed. 
There are two ways in which phenomenal characters can depend on objects, and one way 
is more in line with commonsense. I will call the first way indirect or causal, and the 
other way direct or constitutive. Indirect or causal dependence is exemplified by qualia 
centered intentionalist views, e.g. Charles Siewert (1998). On this type of view, the 
phenomenal character of the experience depends on the objects, but it does so causally. 
This means that if the causal conditions are replicated, even in the absence of the object, 
the phenomenal character of the state can be retained. A view of this sort makes 
phenomenal character dependent on the object, but does so indirectly. The phenomenal 
characters results from the object, but it is not constitutive of it. It is not that object that  is 
appearing, but rather that object which is contingently  giving rise to the appearance. By 
contrast, relational views like the ones endorsed by  Mike Martin (2004), William Fish 
(2008), and Bill Brewer (2011), require direct or constitutive object dependence. When 
the object  dependence is constitutive, the state itself is at  least partly  constituted by that 
very object, and this means that the object must exist  and be present to the perceiver if 
she is to enter the state. If the object is there, and the perceiver is in perceptual contact 
with it, the state has that phenomenal character; if the object is not there or the perceiver 
fails to be in perceptual contact with it, the state simply lacks that phenomenal character. 
According to relationalists, all perceptual phenomenal character is directly or 
constitutively object dependent since perceptual states most basically relate us to objects.
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 Can intentionalists maintain that objects are constitutive of perceptual states in the 
same way? In principle yes. The problem is that if intentionalists maintain this sort of 
constitutive connection, the stipulated contents cease to play any  important role. Contents 
are used by intentionalists as a way of accounting for the phenomenology and 
significance of perceptual states which they  lack objects, but if perceptual states always 
have objects, then contents are needed for neither of these tasks. At least with respect to 
this use, contents are redundant. So effectively, this means that intentionalists deny that 
objects are constitutive in this way. This is clear when we look at cases of misperception. 
Specifically, the way we explain hallucinations reveals the strength of the connection we 
make between objects and phenomenal characters. Most intentionalist views admit that 
hallucinations are perceptual states with phenomenal characters, but deny that they  need 
to be object involving, constitutively. For instance, Susanna Schellenberg (2011), Michael 
Tye (2011), and John McDowell (2013) (all of whom accept that contents are external 
and singular) do this in different  ways. Schellenberg thinks hallucinations can have 
characters due to the deployment of perceptual capacities, even when they fail to pick out 
an object. Tye thinks they can have characters due to uninstantiated properties which 
have no objects. And McDowell thinks they can have characters due to their de se 
contents, and those do not depend on the presence of an object. On these views most 
intentionalist views are committed to indirect or merely causal object dependence, at least 
in hallucinatory cases. By contrast, relationalists tend to reject that hallucinations have a 
phenomenal character. When they do accept its character, they do so by  bringing in some 
object. For instance Martin (2004) and Fish (2009) deny  that hallucinations have a 
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phenomenal character, and Johnston (2004) accepts that  they do by finding objects to 
which they are relations. 
3 The Way Ahead
 In the last  section I argued that although intentionalism can uphold the 
commitments of commonsense, in doing so it undermines the appeal to contents. This 
should make relationalism the more appealing view if contents are only required to 
account for cases of misperception. The problem is that if we adopt the relational view 
and with it the constitutive view of objects, it becomes unclear what we should do with 
radical cases of hallucinations. To think that objects are constitutive of perceptual states is 
to deny  that there are any perceptual states without objects, and hallucinations do not 
have obvious objects. This gives the relationalist two options with respect to 
hallucinations:
(1) Hallucinations are not genuinely  perceptual, and do not involve perceptual 
contact with objects, or
(2) Hallucinations are perceptual, and involve perceptual contact with objects
By contrast, intentionalists can also accept a third view which reflects the causal or 
indirect view of object dependence:
(3) Hallucinations are perceptual and do not involve perceptual contact with 
objects. 
The problem for relationalism is that (3) seems to be the most attractive view of 
hallucinations. (1) seems to fly  in the face of hallucinatory experiences which often seem 
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to have a perceptual phenomenology. And while it is open to relationalists to maintain 
that hallucinations have a merely “perception-like” phenomenology, it is not easy to 
maintain this in a way that is plausible and not ad hoc. (2) also seems difficult to maintain 
since often we are at a loss to say what object  we are related to when hallucinating. This 
leaves (3) as the most intuitive because it accepts at face value the phenomenal character 
of hallucinations, and the absence of the object hallucinated. If (3) is the most attractive 
view of misperception, but is a view that must be rejected for relationalism to be 
appealing from the perspective of commonsense, then relationalism is in a dilemma. 
Either it has an intuitive view of the connection between perceptual experiences and their 
objects but an unintuitive view of hallucinations, or else it accepts the intuitive view of 
hallucinations but in so doing loses the commonsense appeal. Of course intentionalism 
faces the exact same dilemma when it comes to commonsense. 
 My aim in this project is show that relationalism can overcome this dilemma. I 
want to argue that relationalism has a commonsensical story  about how veridical 
perceptual states involve relations to objects, and that it can reject  the problematic view 
of hallucinations. Thus the project can be construed as defending two claims
(A) that the objects we are in perceptual contact with are sufficient for perceptual 
phenomenal character, and 
(B) that the objects we are in perceptual contact with are necessary for perceptual 
phenomenal character.
The first claim depends on showing that when we cite the objects of an experience, the 
objects we are in contact with, and the way we are in contact  with them, this gives us an 
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adequate understanding of perceptual phenomenology. I defend this claim in the first two 
chapters. The second claims depends on showing that even in cases of hallucination, there 
are objects which we are in perceptual contact with. I defend this claim in third, fourth, 
and fifth chapter. By  doing this, I uphold a view that maintains that the highest common 
factor does not fall short of perceptual contact with the objects of the world. In arguing 
this, I undermine the need for contents in cases of misperception, and also the need for 
controversial disjunctive views that allow us to reject the more commonsensical common 




 In this first chapter my aim will be get clear on the core commitment of relational 
views. I begin by arguing that the core relational commitment is that all perceptual states 
involve perceptual contact with worldly objects. This results in two strengths of 
relationalist views, those that think perceptual contact is necessary but not sufficient, and 
those that think perceptual contact is both necessary and sufficient. I call the first  impure 
relationalism, and the latter pure relationalism, and in the remainder of the project defend 
the more stringent pure view while highlighting features that force us to retreat to the 
weaker impure view. I then turn to the thorny issue of mediation in the perceptual contact 
relation. I argue that relationalism is fairly but not entirely  permissive when it comes to 
mediation. By highlighting the acceptable and unacceptable forms of mediation I develop 
a litmus test for what is to count as a minimally  relationalist  view. With this test I 
consider some current relationalist proposals to see whether they  meet the minimal 
commitment.
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1.1 Defining Perceptual States 
 I understand theories of perception as aiming at a fundamental characterization of 
perceptual states.14  “Perceptual state” is a philosophical term of art which needs 
definition. Such states are states that a subject enters whenever they see, hear, taste, 
touch, or smell objects of the world. More generally, they are states in which subjects 
gains access to their world through one or more of their sense modalities. In addition, 
perceptual states also include cases of seeming to access objects through one of the sense 
modalities. Often, the blanket term for all these cases is perceptual experience. While I 
will use that term occasionally, my discussion will mainly make use of the notion of a 
perceptual state. 
 To further home in on perceptual states, I propose beginning with an ostensive 
definition followed by abstraction. Begin by considering your total occurrent and 
conscious state15 at  this time. This is made up  of everything you are experiencing at this 
moment. That state has at least four constituents: there are certain thoughts you are 
having e.g. about this paper, the emptiness of the coffee cup, etc. There is some mood or 
otherwise affective state that you are in e.g. you feel calm, bored, etc. There is also some 
way your body  feels to you interoceptively  e.g. sitting, alert, hungry, suffering a back 
pain, etc. And finally  there is some way the world around you seems exteroceptively. The 
part of your total state that is perceptual includes only  the last two of these. My focus, 
however, will be the exteroceptive part.
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14 In what follows I will omit the word “perceptual”. I also use “state” to mean “perceptual state”.
15 Since the whole project’s focus is conscious occurrent states, I will almost always ways omit the words “occurrent” and “conscious”.
 We now have a preliminary grip on perceptual states: they  are occurrent, 
conscious, embedded within a “larger” occurrent and conscious state (at least for us 
humans), and characterized by the conscious and occurrent reception of information 
about the world and body through one’s senses. This initial characterization falls short of 
what we need, however. This is because the definition only  captures veridical perceptual 
states, which are cases of successfully perceiving the world. Cases of perceptual error 
may not involve the conscious reception of sensory information, as we might think is the 
case in Descartes’ dream scenario. As it stands, we have defined only those states I will 
call good, veridical or perceptual. We are yet to define the bad, falsidical, or 
misperceptual cases.
 To broaden the definition and include the bad cases, we need to appeal to the 
notion of phenomenal character. The phenomenal character of a perceptual state is that 
intrinsic property  of a perceptual state which individuates it in terms of what it is like to 
be in that state. What it is like to be in a perceptual state is for the world (or one’s body, in 
cases of interoception) to be presented, appear, or look some way to one. For instance, 
one's current state may be such that one's body appears full of energy or as having a pain 
in one's left foot. In addition, the room might appear brightly lit and quiet, and one's shirt 
might appear red and soft. Since we are constraining ourselves to perceptual states, the 
relevant notion of appearance, presentation, or look, is that of sensory or qualitative 
appearances, presentations, or looks. 
 Appealing to phenomenal character allows us to redefine perceptual states with 
the desired generality. Start by considering the phenomenal character of your current 
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good perceptual state. Now consider the following continuations of your experience: You 
blink, and Descartes’ demon displaces you into an exact physical replica of your current 
location. Since this is an exact physical replica, the character of your state remains the 
same; everything continues to look the same because everything was designed to be the 
same. A second blink has the demon displace you again, this time into a world that is 
color-inverted relative to yours. The demon, however, also modifies your perceptual 
system such that your new wiring re-inverts the colors of the world. Again, the character 
of your state will remains the same, things look just as they did. Finally, on your last 
blink, the demon hurls you into a void while causing you to hallucinate an exact replica 
of your current location, right before you expire. Again, the character of your state 
remains the same. The world and the objects in it differ across these four scenarios, but 
intuitively these cases share something. All of them leave your perceptual state as is, or if 
the state changes, you are not privy to these changes. For you it seems as if you stayed in 
place before suddenly expiring, despite the changes that  took place. This aspect that 
seems to cut across the different  scenarios is the phenomenal character of your perceptual 
state. It is an intrinsic property of perceptual states, and it provides a situation-neutral 
way of individuating the state.
1.2 Relational Views
 With the definition of perceptual states in place, we can now define the relational 
family of views formally. Recall that relationalism is motivated by the commonsensical 
idea that perception fundamentally places us in perceptual contact with the world. On the 
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assumption that what the world has in it are particular, material, and mind-independent 
objects which possess various properties (for short, worldly objects), a first pass at  the 
minimal relationalist commitment is
Identity: Perception is identical with perceptual contact with worldly objects.
For short, “perceptual contact with worldly objects” is world-contact, so perception is 
being identified with world-contact. More formally, we might say that the property  of a 
perceiver being in a veridical perceptual state is identical with the property of that 
perceiver being in world-contact. Since perceptual states are individuated by their 
phenomenal characters, this means that a veridical state’s character is wholly  constituted 
by the worldly objects the perceiver is in contact with. 
 Relationalism is motivated by the attempt to capture our commonsensical 
intuitions, but as theory of perception, it is meant to be a theory of all perceptual states. 
The identity  claim above is more limited than that, but can be straightforwardly 
expanded. The most obvious combination would be that of maintaining that all (and not 
just veridical) perceptual states are identical with being in world-contact. So the simplest 
construal of relationalism is as an identity thesis:
Pure Relationalism: The property of a perceiver being in a perceptual state is 
identical with the property of that perceiver being in world-contact.
There are also two ways of weakening the commitment of pure relationalism. One way is 
exemplified by  the Identity claim above. On this way of weakening, relationalism is 
understood as a theory  of some but not all perceptual states. We can call such views 
Partial Pure Relationalist views. Disjunctive relational views are a good example of this 
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weaker construal. Disjunctive views maintain that perceptual states must be given a 
disjunctive analysis, with good cases being explained one way and bad cases explained 
another. Accepting disjunctivism along with relationalism gives us disjunctive 
relationalism, which accepts that the explanation of good cases involves world-contact, 
but denies that explanation of bad cases does.
 Another more substantive way  to weaken pure relationalism involves limiting the 
commitment rather than scope of relationalism. On these views, perceptual states 
essentially involve world-contact without being identical to it. In this case world-contact 
is a necessary but insufficient constituent of perceptual states. As long as whatever else 
goes into the state does not violate world-contact (I discuss this in more detail in the 
following section), a minimal form of relationalism is preserved. We can call this 
weakened view impure relationalism:
Impure Relationalism: The property of a perceiver being in a perceptual state 
essentially involves that perceiver being in world-contact, where that contact is 
not violated by whatever else goes into the constitution of S’s state.16
One might wish to adopt this weaker form of relationalism if one thinks that a perceptual 
state’s character cannot be entirely constituted by the perceiver’s perceptual contact 
relation and the worldly object to which she is related. This would mean that some non-
relational features play a constitutive role in perception. An example might be a view that 
takes perceptual phenomenology to partly depend on qualia, and partly on relations to 
objects (provided that the qualia posited to do not violate world-contact). In addition, we 
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16 Particular versions of impure relationalism will have to say more on what is meant by “essentially involving” world-contact.
can combine the two forms of weakening to get Partial Impure Relationalism, which 
accepts impure relationalism for a limited set of perceptual states. These variants can be 
conveniently placed into the following table:
All perceptual states Some perceptual states
World-Contact is necessary and 
sufficient
Pure Relationalism Partial Pure Relationalism
World-Contact is necessary but 
not sufficient
Impure Relationalism Partial Impure Relationalism
 In what follows, my focus will be on pure and impure views, and I will put aside 
partial views. This is because partial views seem to me an admission that relationalism is 
the wrong view of perceptual states. To see this, consider disjunctive relational views. On 
these views, bad cases do not involve world-contact. If these views also admit that bad 
case have a perceptual phenomenal character, then their view amounts to denying that 
perceptual states essentially involve perceptual contact, and this is a denial of 
relationalism. By contrast, if bad cases do not have a perceptual phenomenal character, 
then it is not clear what the disjunction is for. Such views are more appropriately 
described by saying that sometimes, one undergoes a perceptual state (which always 
involves world-contact), and sometimes one is in a state that seems to be perceptual but 
isn't. These latter views are better thought of as eliminativists about falsidical perceptual 
states. In addition to excluding partial views, my aim will be to defend the more 
restrictive pure relational view. In chapter 2 I will discuss some possibilities that if true, 
will require a retreat to impure relationalism, but I will argue that these possibilities are 
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controversial. From the reader's perspective, however, either pure or impure relationalism 
should be acceptable since my arguments aim at defending the more stringent pure view. 
1.3 Perceptual Contact
 All of the above relational views make use of the notion of “perceptual contact”, 
and this makes it  the central notion for relationalists. Since it is not mean to be taken 
literally, being apt for a case of touch but not vision, we need a way of understanding 
contact in non-literal cases. In this section, I consider various features of the perceptual 
contact relation. In the next section, I turn to the role of mediation in the perceptual 
contact relation. Since any view of perceptual states must accept that perception 
minimally involves causal mediation (if it is to be scientifically  plausible) regardless of 
how direct the view is supposed to be, looking at  how contact stands in relation to 
mediation will shed needed light on what perceptual contact amounts to. This should be 
of benefit  to both proponents and opponents of the view since the limits of relationalism 
are not always clearly recognized. 
 Before defining contact more explicitly, two preliminary comments are worth 
making: First, by contact I largely  mean what others have used the term “acquaintance” 
to mean. I avoid using the latter term only  to avoid unwanted assumptions or 
associations, but I think the terms basically  aim at capturing the same relation. Second, 
contact is supposed to do justice to the idea that perception is a sort of openness to the 
world or direct revelation of it. When we are in perceptual contact with an object, the 
object itself is presented to us, it appears a certain way  through its perceptible properties 
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and parts, and in so doing is revealed to us. The relation of perceptual contact therefore 
opens us up to the world and opens up the world to us.
 We can now turn to some of the relation’s central features. Perceptual contact is a 
two place relation, where the relation is a direct, conscious, and occurrent experiential 
relation obtaining between a perceiver S and a perceptible object o. World-contact is 
simply  a restricted form of contact, it stipulates that  one of the relata, the object that S is 
in contact with, be part of the real or external world. Continuing, we can that S is placed 
in contact with o just  in case S is in a perceptual state in which o itself constitutes the 
phenomenal character of that state. The idea is that the presence of the object itself brings 
about a change in the character of the state, and thus “determines” (more on this in the 
next section) it  phenomenologically. So the presence of this particular object is necessary 
for that particular phenomenology, and without an object the state would altogether lack a 
phenomenology. This means that perceptual contact has existential import: if S is in 
contact with o and its properties then o and its properties exist. In addition, the relation 
entails that the existent object is present to the perceiver, which means that it falls within 
the perceiver’s “sensory  scope” (a concept I elaborate on in chapter 2). Finally, since 
perceptual contact focuses on phenomenal determination, it does not depend on the 
perceiver's recognition of contact. If S is in contact with x, and x is y, then regardless of 
what the perceiver thinks (or indeed if she thinks at all), she is in contact with y  when in 
contact with x. 
 In addition to the above features, we can also say that the perceptual contact 
relation is neither symmetrical or reflexive. It is not symmetrical because only one of the 
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relata needs to be a subject capable of having experiences.17 As such, it  follows that the 
object relatum need not be in contact with the perceiver who is in contact with it. Of 
course there are cases in which an experiencing being experiences a being that 
experiences it. Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) case of one hand touching another is such a case. 
There, one hand touches the other, and the other touches the one. However following 
Merleau-Ponty, I take this case to be one of two perceptual contact relations, not one; the 
hand is either touching, or touched.18 Perceptual contact is also not reflexive because one 
need not be in perceptual contact with oneself when one is in contact with the perceived 
object. Otherwise it would be the case that, for example, in seeing a cat, one must also 
see oneself seeing the cat. This blatantly gets the phenomenology wrong.19 
  Finally, we should note that while perceptual contact is a direct  relation, an 
indirect form of perceptual contact is possible. This is due to the fact  that contact is a 
matter of phenomenological determination. For instance, consider a blind man with a 
stick. The man is in tactile contact with the stick, but if the stick bumps against the wall, 
this alters the phenomenal state of the blind man since he now indirectly  feels the 
pressure of the wall. This is indirect contact, which is is parasitic on (direct) contact since 
any time one is in indirect contact with an object, they  are so by being in (direct) contact 
with some other object e.g. the wall determines the blind man’s state through the blind 
man’s perceptual contact with the stick. 
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17 This might seem odd given that ordinary usage is such that if x is in contact with y then y is in contact with x, but recall that this is about perceptual contact 
specifically.
18 Merleau-Ponty 1962, p.92
19 This is so even if one accepts some sort of higher-order theory of consciousness because no theory claims that we both perceive our target object and perceive 
ourselves perceiving the target. To say that would be like saying we saw a third person image of ourselves in the perceptual act every time we perceived.
1.4 Forms of Mediation
 One way to understand in what sense perceptual states involves contact with the 
world is to understand what sorts of mediation are allowed and disallowed by the 
relation. Perceptual contact is a relation that is often said to be “direct” or “immediate” in 
some sense or other. So far we have seen some ways in which it is. We have said it is 
supposed to simply open us up to the world. That it  involves the actual presence of the 
object itself. And that this direct relation is supposed to be what underpins our capacity  to 
represent the world. But as I said in the last section, no view of perceptual states can 
discount all forms of mediation since there is at least causal mediation. The relationalist 
must therefore steer a course on which contact allows some forms of mediation while 
disallowing others. Minimally, what the relationalist must deny  is any form of mediation 
in which the object’s presence or absence becomes insignificant to the character of the 
perceptual state. If this were to happen, then the presence of the object would become 
unnecessary  for perceptual states, and this would seem contrary to the idea of opening us 
up the world, revealing the object, or underpinning our capacity to represent such objects. 
To steer this course, we can begin with an instructive puzzle raised by the language of 
phenomenal determination which we used to characterizing perceptual contact at  the end 
of the last section.
 Consider the least metaphorical case of contact, the case of touch. Specifically, 
consider the case of (successfully) touching a wall. In so doing you are in contact with 
the wall, not with anything else. This is so because when you touch the wall’s surface, it 
is that surface which constitutes the way  things are for you. So the surface’s features 
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determine the phenomenal character of your state. This is one way of understanding 
phenomenal determination. But now notice that there is another way of using the term. 
We can rightly  say that the sensory  capacities of our hand (or alternatively its associated 
processing) determines the character of our state. This is clear if we contrast two 
examples: in the first, you touch the wall which is partly  smooth and partly  rough. When 
touched, the resultant phenomenal character is partly of a smooth surface, and partly of a 
rough surface. But now imagine your hand’s physiology altered such that part of your 
hand is extremely sensitive to ridges while the other is not. With this hand, touching a 
wall with a uniform smoothness (or roughness) would result in a character identical to 
that of your normal hand touching a partly smooth and partly  rough surface. Similarly, a 
uniformly colored wall will look uniform to a normal perceiver, but a color blind 
perceiver can see a multicolored wall as similarly  uniform in color. Doesn’t this mean 
that it is more right  to say  that the phenomenal character of a given state is partly 
determined by the object, and partly by the capacities? Both seem to phenomenally 
determine the character of one's state insofar as varying either changes the state's 
phenomenology. If so, then this raises a problem for describing perceptual contact using 
the language of phenomenal determination. If a perceiver is placed in contact with an 
object just in case the object's presence phenomenally  determines his state by  making a 
difference to it, then either we should also add that we are in perceptual contact with our 
capacities since they phenomenally  determine our state, or else we should admit that the 
language of phenomenal determination does not capture what is distinctive about 
perceptual contact. Since saying we are in perceptual contact with our capacities seems 
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counterintuitive, we should opt for the alternative. The language of phenomenal 
determination needs further precisification to sufficiently capture what is significant 
about perceptual contact. 
 In response we can draw a distinction between two forms of determination, 
enabling and constitutive determinations. These notions are nicely clarified by using a 
metaphor: Consider a theatrical performance in which an actress has just been presented. 
There are two ways in which she could have been presented. One way is for an 
announcer to come on stage and present her. She might begin by talking about her, 
describing her, saying that she is about come on stage, point at  her behind the curtains, 
and so on. Another way  is to for the actress herself to show up on stage. Now she is 
presented by being herself there; being present. She walks onto the stage rather than 
simply  being announced. When the relationalist  talks about objects being presented to the 
perceiver, he has the second picture in mind. The object itself is not merely announced 
(as it might be by some mental contents conveyed to the subject), it itself shows up and 
we are in contact with it and its various properties.
 But now turn to the role of the stage. The stage is the place where the presentation 
of the actress takes place. The difference in the roles of the actress and the stage in the 
theatrical metaphor illustrates the respectively  different roles of constitutive and enabling 
determinations in perceptual states. While the stage is the enabling condition or medium 
of presentation for the actress, the actress herself is the constitutive condition that 
determines the presentation. Her being there, on stage, constitutes the presentation. But 
the medium, the stage, enables her presence more or less conducively. The stage may be 
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badly  lit or well lit, have poor audio equipment or good equipment, be spacious or not, 
etc.. In each case the actress herself is presented, but what changes is the extent to which 
she and her properties are revealed to us. How well we see her, hear her, which features 
of her are visible at all depends on the stage. Still, it  is her who is constitutive of the 
presentation.
 The relationalist view can be explained with this metaphor. First, the object is 
itself present. It is not merely announced (e.g. through some mental content), but itself 
there. The object constitutively  determines the state’s character. But the state is also made 
possible by  various enabling conditions which set the stage for the object. These range 
from the processing taking place in the subject, to the adequacy of the lighting for vision, 
the wave medium for sounds, and so on. If these conditions fail to obtain, it will be like 
the stage with no audio equipment, or lights, etc. One then fails to be in perceptual 
contact with worldly  objects, and so fails to be in a perceptual state. If the conditions 
obtain, they can also obtain to varying degrees. They  will all place us in contact with the 
object, but they  will reveal more or less of it. For instance, the colorblind person sees less 
of the wall’s features than a person with normal human vision, and the person with bad 
eyesight sees less of the wall’s boundaries than does a person with good eyesight.
 Despite the range of these conditions, not all cases of mediation are acceptable. 
Just as the actresses does not show up if the curtain between her and us fails to go up, or 
if she is occluded behind a cardboard cutout of herself, so some mediating conditions can 
simply  cut off our perceptual contact. Since the relationalist is committed to saying that 
perceptual states always involve contact, she must deny these sorts of mediating 
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conditions. For the relationalist, when such mediating conditions obtain, we are simply 
not in a perceptual state. So, to consider the details of this more carefully, we can turn to 
John Foster’s (2000) useful discussion of different mediating or enabling conditions.
 Foster’s aim is to defend idealism as a view of perception, and as such is also 
interested in direct contact (in his case, with mind-dependent objects). Foster tries to 
capture what I calling perceptual contact with what he calls the “φ-terminal” relation. To 
explain the directness of the φ-terminal relation, he consider two types of mediation, 
perceptual and psychological, that might occur when one has a perceptual experience. For 
perceptual mediation, he writes:
It often happens that the perceiving of one thing is wholly channelled through the 
perceiving of another. This occurs when, for some subject S, time t, and items x 
and y, (1) S perceives x at t; (2) S perceives y at t; (3) S's perceiving of x at t 
breaks down into (is constituted by the combination of) his perceiving of y at t 
and certain additional facts; and (4) these additional facts do not involve anything 
further about S’s perceptual condition at t (anything over and above what is 
already covered by  S's perceiving of y). In other words, in combining with the 
fact of S's perceiving of y, they do not add further perceptual facts, about S at  t, to 
the constitutive base.20
For psychological mediation, he adds:
…philosophers who agree that φ-terminal perceiving is not subject to any further 
form of perceptual mediation, may still differ over whether it  is subject to 
mediation in a broader sense, and this difference of view can also be represented 
as an issue between a kind of direct realism and a kind of representative 
theory[….L]et us say that S's perceiving of x at t is psychologically mediated by 
his being in Σ if and only  if (1) Σ is a psychological state; (2) Σ is not, in itself, x-
perceptive (i.e. being in Σ does not, on its own, logically suffice to put one in 
perceptual contact with x); (3) S's perceiving of x at t  breaks down into his being 
in Σ at t and certain additional facts; and (4) these additional facts do not involve 
anything further about S's psychological condition at t (anything over and above 
what is already  covered by  S's being in Σ). In other words, in combining with the 
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20 Foster 2000 p.4
fact of S's being in Σ, they  do not add any further psychological facts, about S at t, 
to the constitutive base.21
 We can assess these types of mediation to get clearer on how they  stand with 
perceptual contact. First consider perceptual mediation. If x is perceptually mediated by 
y, then the subject  perceives y. Under the conditions, the perception of y amounts to a 
perception of x without any additional perceptual facts about the subject coming into 
play. Whether this sort of mediation problematizes contact depends on the further facts. 
For instance, if the fact  is that x is a part of y, then this will not affect contact. Consider 
touching a surface which is part of the wall. Here the state puts us in contact with the 
surface. But the surface is part  of the wall, so the state also puts us in contact with the 
wall. By  contrast, if x is not a part of y, then there will be no perceptual contact with y, 
only with x. These are cases which Dretske (1969) calls secondary  (epistemic) seeing and 
which I above called cases of indirect contact. In such cases one perceives one thing, for 
instance smoke, and in doing so counts as having perceived the fire, but only indirectly.
 Psychological mediation is more difficult to assess because it breaks down into a 
variety of cases which Foster does not differentiate (although his discussion throughout 
the book addresses many of these). This is because Foster defines the psychological state 
Σ negatively, as not procuring perceptual contact with x. So any state that meets that 
condition will count as a psychological state. In this case even a state with a perception-
like phenomenal character will count as psychological if its character is not determined 
by the presence of the object. Of course it may also lack a phenomenology. This allows 
us to differentiate at least four types of mediating psychological states:
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1- States with phenomenal characters that are indistinguishable from states which 
procure contact with the object, O.
2- States that are introspectively or epistemically indistinguishable even if not 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from states which procure contact with O. 
3- States with phenomenal characters that are distinguishable from states which 
procure contact with O .
4- States with no phenomenal character and which are introspectively or 
epistemically distinguishable from experiences which procure contact with O.
The first two cases are indistinguishable from contact with O even though they do not 
constitute such contact. In the first, Σ’s character is indistinguishable because there is an 
appearance of O when there is no O present to do the appearing. This is the sort of state 
that a qualia theorist might  posit. Whether there is a red cube to be seen or not, one’s state 
can have qualia arranged red cube-wise. Regardless of how discerning S is, she will not 
be able distinguish her red cube qualia state from a state involving contact with a red 
cube. In the second case, Σ’s  phenomenal character is different from a case of contact, 
but cognitive or otherwise non-perceptual features make S incapable of differentiating her 
state from one of contact. The failure here is merely epistemic and not phenomenal. 
Different conditions, as when the subject is more attentive, has more background 
knowledge, etc., would reveal a distinction in the phenomenal characters. The third and 
fourth cases can be distinguished from contact with O. The difference between them lies 
in their intrinsic characters. The first has a phenomenal character, the second does not.22
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phenomenological indistinguishable or distinguishable even when they are not.
 How do these different  sorts of mediation affect perceptual contact and thus 
relationalism? It should be clear that mediation through a state of the first  type is 
incompatible with contact. The reason is that a perceptual state which was mediated in 
this way would, in effect, violate the essential role the worldly object plays in relational 
views. If the phenomenal character remains stable regardless of the object’s presence or 
absence, then the mediating state  blocks our contact with the object, and replaces it with 
something else. Returning to our theatre metaphor, this would be like the actress being 
hidden behind a cutout of herself. Whether she is behind the cutout or not makes no 
difference to anyone observing the stage. She will continue to look as if she is there 
because of the cutout. In that sense, her role is explanatorily screened off.23 
 What about the second sort of mediation? Here the issue is a little more 
complicated requiring that we clearly maintain the distinction between our access to a 
state’s character, and the state’s character itself. On the one hand, it is clear that there is 
no worry about the state blocking our contact with the object. The object continues to 
determine the character of the state. What the object does not do, however, is register for 
the perceiver. Whether the object is there or not, the perceiver continues to think it is 
there. Still, this type of mediation is compatible with contact. Contact is compatible with 
the perceiver’s failure to register that contact, just as the actress’s presence does not 
depend on the attentiveness of her audience. 
 The third case is the one apt for the case of touch above. In this case, contact is 
mediated by a state which, alone, is insufficient for contact or belief that one is in contact. 
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Yet this state mediates contact and it  does so by  having its own phenomenal character. 
Consider touching the wall again. One’s hand feels some way to the perceiver as he 
touches the wall. The wall too feels some way. But there is no temptation to say  that one 
has an experience of either one’s hand or the wall, but not both. Perceptual states 
regularly put us in contact with more than one perceptible object, and in this case, one has 
an interoceptive sense of the pressure on own’s hand and an exteroceptive sense of the 
wall and its features. So one has a perceptual state of both one’s hand and the wall. 
Moreover, if one lost one’s interoceptive sense of the hand, one would also lose the 
exteroceptive sense of the wall. So although the sense of one’s hand mediates the feel of 
the wall, it does not  violate perceptual contact with the wall. Being a creature with a hand 
is associated with particular phenomenal states, but these states, even if they are 
necessary  for contact with a given object, are not also sufficient for it, or even sufficient 
for the belief that one is making such contact. Returning to the metaphor, we might say 
that this case is like that  of the stage. The lit stage shows, but we do not  mistake the stage 
for the actress on the stage. Such cases do not involve a blocking of contact, but an 
addition of contact.24
 The final case is also one that does not violate contact because it  neither has a 
phenomenology, nor makes one think it does. An example of such a state might be a sub-
personal brain state necessary for achieving perceptual contact while not itself providing 
a phenomenal contribution. Nevertheless states like this can also determine the 
phenomenal character of an state because they enable that state. Here are two more 
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can feel our hand)
examples of such states: It may be argued that one cannot perceive a cat as a cat without 
possessing the concept cat. If so, then possession of that concept is an enabling condition 
for the perception of a cat, but possessing the concept is (at least  arguably) not  a state 
with phenomenal character. Now take the condition of color blindness. When this 
condition does not obtain, S can perceive a partly red and partly green wall as having two 
distinct colors. When it obtains, the wall has a homogenous color. Not being color blind 
therefore an enabling condition for seeing two distinct colors, but it  is not a 
phenomenally conscious condition. With our above metaphor, we might say - for instance 
- that the ropes that hold back the stage’s curtain are enabling conditions of this sort, 
since they need to hold back the curtain for the actress to show up, but are not visible to 
anyone watching the presentation. 
 We should now have a better sense of how perceptual contact stands in 
relationship  to mediation. Contact with an object does not  imply that the experience is not 
mediated, it merely excludes some types of mediation. Unacceptable forms are ones that 
block perceptual contact. They  have a phenomenal character that is object independent in 
the sense of making the presence or absence of the object irrelevant to the character of the 
state. Relationalists have described this sort of mediating state that blocks contact as one 
that explanatorily screens off the role of the object, and I will follow them in this. 
Keeping the screening off worry  in mind is a useful way to think about the inappropriate 
forms of mediation because it highlights that  the object has a necessary explanatory  role 
for the relationalist. So regardless of whether one accepts pure or impure relationalism, 
the constituents of a perceptual state cannot explanatorily screen off the role of the object. 
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By contrast to such unacceptable cases there are acceptable forms of mediation that don’t 
jeopardize the object's role. These include unconscious states, but also states or other 
features that make their own phenomenological contribution where that contribution is 
different from that of the object being perceived.
1.5 Mediation, Intentionalism, and Impure Relationalism
 Although relationalists have often admitted that perceptual states have enabling 
conditions that mediate world-contact in various ways, and moreover have highlighted 
the screening off worry, they have not always fully clarified the acceptable types of 
mediation. The above discussion has attempted to remedy this, and from this we can 
make three points relating mediation to intentionalism and impure relationalism.
 First, outlining these types of mediation allows us to put aside one apparent 
dispute between relational and intentionalist views; that concerning perceptual contents. 
Much ink has been spilt on the question of whether relationalists can accept perceptual 
contents or not (e.g. See Siegel 2012 and Pautz 2011). With the proliferation of content 
types, and the different ways different intentionalists understand perceptual contents, it 
can be an unwieldy task to say which types of content if any are innocuous for 
relationalism. With a clarification of acceptable forms of mediation, relationalists can 
give an easier answer. Any perceptual contents that do not screen off the role of the object 
are acceptable in principle. This means that if possessing a particular content is not by 
itself sufficient for the perceptual phenomenal character of the state, then that form of 
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content is acceptable. This is why  the debate between relationalists and intentionalists is 
not about mental contents. 
 Second, a clearer understanding of mediation helps us evaluate singular contents 
as a means of capturing the relationalist insight. Some intentionalists e.g. Schellenberg 
(2010) and Tye (2011) are moved by relationalist arguments, but at the same time do not 
wish to let go of the various benefits procured by intentionalism. By way  of marrying the 
views, they have appealed to singular contents of various types as a way of capturing 
what is right about the relational view. While these views seem like the relational view, 
particularly in veridical cases, they in fact commit to an unacceptable form of mediation. 
This is clear when considering how the views respond to cases of misperception. To take 
an example, we can consider Schellenberg (2010)'s Fregean content view which accounts 
for the relationality of perceptual states without having to resort to what Schellenberg 
calls “austere relationalism”. 
 Schellenberg argues that her view successfully gives metaphysical and 
explanatory  priority  to veridical perceptual states, as well as giving an account of the 
relationality of such states, without sacrificing representationalism.25  She argues that 
perceptual experiences should be understood in terms of representational states with a 
Fregean content. Fregean contents on her view play the two roles Frege assigned to 
senses. The first is to provide cognitive significance, the second to determine reference.26 
The first role, on her view, is played by the mode of presentation, the second by the 
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object or property presented. She describes the content of perceptual experience as 
follows  
On the suggested view, the content of experience is constituted by concepts that 
refer to objects and property-instances. On the notion of concepts in play, 
concepts cannot be analyzed independently  of analyzing what it means to possess 
a concept. For the present purposes, it will suffice to characterize what it means to 
possess a concept as having the ability to refer to the external, mind-independent 
objects or property-instances that the concept is of. This ability involves among 
other things being able to discriminate between the things that fall under the 
concept and those that do not.27
So, in being in a perceptual state, Schellenberg says that the perceiver deploys a 
representational content constituted by a Fregean concept to picks out the relevant 
objects. A token experience is then a matter of deploying that concept “in a sensory 
mode”, where that deployment can be identified with the phenomenology of the state.28 
Since the concept is essentially  related to an object that it picks out, Schellenberg argues 
that this allows her to account for the relational aspect of perceptual states. This is what 
makes her view object-dependent as a relational view would have it. At the same time, 
one can deploy a concept while failing to pick out a referent, so concepts are not 
radically object-dependent as relational views would have it. She writes “The 
phenomenology of experience can be identified with employing concepts…[and]…
Concepts can be employed even if they fail to refer”29. 
 The problem with the view, from a relationalist perspective, is that it does not give 
objects a constitutive role in determining the state's phenomenology. This is because that 
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job is done by the deployment of concepts. Deploying concepts, whether they are empty 
or not, gives the state its full phenomenal character. And while this allows the view to 
avoid worries about the indiscriminability  of hallucinations and perceptions, it does so 
only at the cost of having the deployment of the concepts do the whole phenomenal job. 
In the terminology adopted above, Schellenberg’s account is one on which the mediating 
condition - the possession and deployment of the concept - entirely constitutively 
determines the phenomenal character. Moreover, this determination is of a type that is 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from procuring world-contact, and so explanatorily 
screens off the role of the object. 
 Of course this is not to say that Schellenberg is wrong in saying that her view 
achieves object dependency. Her view is object dependent insofar as her Fregean contents 
depend on possessing and deploying concepts that are essentially referential in character, 
and thus essentially tied to objects in the world. This makes for a tight relationship 
between the constitutive condition (the deployment of the concept in a sensory mode) and 
the objects, but this is not as the same as having the objects be what is constitutive of 
perceptual phenomenology. On Schellenberg’s view the state is object dependent through 
the content’s object dependence, where that object dependence only go as far as the 
employment of the concept, without phenomenally registering the deployment’s failure or 
success. For the view to be genuinely relational, it would have to go further. The state's 
phenomenology should depend on both the deployment and its success, because the 
deployment alone cannot have the requisite phenomenal impact. Of course Schellenberg 
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can accept that the presence of the object is required, but this would undermine her idea 
that there is a phenomenal common factor. 
 Finally, the discussion of mediation explains how we should understand impure 
relationalism. As I described it, the view requires that the perceiver be in perceptual 
contact with the worldly object, but where that contact is not alone sufficient for being in 
a perceptual state. If other constituents are part of the state, then one worry is that they 
will introduce features into the state that make world-contact irrelevant  to the state's 
phenomenology. To avoid this, whatever else enters the constitution of perceptual states 
must not undermine the object's role in the state. By explaining the forms of mediation 
that are acceptable, we give a principled way of assessing whether the object's role is 
compromised, and so a principled way of determining what other constituents are 
acceptable on impure views.
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Chapter 2
Two Problems of Veridical 
Perception
 In the last chapter I elaborated on the core commitment of relational views and 
discussed various relationalist proposals in the literature. As we saw, relationalism can 
take one of four forms, two of which amount to accepting relationalism as the correct 
theory  of perception. Those were pure relational views on which perceptual states are 
identified with the state of being in world-contact, and impure views on which world-
contact is a necessary but insufficient constituent of the state (despite being a constituent 
whose phenomenal contribution cannot be undermined by whatever else enters into the 
state’s constitution). Relational views are therefore a cohesive family of views focusing 
on the idea of perceptual contact. Are these views also plausible? In this chapter I argue 
that they are. I do this by focusing on the sufficiency worry  I presented in the 
introduction, which states that it is unclear whether the worldly objects we are in 
perceptual contact with sufficiently characterize a state's phenomenology.
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2.1 Problems of Under- and Over-Determining Phenomenal Character
 Does perceptual contact with objects tell us what the perceptual phenomenal 
character of a state is like? There are two reasons to think the answer is no. Both are 
challenges concerning the relationship between phenomenal character and object-
dependence, and both have appeared under various guises in the literature. According to 
these challenges, in one way, the phenomenology of a perceptual state is underdetermined 
by the relational view, and in another way, it is overdetermined. Consider:
 Perceptual State Underdetermination: Specifying the object perceived 
 underdetermines how things appear to the perceiver, and so underdetermines the 
 phenomenal character of the state. Take looking at Tom the cat who is sitting still. 
 Now consider looking at Tom from a different angle, under a different light, or 
 while intoxicated. Tom will appear different, even though he is still there, and still 
 completely still. Relationalism thus individuates perceptual states through too 
 coarse grained a conception of phenomenal character; phenomenal differences we 
 want to have show up don’t show up.
 Perceptual State Overdetermination: On the face of it, one can be in 
 phenomenally indistinguishable perceptual states even when related to a different 
 object. For instance consider two states, one of being in perceptual contact with 
 Tom, another of being in perceptual contact with Tom’s robot duplicate Tim. The 
 state of perceiving Tom and the state of perceiving Tim are not phenomenally 
 different when Tim is in the exact same posture as Tom. Yet since relationalism 
 individuates perceptual states by their objects, it is committed to claiming that 
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 these two states are phenomenally different since they are of two different objects. 
 So relationalism overdetermines the phenomenal character of the perceptual state; 
 it seems that non-phenomenal differences are individuating the perceptual state. 
 The first  worry has been dealt with in relationalist  discussions of looks, 
appearances, or seemings;30  the second in discussions of phenomenal 
indistinguishability.31  Both of these are serious worries about relationalism. If the 
phenomenology of a state is really underdetermined by perceptual contact, then pure 
relationalism is false. This is because the view attempts to individuate states exclusively 
by appeal to perceptual contact, and perceptual contact simply does not give us a 
sufficiently fine-grained phenomenology. Impure relationalism does not fare much better. 
Since perceptual contact can't do the needed phenomenological work, impure 
relationalism has to appeal to the constituents other than the perceptual contact relation. 
But this raises a question about the phenomenological reasons, if any, for insisting on the 
world-contact commitment. If it is the other non-relational constituents that explain the 
way things appear, then why think contact with objects is a necessary constituent of the 
state at all?
 This worry is aggravated by considering the second overdetermination problem. 
This latter worry seems to show that  contact with an object is not just irrelevant for 
specifying the phenomenal character of the state, but  that it in fact gets in the way of such 
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description of what a subject perceives, rather than explaining how things appear to her in the experience. The problem is that if all the relational view mentions 
is that a subject is perceptually aware of a certain objects and its properties, it is unclear how the view can account for the fact that perceptual experience always 
seems to involve objects appearing some way to the perceiver.” And Brewer writes: “An immediate objection to the proposal that the mind-independent physical 
objects… themselves constitute its direct objects in this early modern sense is that there can be quite different perceptual experiences - had by the same subject or 
by different subjects - with identical such physical direct object” (chapter 5).
31 For instance, see Brewer 2011 and Genone 2013.
a specification. It  does so by  overdetermining phenomenal characters such that apparently 
indistinguishable characters turn out to be distinguishable. This is so because perceptual 
states are individuated by their phenomenal characters. But phenomenal characters on the 
relational view are individuated by  their objects. So if two states are of different objects, 
they  are necessarily states with different characters regardless of the fact that the 
characters are phenomenologically indistinguishable. Once again, the commitment to 
perceptual contact seems to work against the plausibility of relationalism. 
 These two problems compound to raise a final worry about relational views. If the 
relationalist understands perceptual states in a way where the notion of phenomenal 
character is both under- and overdetermined, then either the relationalist does not really 
grasp what a phenomenal character is, or else she means to be proposing a different 
criterion for the individuation of perceptual states. On the more charitable reading we 
might rightly say  that  relationalism is a change of topic rather than an alternative to 
current theories of perceptual states. Perhaps this is a significant new topic, but this still 
means that relationalism is not an alternative to views like intentionalism.32  To correct 
this possible misimpression, the relationalist has to respond to the under and 
overdetermination worries. 
 In the following sections I offer a clear response to each worry before proceeding 
to cases of misperception that occupy the remainder of this project. My discussion will 
differ from previous discussions in the literature in a few ways. First, in responding to the 
underdetermination worry I will attempt to spell out clearly what other relationalists have 
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have a different emphasis than phenomenal character. 
only glossed. There are various constituents that modify perceptual contact, and together 
these give the view its phenomenologically robust response to the underdetermination 
worry. I describe
 each proposed constituent that affects how objects appear to us, and show that the 
constituent is compatible with a purely relational construal of perceptual states. For the 
second worry, I argue that relationalists can indeed accept the phenomenal 
indistinguishability  of states of perceiving different objects. The difference is that for 
relationalists, this phenomenological indistinguishability  derives at least partly  from the 
objects perceived, not the experience itself. In total, there are three ways in which 
experiences resemble one another, and each of these ways derives either wholly or partly 
from the objects we are related to. In the final section, I turn to a deployment of the 
proposed solution to explain cases of illusion and explain how their character can be 
misleading or deceptive.   
 
2.2 Underdetermination and the Features of Perceptual Contact
 Phenomenal character is a property of perceptual states, but relationalists think 
that this property  is individuated, at  least partly  (i.e. in impure relationalism), by factors 
that are external to the state and perceiver. Specifically, they  maintain that this character 
is one in which the worldly objects appear some way to the perceiver. So one way to 
think of this character is that it  is solely (in pure relationalism) or primarily (in impure 
relationalism) constituted by  appearances. Appearances, however, are a controversial 
category. Some views take appearances to be entirely mind-dependent, others treat them 
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as partly mind-dependent, and yet others treat them as mind-independent but distinct 
from the objects which they  are appearances of.33  Relationalists disagree or should 
disagree with all these construals. Instead, relationalists should argue that appearances are 
objective properties of worldly objects.34 
 One way of understanding how the relationalist sees the relation between 
appearances and objects is by analogy to one of two construals of Frege's sense/reference 
distinction. A first construal treats senses as independent from their referents in the sense 
that a sense can exist in the absence of its referent. On this construal, the sense/reference 
distinction helps explain how  we can talk about nonexistent things. But another 
construal, endorsed by  Evans (1982) and McDowell (1984, 1986), takes senses to depend 
on their referents such that there can be no sense without reference. On this view the 
sense/reference distinction cannot help  with talking about  nonexistents. The relationalist 
understands appearances in a way similar to this second construal of senses: there can be 
no appearances without objects that do the appearing (and correspondingly, as we will 
see, this construal cannot help the relationalist account for appearances when there is no 
object appearing). 
 Provided appearances depend on their objects as senses depend on their referents, 
how should we understand how the appearances of objects and the objects themselves 
differ? A good place to start is by  looking at how different relationalists have handled the 
underdetermination worry. Two features that emerge repeatedly are the appeals to a third 
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dispositions of objects, but where they are dispositions to cause various experiences in perceivers, and an example of the last type is Johnston’s (2004) sensory 
profile view, on which sensory profiles are - at least in the case of hallucinations - constituted by uninstantiated properties and are thus mind-independent, and 
independent of any objects. For more on this, see Genone 2013 section 4.
34 Indeed many relationalists maintain some variant of this view. Three examples are Martin 2010, Brewer 2011, and Genone 2013.
relatum that modifies the original perceptual contact relation by  introducing an 
intensional element,35  and the listing of features that  belong under this relatum. For 
instance, Campbell writes “…to specify the phenomenal content of an experience, it is 
not enough merely to say what it is that is being experienced and by whom. Experience, 
on the Relational view, is not a two-place relation…it is a three-place relation between 
the perceiver, the scene perceived, and the point of view from which it is perceived. If we 
had only the two-place relation… that would not allow us to differentiate an object being 
touched from an object being seen, or an object  being viewed from one angle from the 
same object being viewed from another angle.”36 In a similar vein, Genone writes “[o]n 
the relational view, then, the way things are in a subject’s environment, along with 
attention and point of view, constitute her perception experience.”37  And Brewer 
“perceptual experience is a matter of a person’s conscious acquaintance with various 
mind-independent physical objects from a given spatiotemporal point of view, in a 
particular sense modality and in certain specific circumstances of perception (such as 
lighting conditions in the case of vision). These factors effectively conjoin to constitute a 
third relatum of the relation of conscious acquaintance…”38. Here, Campbell interprets 
“point of view” as including features like sense modality, and spatiotemporal perspective. 
Genone cites attention and point of view but is not clear on whether point of view is 
meant to be taken spatiotemporally  or metaphorically. And Brewer cites spatiotemporal 
48
35 For instance, see Genone 2013.
36 Campbell 2011 p48
37 Genone 2013 p.16
38 Brewer Ch5, p.6
perspective, sense modality, and perceptual circumstances such as lighting conditions, as 
belonging in the third relatum. 
 There are important questions we can raise about  the features cited by these 
authors. First, since these features emerge as lists made in passing, it is unclear whether 
the lists are meant to be exhaustive or a mere sample. Second, it is unclear whether the 
different views agree on the features but cite them selectively, or if there is some 
substantive disagreement on what the features are. Finally, it is unclear whether there are 
significant differences amongst these features provided we choose to accept them all. Do 
they  all fit into the third relatum? Or could sense modality, for instance, be considered a 
relatum different from spatiotemporal perspective or attention, such that perceptual 
contact becomes more than a three place relation? The worry  is that these features might 
affect perceptual contact in different ways, with some being acceptable on more 
restrictive views like pure relationalism, with others being acceptable only to impure 
relationalists. More troublesome is the possibility  that some of these features may 
altogether be unacceptable because they introduce a problematic form of mediation. If 
they  do, but are necessary  for understanding appearances and thus solving the 
underdetermination worry, then  relationalism will turn out false, even in veridical cases.
 Answering these questions should be of central interest to both relationalists and 
their opponents. To provide an answer we should begin by noting that little is gained 
from simply citing listing feature, or by  saying that they belong under a third relatum. 
What we want to know is how each feature helps with the underdetermination worry, and 
how each feature is compatible with the relationalist's view. Fish (2009), in particular, 
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does a good job of doing this. He attempts an exhaustive list which includes "the 
distribution of objects and properties in the environment, the subject’s position in/
perspective on that environment, the nature of vision in general and the idiosyncrasies of 
the subject’s visual system, the current distribution of the subject’s attentional resources, 
and the subject’s conceptual resources".39 This is a good list  to begin with, and what I 
would like to do is bolster Fish’s discussion by providing more fine grained distinctions 
applicable to all perceptual states (rather than just visual states) while elaborating on the 
phenomenological role played by each feature before finally demonstrating the 
compatibility of the feature with relationalism. As I read Fish’s list, perceptual contact 
must be understood in light of four basic types of features:
(1) Sensory features of the perceptual contact relation,
(2) Spatial features determining the perceptual contact relation,
(3) Situational features affecting objects and perceivers, 
(4) Cognitive features affecting a perceptual state’s phenomenology.
The first  two of these features are responsible for one type of phenomenological 
contribution, and the latter two are responsible for two sorts of contribution each. Of 
these, I will argue that  the first three features are clearly compatible with pure 
relationalism. By contrast, the last   feature introduce some complications that might 
require a retreat to impure relationalism depending on one's further philosophical 
commitments. Despite this, it  is far from clear that pure relationalism is to be rejected. 
50
39 Fish 2008 p.75
The theses incompatible with the view are at least as controversial as pure relationalism, 
and need to be thoroughly defended before pure relationalism is declared false. 
2.3 Sensorial Modifications of Perceptual Contact
Relationalists maintain that perceptual contact is a relation obtaining between us and the 
objects of the world, where standing in that  relation reveals the objects as being some 
way. But perceptual contact is plausibly taken to be a determinable relation rather than a 
determinate one. Although one can be in direct perceptual contact with a wall, they can 
only be so in a  modality or sense-specific way. One is either seeing the wall, smelling it, 
touching it, or perhaps some combination of these; one is never simply in “perceptual 
contact” with the wall. This also means that one can maintain different sorts of contact. If 
I put my hand on the wall while looking at it, I am in perceptual contact with the wall in 
two ways. I can switch between these ways by closing my eyes while continuing to touch 
the wall, or by moving my hand away while continuing to look at the wall. So it is 
plausibly thought that perceptual contact  becomes determinate only  when sensorially 
specified. In this section I will elaborate on the different sensory  ways we can be in 
perceptual contact and how this affects perceptual phenomenology. I will also ask 
whether appealing to this sort of determination undermines the relationalist's core 
commitments. Each sense modality is associated with its own distinctive phenomenology. 
One might see the right angle corner of the wall or feel it, in each case learning of the 
wall's properties, but in each case the phenomenology of the state differs because the 
tactile and visual appearances of the wall differ. The reasons for these differences 
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depends on how one understands the differences between the different senses.40 Since it 
is possible that some characterizations of the senses are incompatible with relationalism, I 
will start  by evaluating whether relationalism is compatible with each of the candidate 
views.
 A first option is to individuate a sense by its own distinctive phenomenal 
character. In this case one will think that there is a distinctively visual phenomenology, or 
a phenomenology distinctive to visual creatures, and correspondingly different 
phenomenologies for the different senses. Alternatively, one might adopt a 
representational criterion, arguing that the senses differ  phenomenologically  because 
they  represent different pieces of information about the objects in the environment. On 
this view seeing the wall and touching it feel different because sight’s phenomenology is 
determined by  the fact that vision tracks the lit surfaces of objects, while touch’s 
phenomenology is determined by  the fact that it tracks (amongst other things) the 
physical resistance that objects offer. A third option is to explain sensory differences by 
appeal to some physical rather than experiential criterion. Two examples are views that 
individuate the senses by the proximal stimulus received, and those that individuate by 
appeal to sense-organs. Finally, one can accept a hybrid view on which one or more of 
these criteria individuate a given sense.41 
 Regardless of the view one accepts, sensorially modifying perceptual contact  does 
not lead to an inappropriate form of mediation. On the phenomenological view, a 
particular sense is associated with a particular phenomenology. This means that the 
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40 For a detailed discussion, see the introduction in Macpherson 2011.
41 Macpherson 2011 discusses all of these in detail. She herself adopts a hybrid conception.
perceptual contact  is mediated by  a sensory state with its own distinctive phenomenology 
(the state of seeing, hearing, etc). However since the phenomenology  of seeing, or the 
phenomenology of being a sighted creature, is a phenomenology that is distinguishable 
from the phenomenology of seeing a particular object, the form of mediation introduced 
is harmless. Being a visual creature simply does not explanatorily screen off the worldly 
object's role in the perceptual state. If the relationalist adopts this view, she will do so by 
arguing that the perceptual contact relation is adverbially modified such that the a 
perceiver is in perceptual contact with the object visually/auditorily/etc. This allows the 
different senses to track the very same object while doing so in a variety of ways. 
 Similar comments apply to the sensory organ view. If the sensory  organ is one we 
are consciously aware of in perceiving (this is plausible in at least some cases, for 
instance with the sense of touch where feeling the object is accompanied by feeling one's 
hand), we again need to consider the screening off worry. But the worry is again 
misplaced because possessing a particular sensory organ is distinguishable from the 
object perceived by that organ even when the mediating organ is associated with its own 
(e.g. “hand having” or “nose having”) phenomenology. 
 The proximal stimulus and representational views are harmless for two different 
reasons. On the proximal stimulus view, the differences between the senses depends on 
features that are not  conscious. Since we are not conscious of the proximal stimulus the 
mediation introduced lacks a phenomenology and is therefore harmless. By contrast to all 
these views, the representational view introduces no mediation at all because all the 
different senses do is to convey different features of the external world. This amounts to 
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saying saying we are placed in contact with different properties of objects when we 
perceive with our different senses, much as we are placed in contact  with different 
properties of an object  when we perceiver different parts using the same sense. As such, 
there is no mediation introduced. Since the representational view is the last view we need 
to consider, we should now be able to see that appealing to the senses to solve the 
underdetermination worry, regardless of the view of the sense one adopts, is compatible 
with relationalism. Moreover, since no appeal is made to anything external to the 
perceptual contact relation, appealing to the senses is also compatible with the more 
stringent pure relationalism.
 We can now turn to the way in which the the senses allow for a more fine-grained 
phenomenology. To describe their phenomenal contribution I suggest  using three related 
concepts to help  us systematize the sensory contribution. First, their is the spatial scope 
of a sense. Second, its spatial resolution. And finally, there is its object scope. 
 The spatial scope of a sense describes the spatial distances which a sense reveals 
to the perceiver from the center point where the perceiver is located. We can envision a 
sense's scope by  appealing to a three dimensional coordinate system such as the spherical 
coordinate system.  The center point is the perceiver’s body (or perhaps head). From that 
center, the spatial scope is the extent to which the sense reveals the surrounding space on 
the x, y, and z axes. The space revealed will be in front of and behind the perceiver, to her 
left and right, and above and below her. Some parts of this space will be closer to the 
subject, as one's glasses or a drop of liquid in one's eyes, and some parts will be more 
distant, as the skies are for us. Despite this differences, everything within the scope is 
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seen. The result is a “bubble” around the center point which demarcates the spatial scope 
of the sense and thus how much the sense reveals. A few examples help  make this clearer: 
Vision has the largest scope of the human senses. We are able to see much further into 
space then we are able to hear, smell, taste or touch. However the distance seen is limited 
to the space in front of the perceiver. So although vision has the longest scope, it is not as 
panoramic as, for instance, auditory perception. When we hear we get a maximally 
panoramic spatial scope in the sense that we hear everything that surrounds us: we hear 
what is below and above us, what is to our left and right, and ahead of and behind us. The 
same is true of smell and touch, although both are capable of revealing less distance than 
hearing. Finally taste is the sense with the least scope, like touch it requires literal 
contact, and unlike touch, taste only covers the surface of one’s tongue.
 The spatial scope of a sense tells us how much of the environment a sense is 
capable of putting us in contact with, but  it does not tell us how much it does reveal or 
put us in contact with on a given occasion. This is because the senses capacity to reveal 
the features of the surrounding environment can be obstructed by the very objects of the 
surroundings; some things cannot be perceived through. If I am in a box, I cannot see 
outside the box, even if vision is in principle capable of revealing the space outside the 
box. This is, of course, because cardboard surfaces cannot be seen through. Similarly  if I 
am in a sound proof box I will not hear what is outside the box even if in principle it is 
within hearing’s scope. Still, keeping in mind the scope of a sense allows us to determine 
what a perceiver’s experience will be like in a given worldly situation, provided we are 
also aware of those environmental features that could obstruct the sense. Furthermore, 
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spatial scope allows us to keep in mind that perceptual contact is not a relation obtaining 
between a perceiver and a single object. Although we usually think of perception as 
relating us to a single object, this is because we usually  attend to one object, not because 
we perceive one object. Rather, a perceiver is in perceptual contact with a spatial scene 
littered with objects.42 Everything within the scope of the sense can feature in the state, 
provided that it is not occluded by the surrounding items co-perceived.  
 If spatial scope tells us how much space a sense can reveal, spatial resolution tells 
us how much detail of that space is revealed. A good way to see what spatial resolution is 
is to compare two senses with different resolutions. Take the resolutions of our olfactory 
system and our visual system. If while standing still, one starts to smell something, one 
can usually determine the direction that the smell is coming from though one only has a 
rough estimate of that direction and the location of the smell. It arrives from somewhere 
ahead, but it  remains unclear whether the smell is coming from slightly  to the right or 
slightly to the left. In that sense, the resolution of our sense of smell is low, it does not 
give us precise information about the perceived space. By contrast a visual object, a 
speck on the horizon, is not similarly  indeterminately located. It is more clearly to the 
center, to the right, or to the left. Compared to the smell which comes from ahead 
indeterminately, there are several visual locations perceivable within the indeterminate 
place of the smell, each having a color, a shape, etc. So compared to our sense of smell, 
our visual sense has a much higher resolution. It  is more informative about the details of 
a given space. 
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42  That multiple objects can be simultaneously perceived is of course a contingent fact about the way we perceiver. We can imagine creatures with sensory 
scopes that only reveal a single point in space.
 This gives us a comparative way of tracking resolutions. We can tell that smell 
gives a less fine-grained impression of the space than does vision because we can point to 
the location of a visual object in space in a way that is more determinate than an olfactory 
object. The olfactory  object comes “roughly from there” whereas the visual object is 
“exactly here”. An alternative way  of thinking about resolution is to make use of the 
coordinate system we used to describe sensory scope. Within a given scope, we can 
imagine a specific number of points in the covered space. A high resolution gives us 
information about each of these points, a lower one gives us information about clusters of 
points without going into the perceptual details of any given point in a cluster.  
Four additional points are worth making about scope and resolution. First, we have to 
keep  in mind that a sense’s scope and resolution are species relative. For a species, a 
sense has a typical maximal scope and resolution, and that will determine how much 
space and what detail can be perceived. These are contingencies of an organism’s sense, 
and so can differ from species to species, and within a species (depending on how normal 
the functioning of the sense is in a given member). Moreover these contingencies can be 
artificially altered. We use telescopes to expand our visual spatial scope, and microscopes 
to reveal a space at a higher resolution. 
 Second, the scope and resolution of a sense need not be uniform at a time or 
across time. This could be due to features of the sense, other mental features, or the 
environment being sensed. For a change across time, we can consider that as we age our 
hearing can get worse thus lowering its scope. Our vision might also get worse, and this 
lowers its resolution. For differences at a single time, we can consider the fact that objects 
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falling within the center of our visual field are revealed at a higher resolution than objects 
in the periphery because of attention, and that what we touch with our fingers is 
perceived at a higher resolution than what we touch with our arm. These examples are 
due to the sense or other mental features (like attention), but there are other differences 
that are due to the environment. For instance, consider the effects on scope and resolution 
when an object is seen while it is moving really fast, or when it is displayed under bad 
lighting conditions. Each of these affects the sense. The object appears blurry when 
moving quickly, so the resolution at which it is seen is lower. In bad lighting the details 
are less visible and the distances perceived shorter, so both resolution and scope are 
lowered.
 Third, the scope and resolution of a sense determine not only the quantity of 
objects we perceive, but also the types of objects we perceive. This is clear in the case of 
scope where expanding the scope might reveal new spaces filled with new objects e.g. 
looking through a telescope might reveal a new celestial body. With resolution, some 
object types or property types may be too small to see or taste, so higher resolutions can 
reveal the relevant objects and properties e.g. looking through a microscope will reveal 
viruses that are not normally perceivable. These gradations are therefore capable of 
introducing us to new objects in new spaces, or new objects which have existed in a 
given expanse of space. 
 Finally, it could be that some features of the world are in principle outside the 
purview of a sense regardless of its scope or resolution. This is what the object scope of a 
sense tracks. For instance, it may be that regardless of the visual resolution or scope we 
58
have, we can never see smells. We might see the chemicals generating the smells, but the 
smell itself might be specific to the sense of smell. A view that might  take this to be true 
is a view that individuates the senses phenomenologically. In this sense, the senses do not 
just have spatial scope and resolution, but also an object scope. While the object scope 
can vary with spatial scope and resolution, it may be that some objects are simply outside 
the object scope of a given sense and so are in principle inaccessible by it. 
 To summarize this discussion: the perceptual contact relation is plausibly thought 
to be a determinable relation that becomes determinate by being constrained to a sensory 
modality. Regardless of the view of the senses one accepts, the senses do not compromise 
perceptual contact. So both pure and impure relationalism can appeal to the 
phenomenological impact of the senses. The senses contribute to the phenomenology of 
the state by revealing space in different  ways, revealing more or less of the space, at 
higher or lower resolutions, and thus revealing different parts of or objects in space. 
2.4 Spatiality and Perceptual Contact
 Having discussed the phenomenological contribution of the senses, in this section 
I turn to the contribution of the object's spatial characteristics. Since objects have spatial 
properties these properties affect the way  objects appear. Moreover they do so in a 
multitude of ways. By taking into account these factors we are able to describe, and also 
predict, the appearance of a given object. I will highlight three different ways in which 
spatiality affects appearances. None of these appeal to any form of mediation. They are 
rather broadly divided into two types: first, those that involve the object itself. And 
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second, those that involve spatial relations obtaining between the object and the 
perceiver. What follows is an explication of the perceptible effects of spatiality, followed 
by a brief discussion of why they are innocuous to the relational view.
 To begin with, since objects are spatial, they  can be perceived by perceiving some 
of their spatially separated parts. To be perceived, a given part must fall within the 
purview of the perceiver's perceptual apparatus (i.e. within the scopes and resolution of a 
sense) without being occluded. In many cases, the perceiver will see some but not all 
parts. For instance, visually, we usually (with solid opaque objects) see the parts facing us 
but not the parts facing away from us. Thus a single object can appear in multiple ways 
because different parts of it can be perceived. To illustrate this first spatially determined 
factor, consider the variety of phenomenal characters that might result from the 
perception of a Rubik's cube. These characters will depend on the appearance of the cube. 
How the cube appears on any token perceiving (partly, since other factors are involved) 
depends on which side of the cube is being perceived at the time. Perceiving the red side 
will result in an appearance determined by  that side, while perceiving the blue side will 
lead to a different appearance determined by the blue side. A single cube can therefore be 
associated with multiple appearances, and therefore with multiple phenomenal characters. 
This is of course wholly due to the fact that the cube is a spatially extended object, and so 
each of its spatial parts can be perceived at the exclusion of other parts. The way we vary 
these parts is either by  altering the positioning of the cube or the position of the perceiver. 
For instance the red side could be moved to face the perceiver, or the perceiver could 
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move to face the red side. In either case, the phenomenal impact depends wholly on 
which parts of the cube the perceiver ends up in perceptual contact with. 
 A second way in which spatiality alters the the appearance of a perceived object 
depends on where the object is located within the spatial scope of a sense. What 
determines this is the distance between the object and the perceiver, since it is the 
perceiver that sets the center point for the spherical coordinates. To see this contribution 
more clearly, consider the different ways in which one might perceive the cube’s 
unoccluded front side. Since the cube's front side is perceivable as long as it falls within 
the spatial scope of a given sense, there are multiple locations at which the cube may be 
within that scope. The side will be closer if the distance between the object and the 
perceiver is smaller, and the side will be further if the distance between the object and the 
perceiver is bigger. The closer the cube is the bigger the appearance of the unoccluded 
front side, and the further the cube the smaller the appearance. Similarly a sound can be 
closer and thus louder, or further and so quieter. This change in location does not merely 
change the appearance in superficial ways. The cube's side does not merely come to 
occupy  more or less of the visual field, and the sound is not merely louder or quieter. The 
changes are also often changes in how much of the object we can see. This is because 
altering the distance between an object and the perceiver often affects the resolution at 
which an object is perceived. Our distal senses (vision, audition, and olfaction) are able to 
pick up more information at closer distances than further ones. So when the cube's front 
side is closer we can see more of its details than we can when it is further. These of 
course are further changes in the appearances. Like the previous spatial factor, it is 
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significant that these principles are not in any sense subjective. Rather, they are principles 
that are due to the spatial character of the world. We learn about these principles by 
attending to the way we perceive the world, and we may also learn about them in classes, 
as when we are taught perspective in a painting classes.
 A final spatial contribution does not change the parts of the cube that we perceive, 
but rather the location and orientation of the appearance. This once again depends on the 
way the object is spatially  related to the perceiver. For instance, consider a fixed 
appearance of the cube, say its red side that is visible to you. You can be related to the 
very same parts in a multitude of ways. For example, assume that the cube is currently to 
your right. Now consider a mirrored experience. The cube will be to your left. However 
in both cases the very same parts of the cube will show up  to you. Similar comments can 
be made about the cube being seen as above versus being seen as below. These are not 
cases of perceiving a different part of the cube. The difference is not one of seeing parts 
of the cube's left-hand side or right-hand side or its parts that are above or below. You are 
rather perceiving the same parts, but these parts can be differently located in relation to 
you. 
 Related to these mirroring cases are cases involving orientation.  Consider once 
again the red side of the cube appearing in a fixed way. Now consider lying down while 
continuing to look at that side. The same side will be oriented differently. The top-most 
edge will now be the left-most edge. Changing your orientation further, for instance 
looking at the cube upside down, will now result  in the top-most edge become the 
bottom-most edge. The same effect is achieved if we turn the object on its side or upside 
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down while remaining in a fixed orientation. Such changes in orientation, like the 
mirroring changes above, do not alter the parts you perceive, but they do alter the 
location of those parts in the wider experience. These changes therefore constitute a third 
way in which spatiality affects appearances and thus perceptual phenomenology. 
 It should be clear that  none of these contributions introduce any form of 
mediation into the perceptual contact relation, nor do they introduce any further 
constituents into the perceptual state. Rather, these features derive from the fact that 
perceptual contact is a real relation occurring in space and between spatially  located and 
extended objects. With these spatial phenomenal contributions we are again closer to 
solving the underdetermination worry.  
2.5 Two Different Contributions of the Surroundings43
 The picture we should now have is that of perceptual states placing us in sensory 
contact with objects distributed in space, where that space also contains the perceiver. 
This picture goes some way towards alleviating the underdetermination worry we 
initially raised, but it  also leaves some important phenomenological differences 
unaddressed. Specifically, when we perceive a still object, it  is often the case that the 
object can appear in a variety of guises despite the continued perception by  a single 
sense, and despite the fixed spatial locations of the perceiver and object. Consider the 
following example: Tom the cat, on this occasion, is perceived lying still in an alleyway 
that connects to a busy road. Tom and the perceiver are both perfectly still, yet Tom's 
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43 In this section and the following two I use the terms “surroundings”, “environment”, and “situation” interchangeably. Though these terms are different in 
meaning I will not be concerned with any of the differences. 
appearance can vary in at least two significant different ways. First, the surrounding 
lighting might alter Tom’s appearance. His features may be well lit or not, lit by colored 
lights or not, and so on. Second, Tom's appearance might also change due to the 
juxtaposition of his features against the co-perceived surroundings. For example, a large 
gray truck passing by in Tom’s background might make Tom's specific shade of gray 
more salient because of the contrast  with the grayness of the truck. Tom might also look 
larger or smaller depending on the cats accompanying him in the alleyway; his size will 
be emphasized one way or another relative to the remaining cats. Both these changes in 
Tom's appearance are due to the surroundings of the perceiver and her target  object. But 
both case are different. How so?
 There are at least two ways in which the surrounding environment and its objects 
affects the appearance of a perceived object. The first of these ways is through a direct 
effect on the object. This is because the surroundings of an object have a role to play in 
determining an object's current state. Objects have a variety  of properties that endure 
regardless of the surrounding environment, but some properties of objects are not like 
that. Instead, they are situation-dependent  properties. As we vary the surroundings of an 
object, different situation-dependent properties are manifested by the object  depending on 
the nature of the surroundings. This means that when an object is perceived in different 
surroundings, the perceiver will be related to the object as it manifest different situation-
dependent properties. Since these properties differ, and since some of these properties are 
perceptible, the object's appearance will differ in accordance with the perceptible 
manifest properties. 
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 By contrast to this first direct way in which the surroundings affect the appearance 
of an object, their is a second indirect way in which the appearance may be affected. The 
appearance is indirectly affected in the sense that the surroundings alter the perceiver's 
wider experiential state, and not the the perceived object itself. This, however, can affect 
the phenomenology  of the state if perceptual states are phenomenally holistic, or if there 
are gestalt experiences. The role of the surroundings in such cases has to do with the fact 
that the surroundings are perceived along with the target object (or to put it differently, 
the surroundings fall within the scope of the sense along with the target object). In so 
doing, the surroundings co-determine the phenomenology of the state. Rather than a 
change in the perceived object's appearance, there is a change in the experience of that 
appearance. In this sense, holism affects the appearance of objects indirectly. 
 Although the surroundings have these two distinct phenomenological roles, 
relationalists need only be committed to the first direct role of the surroundings. Here the 
object's environment determines its state, and it is the object in this state that we perceive. 
The second indirect role of the surroundings requires accepting phenomenal holism and 
gestalt experiences as further commitments, and these are not commitments required by 
the relational view. Despite this, it is worth discussing both this latter contribution along 
with the first, as doing so will help demonstrate that even if there are phenomenally 
holistic or gestalt experience, neither stand in the way of a relational view of perception.
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2.6 The Surroundings I: Perceiving the Object in its Current State
 The first phenomenal contribution due to the surroundings occurs through the 
direct influence of the surroundings on the object being perceived. The way an object is 
in its current surroundings affects the state's phenomenology  because the perceiver is in 
contact with the object when it is in its environmentally  determined state. Since (at least) 
some of an object's environmentally  determined properties are perceivable, when we 
encounter the object, its appearance is the appearance of an object in its current state. Of 
course not every feature of an object depends on the surroundings (e.g. the mass of an 
object), but some features do. Such features involve the manifesting of a dispositional 
property  that an object has, and they are manifest only when the object stands in the 
relevant relations to its surroundings. To take an example, a piece of wood has the 
disposition to float in water as one of its intrinsic or environment independent features, 
but the property of floating in water is a property  manifested by the wood only when it is 
in water. The water, in this case, is part of the wood’s surroundings. Conversely, the wood 
is part of the water's surroundings. So when an object is in a given environment, it is in a 
state of manifesting both its environment independent properties as well as manifesting 
various environmentally-triggered dispositions. This state is the current state of the 
object. In being in contact with the object, we perceive it as it  is in its current state. This 
is what makes the object appear a particular way and therefore determines the 
phenomenology in a particular way. 
 Keeping this in mind helps us account for a variety of phenomenal differences. 
Consider perceiving Tom's color. Tom's fur has a certain pigment and this pigment is an 
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intrinsic feature of Tom's fur. When we see Tom, we see the pigment of his fur, but we 
see it only under certain conditions. Visual perception is such that only the lit surfaces of 
objects appear (and only when they  are within the scope of a sense). Thus the fur's 
pigment in complete darkness does not appear to us, or alternatively, appears to us as 
darkly  as its surroundings. Once lit, however, the fur and its pigment become visible. The 
color we see the fur as being is the color of the pigment under that light. In that condition, 
the fur's current state is the state of manifesting its property  of having a certain color 
under that light (and this color is a result of the pigment that the fur always has). So while 
we might see Tom's fur looking red or white, this difference will be one that depends on 
the way Tom's fur is in its current environment. This is what explains why Tom appears 
the color he does.44
 Two additional comments further clarify the above environmental contribution to 
phenomenology. First, note that in cases like the above, the phenomenal difference due to 
the environment does not depend on perceiving the contributing factor in the 
environment. The perceived object manifests its disposition because it is causally  affected 
by the environment, and not because the perceiver also experiences the environment or 
the causal interaction. Perceiving the target object is sufficient because the phenomenal 
character of one's state is determined only by the object in its current condition. So when 
Tom is under a red light, we need not see the light to see Tom's fur appearing as it does 
under the light. Perceiving Tom alone is sufficient because what we are seeing is a 
property of Tom's fur; namely, the property of manifesting a given disposition. 
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44 For more on this sort of account of perceptible colors, see Matthen 2010 who makes similar points by appeal to pigment and illumination.
 By noting the above we should be able to see that this sort of phenomenal 
contribution does not require that we posit any  sort  of mediation into our perceptual 
contact with Tom. The difference in phenomenology is due to the object itself. We are 
simply  in contact with it when it is in that  state. There is, however, a perceptual mediation 
going on with respect to the lights. If I perceive Tom's fur looking red when his fur is 
gray, there is an important sense in which I do perceive the lighting conditions even if the 
responsible lamp is itself out of my view. The way I perceive the light is indirectly. By 
perceiving Tom lit in a particular way, I perceive the light as it affect's Tom's fur, and so I 
am in a perceptual state in which I perceive the lights by  perceiving Tom's fur. This is 
what I earlier called indirect perceptual contact (see chapter 1, section 4).
 Second, it is worth tying the sort of contribution I am describing with some 
related claims in the literature as this will help clarify the position. I said that both Martin 
(2010) and Genone (2013) give accounts similar to the one I am proposing. Martin argues 
that an object has intrinsic properties that are perceivable, and Genone argues that we 
perceive an object's relational properties in a given environment. Both views are right. 
We perceive an object's intrinsic properties, and in some cases we do so by perceiving the 
dispositions that an object manifests in certain environments, and these are relational 
properties. Another close connection is that between my view and Schellenberg's (2008) 
situation-dependent view of perception. Schellenberg argues that in perceiving objects, 
the way objects are presented to us is partly determined by certain features of the 
environment which she calls situational features. Situational features play a role in the 
phenomenology of experience because they  determine the situation-dependent properties 
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of objects. Such properties “are (nonconstant) functions of the intrinsic properties of the 
object and the situational features.”45  Schellenberg’s view is therefore similar to both 
Genone's view and my own. For her view as well as ours, the situation-dependent 
properties of objects are, like the intrinsic properties of such objects, external and mind-
independent. As Schellenberg notes, this feature of her view is significant because in 
many cases, how objects appear in a given situation has often been treated as mind-
dependent or subjective. Against this Schellenberg says “I am arguing only that what is 
often understood solely  in terms of mind-dependent properties or objects should be 
understood at least in part in terms of situation-dependent properties.46"47
2.7 The Surroundings II: Holism and Gestalt Effects
 The first contribution due to the surroundings allowed us to account for the target 
object’s appearance on a given occasion by  noting that the object manifests a particular 
set of properties in a given environment due to its dispositions. The second contribution, 
by contrast, is due to the nature of perceptual states, with the surrounding objects playing 
only an indirect role. That role is the role of being perceived along with the target object 
(which, recall, is not a requirement on the first environmental contribution). In being co-
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45 Schellenberg 2008 p.60
46  There is however one minor difference between my view and Schellenberg’s: she assimilates some spatial effects on the phenomenology to situation-
dependent properties. As I understand her argument, she takes an object’s spatial appearance to depend on where the perceiver experiences the object from. Thus 
the object’s appearance is location relative (i.e. relative to the place where the perceiver is standing), and she takes that location to be a feature of the situation. I 
do not think this is a significant difference. I have no problem with assimilating certain spatially determined properties to situation-dependent ones as long as we 
keep the differences in the phenomenal contributions clear. Since I think Schellenberg's view does that, I see no problem with parsing things as she does.
47 Schellenberg 2008 p.63
perceived, surroundings objects can affect the way a given object appears if a thesis like 
phenomenal holism is true. 
 As I will understand it, phenomenal holism is the view that  some phenomenal 
characters of a given perceived object will be instantiated when that object is experienced 
as being part of a greater (experiential) whole, where that whole is constituted (at least in 
part)48  by the co-perceived surroundings. This is a weak construal of the view, and it 
leaves open various possible variations.  It is a weak construal because on more 
demanding versions of phenomenal holism, the resultant  characters may be thought to be 
exclusively  instantiated by being parts of such wholes, or by  being part of a specific 
whole.  My articulation leaves room for variations in the sense that once could take the 
parts to depend on the character of the whole, or else to depend on the character of some 
other part or parts occurring in the whole.  For our purposes, it does not matter whether 
the stronger theses are true, or how we go on to specify the interexperiential relations. 
This is  because what matters for us is the core idea common to all holistic views. 
Namely, that  in some instances, the surroundings of an object have an indirect role to 
play  in determining the phenomenal character resulting from the perception of that 
object. The idea is that minimally, phenomenal characters partly  depend on features of the 
way experience is rather than the way objects are, and this means that there can be 
phenomenal differences that emerge despite the sameness of  object and appearance. 
 Something similar will be true of gestalt experiences. Like the parts embedded in 
a phenomenal whole, the parts in a gestalt experience undergo phenomenal changes due 
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to the surroundings co-perceived. Regardless of how we understand gestalt experiences 
or whether we accept their existence, if their are such experiences, they  too will provide a 
phenomenological contribution that is due, in an indirect  way, to the surroundings. So 
how do such contributions occur, and are they in conflict with relationalism? 
 An example helps shed light on the contribution of phenomenally holistic 
perceptual states. In some classes on color,49 students are required to paint equally spaced 
gradations of colors onto a grid. Which gradations are to be painted depends on what the 
two end points are. For instance, students may be asked to paint a eight gradations 
between the colors red and green, or black and white, or yellow and blue, etc. In some 
cases, these gradations become very fine. For instance, a student might be required to 
paint six gradations occurring between yellowish gray to blueish gray, where every 
gradation will be yet another (slightly yellower, or slightly bluer) shade of gray. In such 
cases, students often determine what the next correct gradation is by contrasting their 
painted gray squares against neutral gray backgrounds, or neutral blue backgrounds, and 
so on. In doing so, the students are able to learn more about the square’s color than they 
do by  looking at the colored square alone. So although the gray square is not directly 
affected by  the background (we can imagine the gray or blue background to be the sky 
which the student holds up the color square against), the phenomenology of the square 
seems to be affected by the phenomenology the wider state in which the square is seen. 
Specifically, the experience is such that some of the gray or blue seen in the background 
of the square has an effect on the phenomenology resulting from the target color square. 
71
49 Here I am describing two courses taught at the American University of Beirut’s Graphic Design Department, Color I and Color II.
If we assume that this is what is happening in this case (and we might not since we could 
think that the difference in the two experiences is not a difference in phenomenology, but 
in what we have access to), then we will have a new sort of contribution that depends 
indirectly on the surroundings. Similar comments will apply  in the case of gestalt 
experiences.50
 Does this phenomenal contribution of the environment compromise relationalism? 
The answer depends on how one understands the relationship between phenomenal 
holism (and/or gestalt experiences) and perceptual states. On the one hand, phenomenal 
holism entails that the phenomenology  of a perceptual state is partly determined by the 
relations between phenomenal parts of the experience, rather than perceptual contact with 
the object. As such, if phenomenal holism is a constitutive and not  merely  causal 
condition on perceptual states, than pure relationalism will be false. Pure relationalism 
maintains that the phenomenal character of a perceptual state is solely constituted by  the 
character of the objects perceived, and this is clearly  not the case if phenomenal holism is 
constitutive of perceptual states. Part of the character depends on relations that are 
independent of the objects being perceived. In this case the relationalist will have to 
retreat and adopt impure relationalism. This retreat will be possible because even if 
phenomenal holism is constitutive of perceptual states, it  does not introduce a type of 
mediation that compromises the relationality  of perception. To compromise relationality 
phenomenal holism will have to explanatorily screen off the role of the object, but this is 
just not so. The phenomenology resulting from holistic states is not phenomenally 
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50 Like the commitment to phenomenal holism, the commitment to gestalt experiences requires maintaining that the experience of a target object will partly 
depend on the surroundings perceived, as the surroundings will provide an organization that can be subsumed under gestalt principles, and thus result in a 
specific gestalt experience.
indistinguishable from the phenomenology  of perceptual contact with worldly  objects or 
any specific object. So in principle, holism is compatible with relationalism. Moreover, it 
is worth pointing out that taking phenomenal holism to be constitutive of perceptual state 
is controversial. It seems possible that there are perceiver’s whose experiences are not 
composed of experiential parts because their experiences are maximally simple. So unless 
we are given a reason for thinking that holism is constitutive, the retreat to impure 
relationalism will be unnecessary. And in any case, such a retreat still maintains the core 
relationalist commitment. 
2.8 Cognitive Factors I: Attention
 The features I have cited so far have have been either features of the perceptual 
contact relation, features of objects, or features of perceptual states themselves. In this 
section and the next, I will introduce two features that differ from the previous ones 
because they are features of our wider mental life. The two features are attention, and 
cognitive penetration. As in the case of holism and gestalt  experience, if perceptual states 
are structured by  attention and cognitive penetration, they will be so in one of two ways. 
They  will either be so constitutively or causally. The causal claim will not  affect our 
commitment to either pure or impure relationalism since both views are only  concerned 
with the constitution of perceptual states. If the components are constitutive, then pure 
relationalism will again turn out false. But as with holism, the further constitution claim 
is controversial.51 At least prima facie, there is a good case to be made against it since it 
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certainly seems possible and indeed plausible to think that  perception can occur in some 
beings with neither attentional mechanisms nor conceptual abilities. Ultimately  this is an 
issue that requires further exploration. What is important however is that neither attention 
nor cognitive penetration are in principle incompatible with perceptual contact. Neither 
contribution screens off the role of the object, so neither involves mediating the 
perceptual state in an inappropriate way. So, in the next two sections I will discuss the 
phenomenal contributions of these factors by way of extracting the relationalist from the 
underdetermination worry, but will put aside concerns about the compatibility of these 
constituents with relationalism.
 The first of these features, attention, is relevant to our discussion only if attention 
is understood is understood as a conscious level process.52 More specifically, the relevant 
views are those that maintain that attention (minimally) structures the phenomenal 
character of perceptual states.53 A good example of this sort of view is the one endorsed 
by Watzl (2010, 2011), and earlier, by various philosophers from the phenomenological 
tradition (some examples are Husserl 2004, Sartre 1943, and Gurwitsch 1964). If 
attention structures our experience as these philosophers maintain, then some 
phenomenal variations will depend solely on attentional differences and not differences in 
the object. 
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53 This is one of several competing views of attention. On the one hand there are philosophers and psychologists who treat attention in a reductive way, and so 
would reject this sort of phenomenal contribution. On the other hand, there are various anti-reductionist views, not all of which agree that attention should be 
characterized in terms of the capacity to phenomenally structure experiences. So if it turns out that this structuring view of attention is wrong, then attention will 
not contribute to perceptual phenomenology, and thus will not be relevant to evaluating the relational view. I am, however, inclined to think that attention does 
structure our experience, and so I take it to be relevant to evaluating relationalism.
 To take an example, consider the nonreductive structuring view most recently 
endorsed by Watzl (2010, 2011). Watzl describes his view as a structuralist view, writing 
"consciously  attending to something consists of the conscious mental process of 
structuring one's stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than 
others"54 In Watzl (2011b), he writes "attention is contrastive: it structures our mental life 
so that  some things are in the foreground of others."55  So the central idea is that in 
perceiving and other conscious processes, the phenomenal character of our perceptual 
states is partly  determined by  a contrast which attention is responsible for. An easy  way to 
understand this contrast is by  example: Imagine being in a room with several people 
where four different conversations are taking place. Now consider the case in which your 
eyes are closed and you are entirely motionless, with your senses operating uniformly, 
and the environment fixed. Initially, your perceptual state will be similar to that of being 
in a crowded room. You can hear that there is speech, but you cannot hear any one of the 
conversations. Rather, there is only the rustle of the spoken words. Now consider being 
asked to attend to the dialogue in the leftmost corner of the room. Motionlessly, you can 
attend to the sounds coming from that part of your perceptual field.  In so doing, that 
dialogue comes into what we might label the attentional foreground. This is to say you 
can now hear the words being spoken, you know what the dialogue is about, and so on. 
The remaining dialogues, by contrast, will now be in your attentional background. You 
may still hear them, and we might even assume that they continue to influence your 
perceptual state in the exact same way as they  did prior to your attentional act (although it 
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is plausible to think that in fact they become peripherally experienced, being less clear, 
less audible, etc.)56. But they are now, by  contrast to the target conversation, in your 
attentional background. Just as you can attend to this conversation, you can also shift 
your attention to another of the dialogues. This will lead to a similar change. The new 
conversation will come to occupy your attentional foreground while the rest of the 
dialogues remain (or become more) perceptually obscure as they  occupy the attentional 
background.
 When we consider these types of changes, it becomes clear that one's perceptual 
state can be phenomenologically altered by shifts in attention. Moreover, it is clear that 
these shifts are attentional shifts, rather than shifts in one's perceptual apparatus. 
Although in most cases, one pays attention partly  by moving one's body - for instance 
tilting one's head to hear better, or moving one's head closer to see better - attention also 
seems to operate without such shifts.57 One benefit of using an auditory example is that it 
allows us to bracket this worry  about attention's role being played by subtle bodily 
movements such as the movements of one's eyes. 
 How should we understand the phenomenological shift that attention produces? In 
fact attention is responsible for different sorts of shifts. On the one hand, attention may  be 
responsible for changes in the sensory apparatus itself, for instance, changes in how much 
light the eyes take in, their movement, etc.58  On the other hand, attention may affect 
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characteristic peripheral ways” (p.155).
57 Watzl 2011a calls this feature of attention purity, he defines it as follows “Consciously attending to something does not necessarily involve (a characteristic) 
bodily movement or posture, or an awareness of such a bodily movement or posture” (p.147)
58 For instance, see Carrasco, Ling, and Read (2004) on how attention affects perceived contrast.
changes independently of changes to the sensory apparatus. These changes can be broken 
down into (at least) three different sorts: First, there is attentional focus, in which one 
holds one's attention on a given object. Second, there are attentional shifts, in which one 
proceeds from focusing on one thing (or aspect) to focusing on another. And third, there 
is attentional draw, in which one also shifts one's attention, but the shift seems initiated 
by the object “grabbing” one's attention.59 For our purposes, I put aside the changes in 
our perceptual apparatus since these are more appropriately described as sensory 
modifications that affect what features of the object one perceives. I will simply focus on 
the second set of changes.
 One useful way of thinking about attentional focus is by appeal to a sense's 
resolution. Earlier I argued that each sense has its own (typical) resolution and this is the 
extent to which it  can reveal details about a given space. I maintained that  this resolution 
is non-uniform both at a time and across time. One way  in which shifts in resolution 
occur is through attention. In the auditory  example above, the phenomenal changes that 
occur are ones in which a given object in the perceiver's environment becomes 
perceivable in one's attentional foreground. Once in the foreground, the perceived object 
shifts from being perceived at  a lower resolution where the sounds are indistinct to being 
perceived at a higher resolution in which the sound is (more) distinct. So shifts in 
resolution can, at least partly, explain what it means to say that an object is in one's 
attentional foreground. Of course being perceived in the foreground may also be 
responsible for other, non-phenomenal contributions. For instance, Wu (2011) argues that 
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attention helps select for actions, and Smithies (2011) argues that it enables rational 
access.
 This shift in resolution may also affect what one sees in the background. 
Returning to the example above, when one is focused on none of the conversations, the 
sounds of the whole room are heard simultaneously and with uniform resolution. One 
hears the conversations, some of the activity in other rooms, the hum of the air 
conditioner, and so on. But once one focuses on a single conversation, that background 
changes. The conversations in the vicinity  continue to be part of the perceived 
background, but the hum of the air conditioning, and the sounds of the other room, may 
altogether drop out of one's experience. A visual example will help  illustrate this more 
clearly. Consider looking at a painting displayed on a door. If one is not focused on the 
painting and its details, one will see the painting, the door it is on, and some parts of the 
wall. But if one begins to (motionlessly) focus on a detail in the painting, the painting's 
resolution increases, but this increase is also accompanied by a shift in what the 
perceived background is. Since one is focused on that detail, it is the detail's immediate 
surroundings that  are part of the perceived background. The door may continue to feature 
in the experience, but the wall might altogether fall out of view. So shifts in resolution 
may be accompanied by shifts in what the perceived surroundings are.
  Finally, we can turn to the contribution of attentional shift and attentional draw. In 
both these cases, the contribution to phenomenology is somewhat difficult to describe. 
This is for at least two reason. When shifting one's attention (which happens in both 
cases), part of what one is doing is ceasing to attend to a given object while not yet 
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attending to the next object. The result is a loss of resolution of the object one was paying 
attention to, and a yet unfulfilled increase in the resolution of the next object. Moreover, 
since shifts in attention often involve motion on the part of the perceiver, there is a further 
unclarity  in what  one perceives due to the motion. Much as we see the details of a car 
driving by quickly less clearly  than we do the same car when it is still, how the 
experience seems to us as we shift our attention also involves the unclarity  due to fast 
motion. The phenomenal effect might therefore be described as one in which we perceive 
the objects around us distractedly, unclearly, or at particularly low resolution.  
2.9 Cognitive Factors II: Cognitive Penetration
 The second feature, cognitive penetration, is the view that the phenomenal 
character of perceptual states can be altered by states of one's cognitive system, 
specifically, by one's conceptual repertoire.60 If cognitive penetration is true, an alteration 
of one's perceptual phenomenology can occur if the perceiver possesses concepts relevant 
to the objects perceived, and she applies these concepts in her experience. The change is 
not a mere change in one's perceptual beliefs, but rather a change in how one perceives 
what they perceive. So holding all perceptual conditions constant, perceiving a single 
object can still result  in a variety of phenomenal characters depending on the concepts 
one applies to the object. 
 Cognitive penetration is a controversial thesis, there are controversies about how 
we should understand the view, what should count as examples, and whether the view is 
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true at all.61 As a result, finding a noncontroversial example is somewhat difficult. But to 
give a general idea of the claim being made, we will need some example, so here is one: a 
perceiver might see a cat, and in so doing undergo a particular phenomenology. But this 
phenomenology will differ if the perceiver is a cat expert  who both possesses and knows 
how to apply various concepts referring to different cat breeds. Such an expert will not 
undergo a “generic cat” phenomenology (as I might), but something more specific. Her 
phenomenology will reflect  a particular breed of cat, for instance, a Persian or Siamese 
cat. For our purposes we need not worry  about the details of how this is so. Our concern 
is only with the compatibility between relationalism and the cognitive penetration thesis. 
 To illustrate the contribution of cognitive penetration, we can modify the attention 
example slightly. In this version, we can assume that each of the conversations being held 
is held in a different language. With that difference, we can consider a few cases of 
cognitive penetration. First, we begin by imagining a listener who does not know the 
language she is attending to, and moreover does not know what a language is (we can 
assume she is a noncommunicative alien species). Since she lacks the concept of a 
language, she will not be able to apply the concept to what she is hearing. In this case, it 
will be reasonable to assume that her experience will be something like the experience we 
have when hearing the rustling of leaves. The sounds made by  the trees is a complex one, 
but it is not one that is linguistically  structured in any way, and so it does not sound like 
any language to us (poetic interpretations aside). It is simply  a complex sound, much like 
the sound of a waterfall or a vacuum cleaner. We can now imagine varying the case such 
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that the listener possesses the concept of a language, and applies this concept to what she 
is hearing, but does not understand the language. Her phenomenology  will be subtly 
different. Previously  the sounds were perceived as complex but entirely  unstructured, 
whereas now the sounds will appear structured, despite the difficult of discerning the 
structure. For instance, the listener's phenomenology  might now allow her to recognize 
that the foreign words are intoned in a certain way  such that some seem to be produced 
by way of posing questions and others by way of exclaiming. This would not have been 
possible previously. A third alteration we can make is to now stipulate that listener both 
possess the concept of a language and knows the specific language. In this case, her 
phenomenology will differ further. She will now hear specific words, these words will 
have a semantic content (assuming she understands them, which she may not), she will be 
able to evaluate on the basis of the experience whether the sentences are well formed or 
not, and what they are about. Finally, we can now imagine how these sorts of conceptual 
changes would affect the scenario of hearing multiple conversations. If the listener only 
understands the language in which one of the conversations is spoken, her experience will 
naturally  be one of comprehending and hearing those words amidst the buzz of foreign 
languages. If we shift which dialogues she understands, this will shift her experience 
correspondingly. So it  seems that the phenomenology of perceptual states changes with 
changes in our conceptual repertoire. If these cases are cases of cognitive penetration,62 
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might think that these changes do not affect what one perceives, but are rather changes in one’s resulting perceptual beliefs.
then the phenomenology of perceptual states can vary because of our concepts. But as we 
saw (in section 9), this will not undermine the core relational commitment.63
2.10 Solving the Underdetermination Worry
 With the preceding features in place, the relationalist's difficulty  with phenomenal 
underdetermination is largely overcome. The worry focused on the fact that perceptual 
contact with a worldly object cannot account for the variations in phenomenal states that 
occur in relating to a single object. As we have seen, by detailing the features of the 
perceptual contact relation, we can account for these variations. 
 The picture required to explain the underdetermination worry varies on two 
dimensions. On the one hand, some features affect the appearance of the object i.e. the 
way the object is on a token viewing. Others affect the phenomenology of the state 
directly  rather than affecting the appearances. These are therefore properties of the state 
rather than the object. While the features affecting appearances and therefore 
phenomenology will be acceptable to all relationalists, the features affecting the 
phenomenology of the state directly will only  be acceptable to impure relationalists if 
those features are constitutive of perception. As we saw, however, maintaining that these 
latter features (i.e. holism, gestalts, attention, and cognitive penetration) are constitutive 
is controversial. 
 The total picture we have is therefore as follows: A perceiver is in contact, 
sensorially, with various spatial, worldly objects. These are objects that fall within the 
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object scope, spatial scope, and spatial resolution of her sense. The perceiver is herself 
somewhere as she perceives the objects, and in accordance the objects appear will either 
close or far, to her left or right, turned upright or not, mirrored or not, and so on. The 
surroundings add to this by play two further phenomenology-determining roles. First, 
through the surrounding objects of the environment being in causal interaction with the 
perceived objects, these interactions determine the objects' present states. The objects are 
thus perceived as they presently are. Second, the surroundings, when perceived along 
with a target object, can affect the resultant experience if phenomenal holism is true, or if 
there are gestalt experiences. Finally, both attention and cognitive penetration also 
contribute to the phenomenology of perception. Attention structures the phenomenal 
character in a way that generates a contrast between a foreground and a background, and 
cognitive penetration allows a perceiver's conceptual repertoire to play a role in how 
thing's appear.
 To solve the underdetermination worry  what I have done is cited various features 
that explain typically cited phenomenal changes (such as changes due to lighting 
conditions, sense, etc.) that are meant to press the underdetermination worry. These 
features may not account for every change in phenomenal character. It is hard to see how 
one can come up  with a principled way of uncovering a complete list of factors with 
which to individuate phenomenal characters, but fortunately  we need not occupy 
ourselves with this sort of worry. This is so for two reasons: First, the main task facing 
relationalism is that of showing that the underdetermination worry is not a worry that 
seriously undermines the plausibility of the view. If the relationalist  had no explanations 
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of any or most phenomenal changes, then this worry  would be a serious one. But with the 
features cited so far, this worry is shown to depend on underestimating the resources 
available to the relationalist in detailing the perceptual contact relation. Whether every 
possible phenomenal change can be accounted for by relationalism is a further question. 
It is one that relationalists should take seriously. But outside of specific proposals for 
unexplainable changes, it seems to me that the relationalist  can assume her view to be 
capable of dealing with phenomenal underdetermination. Second, even if we accept the 
burden to explain all possible phenomenal changes, this burden is not one that stands in 
the way of adopting relationalism. This is because the burden is shared with alternative 
views. For instance, Block (2010) has argued that phenomenal changes due to attention 
cannot be explained by representationalists, and Watzl (in progress)64  argues that 
intentionalism as a whole has difficulties in accounting for the phenomenal contribution 
of attention. If so, then relationalism is not uniquely troubled with not giving a fully 
worked out account of all possible phenomenal changes. As long as it  fares no worse than 
other views, the underdetermination worry is not a real threat.
2.11 The Overdetermination Worry and its Solution
 While the underdetermination worry focused on the fact that relationalism 
distinguished phenomenal characters in too coarse-grained a manner, the 
overdetermination worry  is a worry that relationalism distinguishes phenomenal 
characters too finely. Specifically, the issue arises because perceptual states are 
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individuated by their phenomenal characters, and on relational views those characters are 
individuated at least partly  by the worldly  objects. So it follows that two token states that 
relate us to different objects will always have different phenomenal characters. The 
problem is that this seems wrong. Many experiences suggest that perceivers undergo 
phenomenally indistinguishable characters even when related to different objects. For 
instance, recall the example of perceiving Tom the cat  and Tim his robot duplicate. If all 
the conditions are held constant, than even a perceiver who is infallible at discriminating 
phenomenal characters would not be able to tell apart the state of seeing Tim from that of 
seeing Tom. So surely it must be wrong to think that these two characters are nevertheless 
different.
 The first thing to say in response to this worry is that it is not a worry  that 
relationalists face alone. Intentionalists who think that perceptual states represent singular 
and not just general contents share this worry. Like relationalists, such intentionalists 
think that perceptual states convey information of the form “that x is f” and not just 
“there is an x, and that x is f”. So rather than merely representing properties ascribed to 
some object, singular content intentionalists also think that perceptual states represent 
properties as belonging to particular objects. In light of this, the insistence on the 
generality of phenomenal character is controversial and cannot  be taken for granted. Of 
course one can define phenomenal character as being general, but the question is whether 
such a definition ought to be adopted. Simple insisting on the generality of phenomenal 
character amounts to tipping the scales against the relationalist by  stipulation and nothing 
more.  
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 Alternatively, if there really  are reasons to accept such a construal of phenomenal 
character, then the relationalist  will have to reject the centrality of the concept of 
phenomenal character to perceptual states. Indeed some relationalists have thought that 
this is the route relationalists should take. Matthew Kennedy, for instance, argues that 
relationalists are precisely focusing on an aspect other than phenomenal character. He 
writes “Our concept of phenomenal character makes a kind of off-kilter reference to the 
structure of Good experience. But the concept fails to capture the relational, world-
involving orientation of this structure. Nor does the concept land on a natural part or 
component of this structure.”65 I do not follow Kennedy in this. I think that  the concept of 
phenomenal character can be used in a way that picks out particular objects as the 
relationalist and singular content intentionalist need. Kennedy thinks that such a view 
would involve a radical change in our concept of phenomenal character and so chooses to 
do away  with the concept's centrality altogether. If Kennedy is right that  this change is 
too radical, then, I agree with him, so much the worse for the concept of phenomenal 
character. It is just not apt for the relational view of perception.  
 But there are more substantial responses on behalf of the relationalist. The 
relationalist can account for the genuine phenomenal indistinguishability of two 
characters that are of different objects in at least  three ways. To begin with, we should 
first put aside those cases of epistemic indistinguishability. In those cases, two 
numerically distinct  objects, a and b, qualitatively  differ and their difference is actually 
reflected in the phenomenology  of the state. But due to features of the perceiver’s 
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epistemic limitations, the perceiver fails to tell the two states apart. These cases should be 
put aside because they are not genuine cases of indistinguishable phenomenal characters. 
By contrast to such cases, there are three possibilities of genuine indiscriminability 
despite the numerical difference of the objects that  the relationalist can and should accept. 
Those cases are:
Case 1: a and b are quantitatively distinct objects, but the objects themselves are 
qualitatively identical. They are also viewed under the exact same conditions. As 
a result, they are phenomenologically indistinguishable.
Case 2: a and b are quantitatively and qualitatively  distinct  objects. But  this 
appearance of a, and that appearance of b are qualitatively identical. As a result, 
they are phenomenologically indistinguishable.66
Case 3: a and b are quantitatively and qualitatively distinct objects. Moreover 
their appearances on these viewing are qualitatively different. But due to features 
of the perceptual state itself, or the wider mental state, the resultant states are 
phenomenally indistinguishable. 
 In the first case, the idea is that the indistinguishability of the phenomenologies is 
inherited from the qualitative similarity  of the objects themselves because the objects 
really are qualitatively identical. Consider Tom and Tim, for instance. Tim is designed to 
be exactly  like Tom, so it  is no wonder that Tom and Tim can appear identical, and as a 
result lead us to mistake Tim for Tom (or Tom for Tim). Or consider objects mass 
produced in a factory. Cars or televisions of the same model and brand are designed to 
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not just  look alike, but to be alike. They have parts arranged in the same way, they are 
designed to instantiate the same properties, and so on. Any differences are mistakes in the 
manufacturing, an ideal manufacturing process would make every token object 
qualitatively identical to every other token. In these cases, given that a perceiver sees any 
one of these objects under the same conditions, she should not be able to discriminate 
them. There is  simply nothing to differentiate them qualitatively. Although they are 
numerically distinct, and the experiences of them are the experiences of different objects, 
the phenomenologies that result  are indistinguishable. This is so derivatively. The objects 
are intrinsically indistinguishable, and they are perceived in identical conditions. 
 The second case is more interesting. In it the objects are not qualitatively 
identical, it  is only there appearances that are. As an example, consider looking at a red 
oval shape against a white background from the top. Now consider looking at a red circle 
shape against  a white background from the side. The appearances of both objects will be 
identical. This is because the appearance of an object is defined with respect  to the 
various variables specified in this chapter, and one of these variables is the viewing 
location. The two objects have qualitatively identical appearances because despite their 
intrinsic differences, when seen in these conditions they appear identical. The amount of 
variation between the objects compared in these types of cases is extremely large. White 
objects lit with red lights will be indistinguishable from red objects under normal light. 
Distant planes against a blue sky will be mistakable for a nearby dot on a blue page. 
Moreover most things appear identically under certain conditions. For instance in 
darkness all objects look the same: they are absolutely dark. Similarly, with large 
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distances, all things look alike: they look like dots. Moreover, the appearances might be 
identical even when comparing one object with many (I discuss such cases in detail in 
section 3 of chapter 5).  
 The third way in which phenomenologies can be indistinguishable neither 
depends on the qualitative identical of numerically  distinct objects, nor on the qualitative 
identity  of the appearances appearances. This is because two objects might be different 
and have different appearances, but features such as holism, gestalts, attention, or 
cognitive penetration can lead to indistinguishable phenomenologies. For instance, two 
different  colors might, despite the fixed lighting conditions, produce similar 
phenomenologies because in one case, the background coupled with the phenomenal 
holism of the state makes the phenomenal character resulting from one color genuinely 
indistinguishable from that of perceiving the other color.
 So nothing in what  the relationalist says forces her to deny the phenomenal 
indistinguishability  of states in which one perceives different objects. What the 
relationalist denies is that this qualitative indistinguishability is due to the generality  of 
phenomenal character or the fact that  there is a common core to these states. Instead, the 
phenomenal indistinguishability depends on the qualitative indistinguishability  of the 
objects, the qualitative identity of the appearances, or the fact that properties intrinsic to 
perceptual states interact in certain ways with given object pairs. 
 Where does this leave the concept of phenomenal character? In chapter 1 I started 
by defining perceptual states through their phenomenal character, and I said that 
phenomenal character cuts across different sorts of cases (veridical, illusory, and 
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hallucinatory). But now that the relational view has been more thoroughly articulated, we 
can see that the relationalist defines phenomenal character in terms of object’s appearing 
in various ways (with other features potentially factoring in either causally or 
constitutively). Since the relationalists treats appearances as objective features of worldly 
objects, then even indistinguishable phenomenal characters do not cut across different 
cases. In each case the phenomenal character is the character of a different object. It is 
just that those objects have qualitatively identical features, or else identical appearances, 
or else identical appearances given features of the state itself. So in other words, the 
overdetermination worry  is a misplaced worry. The genuine indistinguishability of 
phenomenal characters does not show that  phenomenal character does not pick out 
specific objects.
2.12 The Case of Illusions
The discussion of this chapter places us in a position to understand how perceptual 
illusions are possible. While the relationalist literature does not converge on a single 
account for hallucinatory  perceptual states, the situation is different when it comes to 
illusions. A consensus on a relationalist understanding of illusions seems forthcoming. 
Various relationalists have provided elaborated accounts of the case of illusions,67  and 
while there is some divergence in the accounts, there are at least three basic constituents 
that repeatedly  emerge. In this section I discuss these three features, relating them to the 
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account given in this chapter, and to Brewer (2011) and Genone (2013)'s discussions of 
illusions.
 We can begin with an example of an illusion followed by a definition of illusory 
cases. Consider the Zöllner lines below:
These lines count as illusory because while they  appear nonparallel they are in fact 
parallel. We can define cases like that of the Zöllner lines as follows:
S undergoes an illusion as of o being F only if:
1- S in a perceptual state with a phenomenal character that presents o as being F,
2- S is in perceptual contact with o, and
3- o is not F
Illusory states are a type of perceptual state, and they are illusory because of the objects 
they  relate us to. Such objects have an illusory  character, and for short can be called 
illusory objects. What make these objects illusory is the fact that their appearance is 
misleading with respect to the object's intrinsic characteristics. This misleading character 
depends on various features of perceptual states in general, and illusory objects in 
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particular. I will begin by discussing the features of perceptual states that allow illusions 
to arise.
 First, illusions can arise because an object  can appear in a way that differs from 
the way it is. In solving the underdetermination worry we saw how this is possible. 
Plausibly, illusions like the Zöllner have an appearance that depends on the viewing 
conditions. For instance, because the lines are seen along with the lines intersecting them, 
they  appear nonparallel; this is the result of features like phenomenal holism or the 
possession of a gestalt  property. But alone, such features do not explain why we should 
mistake the object perceived for another object with different properties. What explains 
this latter feature is that appearances can be opaque with respect to the object's enduring 
character. This opacity is explained by our response to the overdetermination worry. 
Since distinct worldly objects can result in states with qualitatively  identical characters, a 
given experience need not be transparent as to the specific object of the experience. As 
we saw different objects can result  in identical characters in three ways: either the objects 
themselves are qualitatively  identical, or their appearances are, or their appearances, 
coupled with features of perceptual states themselves, lead to identical phenomenal 
characters. Since quantitatively and qualitatively distinct objects can seem the same from 
the perceiver's perspective, distinct  objects can be mistakable for one another. For 
instance the Zöllner lines, which are parallel, have an appearance that is qualitatively 
identical or at  least similar to the appearance of nonparallel lines.68 In this sense, a given 
perceptual state's character epistemically underdetermines the object we are related to. 
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68 It is plausible to think that illusory objects need not be qualitatively identical to objects with differing features for them to be illusory. A close similarity or 
resemblance is sufficient, since perceivers need not be maximally attentive to the objects they experience.
 This gives us the general feature of perceptual states that make illusions possible:
(1) Objects of illusion a- have an appearance, and b- that appearance is similar to 
the appearance of a different object with incompatible properties
Since this first feature is shared by non-illusory objects and thus veridical states, it does 
not explain what is distinctive about illusions. This is because typically, when an object 
has an appearance that is similar to the appearance of some different object, we do not 
necessarily mistake the one for the other. For instance, consider a case in which you see a 
white-furred cat under an orange light bulb. The cat  looks orange (we can assume its 
appearance is indistinguishable from a cat with genuinely orange fur that is lit under a 
white bulb). Of course the property  of having orange fur is incompatible with the 
property  of having white fur and vice versa. Still, the perceiver is not inclined to 
misidentify  the white cat as an orange one. Under the circumstances, the perceiver 
expects the white cat to look orange (based on background knowledge), and so the 
orange-looking cat is perceived as being white. Indeed, if it looked white, the perceiver 
would think the cat had luminous white fur, not white fur. This is importantly  different 
from the way  we experience the Zöllner lines. There the parallel lines look nonparallel 
and the perceiver takes this to indicate the lines are nonparallel. The perceiver mistakes 
the parallel lines for nonparallel ones in a way that she does not  mistake the white cat for 
an orange one. One might focus on the difference in the type of illusion in each case, but 
this would be to miss the point.69 In each case the object has an appearance that differs 
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69 This is because there are different types of illusions and one might think that the cat case is a  environmental illusion while the Zöllner case is due to our 
perceptual apparatus. For more on different types of illusion, see Fish (2011) and Genone (2013).
from how the object is intrinsically, but the epistemic outcome differs. So what explains 
this latter difference?
 The answer is that in one case but not the other, the viewing conditions are taken 
to be comparable by the perceiver despite not being so. This is the second feature of 
illusory states:
(2) When looking at  the illusory object, the perceiver takes her viewing conditions 
to be comparable to the viewing conditions she is in when perceiving an object 
with incompatible properties but a similar or identical appearance.
The case for this claim is as follows. Consider again the orange-lit cat. In some 
experiences of the cat, the perceiver can see that there are orange lights above it. In such 
cases the orange light bulb is co-perceived with the cat. The same thing can happen with 
the orange cat lit by  normal lights; a perceiver might  see the cat and the lights. In such 
cases, the perceiver is epistemically aware that the conditions are not  comparable because 
she co-perceives the lighting conditions, and the result is that she does not mistake the 
orange cat for a white cat, despite the identical appearances. In the Zöllner case, by 
contrast, the perceiver is not similarly  aware of the difference in viewing conditions. 
Although she co-perceives the lines intersecting the parallel lines, she is not epistemically 
aware of the effect that  the intersecting marks have on the visual system. She assumes 
that the condition of looking at the Zöllner lines is like that of looking at ordinary 
nonparallel lines which would have a similar appearance. This is made clearer by 
considering a variation on the cat case that does count as illusory. Consider seeing the 
orange-lit cat without co-perceiving the lights or anything else that  indicates their 
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presence (apart from the cat, of course). We can imagine that the lights are occluded from 
view, and that one has no  background knowledge or anything else that allows one to 
determine the lighting conditions.  In this sort of case, it is plausible to think that a 
perceiver will mistake the orange-lit cat for an orange cat, and thus be the victim of an 
illusion. This is plausible because naturally  we assume that the lighting is normal unless 
given a particular reason to assume otherwise, and normal lights are roughly white. This 
sort of experience is what philosophers have in mind when discussing environmental 
cases of illusion.70 Not every  appearance due to environmental conditions is illusory, but 
some are. Those are the cases in which the conditions are not comparable but the 
perceiver thinks they are. 
 It is important  to note that the issue is not  about how knowledge or co-perception 
of the viewing conditions alters the way the object perceptually appears to the perceiver. 
Whether or not a perceiver has the relevant knowledge or co-perception, the object's 
appearance is unchanged. The cat continues to look orange, and the lines continue to 
appear nonparallel. What changes is the inference that the perceiver makes on the basis of 
the experience: in the one case, but not the other, she makes the wrong inference. This 
point is clearly highlighted in Genone's (2013) account of illusion. He writes:
So according to the view I'm advocating, when a subject perceives an object, she 
perceives a determinate set of appearance properties.71 
and 
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70 For instance Siegel’s (2012) primary example of an illusion is the Fishtank case which is plausibly interpreted as an environmental illusion that depends on the 
refraction of light by water.
71 Genone 2013 p.33 (draft)
What I am proposing is that whether or not a perceived appearance is misleading 
depends on the subject's understanding of the relationship between appearances 
and intrinsic properties in different contexts.72
and finally
If any conflict does arise, it is between the ways objects are, including how they 
appear, and the judgments we make about them…73
Like the account I am endorsing, Genone takes the appearance of an object to be due to 
the object's intrinsic and relational properties.74  He takes us to be perceiving those 
properties when we perceive an object. By  contrast, whether the appearance is misleading 
or not depends on the subject's understanding. It is her understanding about the 
relationship  between how things appear in different contexts. Thus the mistake is not a 
perceptual one; it  is about the judgments we make on the basis of experience. What 
Genone does not explicitly highlight is the fact that an understanding of how things 
appear in different contexts requires that the perceiver herself be aware of the context. 
This awareness could be perceptual, as in the case of the cat, or else a matter of 
background knowledge (one would need to know that our visual system is so affected), as 
in the case of the Zöllner lines.
 Although the two features I have described tell us a lot about illusions, they are 
still do not sufficiently characterize such states. To fully characterize them, a third feature 
is needed:
(3) The appearance of the illusory  object is more typical of the other object under 
these viewing conditions. 
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72 Genone 2013 p.31 (draft)
73 Genone 2013 p.39 (draft)
74 Genone 2013 p.23 (draft)
 This typicality condition is required to solve a puzzle that could arise if one 
appeals to only the first two features. This puzzle which involves an unwanted symmetry 
is discussed by Brewer (2011)
It may be objected at  this point that similarity is symmetrical. So [the object view] 
has the unacceptable consequence, in connection with the [Müller-lyer lines], for 
example, that the relevant paradigm pair of lines of unequal lengths at different 
depths look equal in length, for the very same reason. Similarly [the object view] 
may seem to be committed to the claim that a bent unsubmerged stick looks 
straight and that a red piece of chalk in normal lighting conditions looks white.75
The worry is that if lines like the Müller-Lyer or Zöllner lines look like ordinary  unequal 
or nonparallel lines, than why not think that unequal or nonparallel lines look like equal 
or parallel ones? Similarly, if a white cat under orange lights looks like an orange cat, 
then an orange cat  under white lights looks like a white one under orange lights. The 
objection is that  if two object  look similar, what makes it the case that  one of them counts 
as illusory but the other not? The answer is provided by the third typicality condition. 
Brewer’s appeals to a similar notion, that of paradigm exemplars. He writes
First, o looks F, according to [the object view], in virtue of its visually relevant 
similarities relative to the spatiotemporal point of view and other circumstances of 
perception with paradigm exemplars of F. The [Müller-Lyer] diagram does not 
constitute a paradigm case of lines that are equal in length. Given the misleading 
hashes, it would certainly be an inappropriate exemplar to use in manifesting or 
acquiring the concept of equality in length. So, although plain similarity is 
symmetrical, the relevant condition of similarity to a paradigm is not.76 
This is to say that while it is true that the objects with incompatible properties have 
qualitatively identical appearances, given the situation the perceiver takes herself to be in, 
the appearance constituting her phenomenal character favors one of the two objects. This 
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76 Brewer 2011 p.23 (draft)
is the object that more typically has the appearance in the situation envisioned by  the 
perceiver. This typicality  (or in Brewer's case, paradigm exemplar) is what  explains the 
asymmetry. 
 With this last feature, we can now see how illusions are possible on the relational 
view. Although the element of deception arises because of the way the perceiver grasps 
his situation, illusions truly have the perceptual character that is misleading. This is what 
explains why illusions resist changes in belief, and why  they are genuinely perceptual 
phenomena. Their character is due to a feature of all perceptual states, namely, that upon 
perceiving, things appear to us a particular way, and the way they appear can resemble or 





 In the previous chapter I argued that the objects we are related to in a perceptual 
state sufficiently constrain the phenomenal character of perceptual states, so the 
sufficiency worry  raised in the introduction is misplaced. In this chapter I turn to the 
worry  that objects are not necessary for perceptual states because hallucinations are 
possible. I begin by  elaborating on the way  hallucinations have been construed in the 
literature and the impact they  have had on theories of perception. I then consider 
relatianalist's two prevalent options in dealing with hallucinations, and argue that both are 
underpinned by a particular conception of hallucinations. I argue that it is this conception 
that needs to be rejected, and the way of rejecting it  I pursue appeals to (what I call) an 
illusionist view of hallucinations.
3.1 Hallucinations and Commonsense
 In the introduction I said that one central reason for adopting relationalism is that 
it fits well with common sense. While this is true, the existence of misperception or 
perceptual error (I use both terms interchangeably) is also a claim we are committed to by 
common sense. It is a commonplace observation that perception is sometimes misleading, 
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and that it sometimes misconstrues the way  the world and the items in it are. We need not 
look far to see this. To begin with, consider Socrates’ statement on behalf of Protagoras in 
Theaetetus:
I would remind you of what we were saying before, namely, that to the sick man 
the thing she eats both appear and are bitter, while to the healthy man they  both 
appear and are the opposite77
And Descartes’ expression of insecurity about his waking life:
Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece of 
paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do 
so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not  happen with such 
distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions 
when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep!78
The observations made by these philosophers are not esoteric. They are rather meant as 
platitudes of commonsense. The same thing can perceptually seem different ways, and 
one's state may deceive one about the way the world is. What is important about these 
observation is that they are not thought to be mere confusions in thought. Rather, there 
seems to be something distinctively perceptual about the errors. A perceiver might be 
confused, inattentive, or deluded and so reach a false conclusion about the perceived, but 
in some cases what is perceived itself seems wrong: The sick man experiences the sweet 
food as bitter; the paper is experienced as perceptually present by the dreamer.
 The commonsense observation is a negative observation, it notes that sometimes, 
perception fails to be an optimal case of perceptual contact. By  contrast, the philosophical 
interpretation of perceptual error is more loaded. Philosophers have traditionally traced 
the commonsense observation to two positive perceptual encounters, those that  are 
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illusory, and those that are hallucinatory. Since I focused on the case of illusions in the 
last section, here I turn to the apparently different case of hallucinations. To begin with, 
consider the radical case of Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS). Oliver Sacks describes his 
encounter with a CBS patient in his book Hallucinations (2012) as follows
“One day late in November 2006… one of the residents… had suddenly started 
seeing things, having odd hallucinations which seemed overwhelmingly real.…
When I arrived and greeted her, I was surprised to realize that Rosalie was 
completely blind…. Though she had not seen anything at all for several years, she 
was now “seeing” things, right in front of her. “What sort of things?” I asked. 
“People in Eastern dress!” she exclaimed. “In drapes, walking up and down stairs 
… a man who turns towards me and smiles, but he has huge teeth on one side of 
his mouth. Animals, too. I see this scene with a white building, and it is snowing
—a soft snow, it is swirling. I see this horse (not a pretty horse, a drudgery  horse) 
with a harness, dragging snow away … but it keeps switching.… I see a lot of 
children; they’re walking up and down stairs. They wear bright colors rose, blue - 
like Eastern dress.” She had been seeing such scenes for several days.” ⁠79
CBS starkly illustrates the case of hallucinations, but it is a hallucinatory  case we do not 
have first person access to. So although nowhere as elaborate, we can consider the case of 
afterimages which are often considered a type of hallucination. Focusing on the black dot 
in the image below for a minute, then turning to a plain white surface (preferably one at a 
distance equal to the distance between you and the actual image) should induce an 
afterimage.
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If successful, one's perceptual state will present a red heart shape in the clear absence of 
one. 
 Philosophers contrast these cases of hallucination with cases of illusions. Siegel 
(2012), for instance, glosses the distinction between the cases by saying "In a 
hallucination, perceptual contact is missing; illusions are misleading guides to what is in 
the environment".80 Foster (2000) elaborates on the distinction further, he writes
In this respect, the [illusory] case stands in sharp  contrast with what would happen 
if someone were viewing a circular object, but […] a device which was attached 
to his optic nerves eliminated a certain portion of the sensory  input, in a way 
which severed visual contact with the object's boundary  and its immediate 
surroundings, and replaced what was eliminated with neural signals that created 
the false impression of an elliptical boundary. Here, the element of non-
veridicality  within the total visual experience would be purely hallucinatory. It 
would not be a case of the subject's seeing the circular boundary as elliptical, but 
of his not seeing the boundary at all. But, in the case of the lenses, there is no such 
element of hallucination.81
These claims can be understood by considering the CBS and afterimage cases above. 
Beginning with the red heart afterimage, we can note the following: on the one hand, the 
state we enter seems to have a perceptual phenomenal character; it presents a red heart. 
On the other hand, the state lacks an obvious worldly  object for us to be in perceptual 
contact with. There is no red heart shaped object before before the perceiver, at most 
there is a white surface and that seems to have little to do with the state's phenomenology. 
While the green heart we originally looked at  shares a few features (namely, the shape) 
with the hallucination, we are no longer looking at it when we see the red heart. So 
hallucinations seem to involve a presentation that has nothing to do with the perceptually 
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accessible environment. Similarly so in the case of Rosalie. Since she is blind, she has no 
visual access to her environment, yet she sees what she does. Perceptual contact  seems to 
be missing in both cases, as Siegel and Foster describe. 
 Hallucinations introduce their own distinctive features. If we look at Foster's 
description, we notice that  he finds two features definitive of hallucinations but not 
illusions: first, hallucinations sever perceptual contact. This is unlike illusions which 
merely distort our contact. To say that hallucinations sever perceptual contact is not to say 
that they present  an object that  simply occludes what we are in contact with (although a 
hallucination may do that too), as when one sound drowns out another, or something 
stands in between you and what you are looking at. It is to say  that the state either 
involves no perceptual contact with any worldly objects at all, or else that it involves 
contact with some object that is inappropriate to the hallucinatory image. In either case 
the state involves a violation of world-contact (which, recall, is short for perceptual 
contact with particular, material, and mind-independent objects as well as their 
properties). The second feature of hallucinations is that they replace the eliminated 
perceptual contact with an apparently ersatz object. So in addition to the loss of contact, 
the perceiver continues to experience things as being some way. The way they are does 
not depend on perceptual contact. So unlike illusions, hallucinations seem more aptly 
defined as follows:
S undergoes a hallucination as of o being F only if:
1- S in a perceptual state with a phenomenal character that presents o being F, and
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2- S is not in perceptual contact with o or any  other object that has F (either 
because S is not in any  perceptual contact, or because they are in contact with an 
inappropriate object). 
If hallucinations are like this, then hallucination involve what I will call a mere 
appearance. Mere appearances are entities that are negatively defined. They are whatever 
explains the phenomenal character of the hallucination without appeal to world-contact. If 
hallucinations involve mere appearances, then the nonnecessity worry raised in the 
introduction is a legitimate worry for relationalist views.
3.2 Three Reactions to the Argument from Hallucination
 As I see it, philosophers of perception are confronted with a balancing act when it 
comes to the metaphysics of perceptual states. They need to give weight to each of the 
two commonsense observations, the one which suggests world-contact, and the one that 
suggests its violation in perceptual error. Every theory tries to construe these two 
observations in a way that won't lead to an outright contradiction, and it is in striking this 
balance that hallucinations become important. If veridical cases were alone at stake, there 
would be no reason to compromise the commitment to world-contact. Moreover the 
addition of the commonsense observation of perceptual error does not by itself require 
the compromise of world-contact. It is only in fleshing out the experiences that undergird 
that observation that the possibility  of violating world-contact arises. Traditionally, both 
illusions and hallucinations were understood to require a rejection of world-contact. Both 
phenomena were deployed in arguments against  relational views and its commitment to 
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world-contact. The arguments, which I construe as reductios of relationalism, go as 
follows: 
The Argument from Illusion:
P1- If a perceiver S is in a perceptual state P, then P's phenomenal character is 
determined by the worldly  object o that S in in contact with. (the relational 
commitment)
P2- In illusions, P's character presents o as F when o is not F
P3- In illusions, P's character is not determined by o (since o is not F)
C- The relational commitment is mistaken.
The Argument from Hallucination
P1- If a perceiver S is in a perceptual state P, then P's phenomenal character is 
determined by the worldly  object o that S in in contact with. (the relational 
commitment)
P5- In hallucinations, P's character presents o being F when S is not in perceptual 
contact with o or any other suitable object.
P6- In hallucinations, P's character is not determined by o
C2- The relational commitment is mistaken 
 Though both arguments reach the same conclusion, they do so in different ways. 
Illusions merely distort our contact with an object, they do not involve mere appearances. 
As we saw in chapter 2, this sort of distortion is acceptable on a sufficiently elaborated 
relational view. P2 can be made consistent with world-contact  by distinguishing objects 
and their appearances, and this blocks P3 which in conjunction with P1 leads to the 
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rejection of relationalism. So illusions do not pose the problem they were once thought to 
pose to the idea of world-contact. By contrast hallucinations cannot be dealt  with in the 
same way. They do not  merely  involve a misleading appearance, but also a mere 
appearance. Mere appearances raise the possibility that perceptual contact with an object 
is unnecessary  for being in a perceptual state, and thus reject the core relationalist 
commitment. Hence the argument from hallucinations has played a central role in 
rejecting relationalism.
 We can either accept  the argument from hallucination or reject it. If we reject it 
then we think that hallucinations do not compromise the relational view and with it the 
core commitment to world-contact. If we accept the argument, we can do so on one of 
two grounds. We can accept that hallucinations are not relational at all, or hold on to their 
relationality but argue that they require a revisionary  ontology. This is because world-
contact decomposes into two claims:
(1) Contact: Perceptual states involve the perceptual contact relation.
(2) Worldliness: The object we are in perceptual contact with is a worldly object, 
that is, a particular, material, and mind-independent object. 
(1) commits us to the relational character of perceptual states, and (2) to the type of 
objects we are perceptually  related to. This means that we can reject (2) without (1) but 
not (1) without (2) (since the absence of perceptual contact from (1) makes the 
commitment to (2) unnecessary.82). We can claim that  both (1) and (2) are compromised 
and so hallucinations do not involve perceptual contact at all, or we claim that (2) but not 
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the object. But one might think that all perceptual objects are worldly objects and deny that we a bear a perceptual contact relation to these objects. We might, for 
instance, represent worldly objects and only worldly objects. In this case, we accept a statement like (2) without (1).
(1) is compromised because hallucinations do not involve relations to ordinary worldly 
objects, but are relations to what we may call extraworldly objects. Alternatively if we 
reject the argument from hallucination, we will maintain that  hallucinations compromise 
neither (1) nor (2). 
 If we reject (1) and (2), then we have given up on views like Pure and Impure 
relationalism. Instead of appealing to perceptual contact  or a similar relation, we 
characterize  perceptual states as consisting most fundamentally  in intrinsic, nonrelational 
properties. In some cases, this means characterizing the state in terms of qualia, which 
are mental and qualitative aspects of consciousness. In other cases, this means 
characterizing states in terms of representational contents, where those contents are 
general and not object-dependent.83 On these views, the difference between veridical and 
nonveridical states is external to the phenomenology of the state. For instance, veridical 
cases might involve appropriate causal connections between the state and its objects, 
while nonveridical cases do not do so.
 Rejecting (2) but not (1) preserves something like pure and impure relationalism. 
The difference in these cases is that hallucinations involve a modification of our idea of 
worldly objects. Hallucinatory states involves relations to something, but they  are no 
ordinary  worldly object for us to be related to. So we need to introduce a new type or 
types of object to be related to in hallucinatory cases. This means a revisionary ontology 
is required. I call an ontology revisionary just in case it goes beyond our ordinary 
ontology, the ontology  endorsed by the commonsensical view of the world coupled with 
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the scientific findings about it.84 Different views endorse different revisions. For instance, 
A.D. Smith (2002) proposes that  hallucinations involve relations to nonexistent or 
Meinongian objects, and it is those extraworldly objects that account for hallucinatory 
phenomenology. Mark Johnston (2004), by contrast, maintains that hallucinations 
involves relations to sensible profiles, where such profiles, unlike their veridical 
counterparts, involve properties without bearers; uninstantiated properties. Like Johnston, 
Michael Tye (2011) also accepts uninstantiated properties in hallucinatory  cases. 
Common to these stipulates is the function they serve: they are the objects of 
hallucination.
 The views resulting from the rejection of (2) but not (1) can accept the stipulated 
entities for hallucinatory cases only, or for all perceptual cases. Smith, Johnston, and 
Tye's views all limit their stipulates to hallucinatory  cases, but older views, like indirect 
realist and idealist views do not do so. Indirect views (for example, those endorsed by 
many early modern philosophers)85, depart from relational views in maintaining that the 
stipulated extraworldly objects are  intermediaries between the perceiver and her world in 
good cases, but as the final object in bad cases. The most well-known recent form of this 
view is the sense-data view on which sense-data are stipulated as the direct  objects of 
perception, with these objects being connected to worldly objects in good but not bad 
cases. On these views, relationalism is limited to our relation to the mediating entity. On 
idealist views (two examples are George Berkeley's (1998) and Foster's (2000) views), 
the extra-worldly object do not act as intermediaries in good but not bad cases. Instead, 
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they  replace our ordinary ontology. Berkeley, for instance, argued that all worldly  objects 
were mind-dependent. What differentiates veridical from hallucinatory cases is the way 
in which these objects feature in our perceptual states. Veridical cases are of consistently 
present mind-dependent objects, while hallucinations are inconsistent, violating the laws 
usually  obeyed. Thus a hallucination presents an object that is visible but untouchable 
when normally  it would be touchable, or that is visible only  from one angle but not 
another when usually it would be visible from every  angle. Like indirect realism, 
idealism offers a common core of extraworldly objects, but unlike indirect realism, it 
does not make its objects mere intermediaries. In this way  it maintains relationalism but 
with a modified ontology.86
 Rejecting (1) and (2) and with them the argument from hallucinations best 
preserves pure and impure relationalism. These views are fully  relational in the sense that 
they  reject the idea that hallucinations compromise or require a modification of world-
contact in any way. The dominant strategy of procuring world-contact involves denying 
that hallucinations are perceptual (by either maintaining they  are cases of imagination or 
belief, for example)87. Since they are not, they cannot compromise perceptual contact. 
Two examples are Martin (2004, 2006) and Fish's (2009) views. On Martin's view, 
hallucinations are most basically states with a particular epistemic property, the property 
of being indistinguishable from a corresponding veridical case from the perspective of the 
perceiver. This property is not grounded in a more fundamental phenomenal character of 
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86  Perhaps some varieties of skepticism also warrant a place in this category. On such views, the ontological structure of reality is unknowable or, on a 
metaphysical skepticism, nonexistent. The result is that one is left only with perceptual seemings. These, the skeptic could maintain, are objects of contact, 
although they are not worldly objects. A possible proponent of this view is Descartes by the end of the second meditation.
87 For more, see Macpherson (2013).
such states, but is rather a stand-alone property of some mental states. Fish's (2009) view 
elaborates on this sort of property by  identifying hallucinations with states that  match 
veridical states in their cognitive and behavioral profile, yet are nothing more than 
undergoing these effects. On both views, hallucinations are not distinctively  perceptual 
phenomena since they do not involve a perceptual phenomenology. As such, 
hallucinations compromise world-contact; they are not perceptual at all.
3.3 A Different View of Hallucinations
 If one is committed to relationalism, then it seems that one can must either posit 
objects to be related to when hallucinating, or else deny the perceptual character of 
hallucinations. Both options are problematic.88 Here I will briefly  discuss some worries 
for each option, and then argue that we can avoid both options by rejecting the 
conception of hallucinations that drives each response.
 Consider the option of positing entities to which we are related to in cases of 
hallucination. There are at least four reasons for why this is problematic. One is that the 
entities posited are peculiar (Schellenberg 2010, 2011). For instance properties we 
perceive usually have bearers. The property is an abstract entity that is instanced at a 
particular space and time by  its bearer. But since an uninstantiated property has no bearer, 
it is not clear how we can perceive the abstract property. A second worry is that the 
posited entity may screen off the worldly objects even in veridical cases (Martin 2004). If 
the posited entity  depends on replicating the internal state of the perceiver, then this entity 
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88 For instance Siegel (2011) has discussed problems with the eliminative strategy, Martin (2004) has raised the screening off worry for views that substantiate 
hallucinations, and Schellenberg (2011) has argued against the introduction of “peculiar” entities for hallucinatory cases.
will be sufficient for the experience's character even in veridical cases. A third worry is 
that the entities posited seem to be introduced ad hoc, they are custom-made to respond to 
the problem of hallucinations. A fourth worry is that the stipulated entities make 
hallucinations too real. Assuming one could argue that these entities are particular to 
hallucinations, then a surprising conclusion follows: when we hallucinate, we make an 
empirical discovery. Just as we can discover there is a new type of frog by looking 
somewhere, so when we hallucinate we discover a new type of thing, for instance, a 
perceptible uninstantiated property, or a perceptible Meinongian object. Hallucinations 
seems to introduce us to new objects in the world. A final worry is that the stipulation of 
these entities, and the fact that  they are distinctive to hallucinations, bloats our reality. So 
unless they are necessary, we should avoid them. 
 The alternative of denying hallucinatory phenomenology  seems equally 
unsatisfactory. If positing extraworldly objects makes hallucinations too real, denying 
hallucinations perceptual character makes them too unreal. First, there are 
phenomenological reasons against the view. If hallucinations are not genuinely 
perceptual, then we must explain away there apparently perceptual phenomenology. 
Phenomenologically, hallucinations can be fairly mundane, like experiencing an 
afterimage. It seems farfetched to think one is not undergoing any phenomenology in 
those cases (e.g. the redness of the heart  from the first section). One might argue that 
afterimages are either not hallucinations, or else partial hallucinations to be explained in a 
different way (more on this later), but there are many  instance of hallucination that  have a 
strikingly perceptual phenomenology. Rejecting the sincere reports of hallucinators seem 
111
to attribute delusion to them, and this is a high price to pay. A second related worry is that 
the idea that hallucinators are delusional is unappealing from the perspective of 
commonsense. If relationalism is partly  motivated by commonsense, then it  seems to go 
against the grain of this motivation to argue that hallucinations are nonperceptual. 
Anyone who has undergone a hallucination commonsensically believes that they 
perceived something. To deny this seems to undermine the commonsense appeal of 
relationalism. A third worry is that the assimilation of hallucinations to delusions seems 
mistaken for various reasons. I will understand a delusion to be the attitude of adopting a 
mistaken belief which the deluded subject finds it  hard or impossible to dismiss on the 
basis of their experience even when they know (e.g. from testimony) it is mistaken. Even 
the most sympathetic eliminative view of hallucinations treats hallucinations as 
delusions. Hallucinations are at best delusions involving perceptual beliefs.89 Even if this 
is compatible with hallucinators reporting phenomenal character, it  is not empirically 
plausible. Scientifically, there is a large body of empirical evidence that suggests 
hallucinations are perceptual because they are implicated in specifically perceptual 
regions of the brain.90  Moreover the mistake of taking hallucinations to be delusions 
seems a sociological artifact in two ways. First, consider these quotes in  Sacks' recent 
(2012) book Hallucinations: 
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89 This is, for instance, Fish’s 2009 view.
90 For instance, see Ffytche 2013 and Naish 2013 for interesting data to that effect, but also Sacks 2013 which recounts many different types of hallucinations 
and discusses their physiological underpinnings.
But in modern Western culture, hallucinations are more often considered to 
portend madness or something dire happening to the brain—even though the vast 
majority of hallucinations have no such dark implications.91
and
Psychiatry, and society  in general, had been subverted by the almost axiomatic 
belief that “hearing voices” spelled madness and never occurred except in the 
context of severe mental disturbance.92
and
Smith’s father and grandfather rarely spoke of their voices. They listened to them 
in secrecy and silence, perhaps feeling that admitting to hearing voices would be 
seen as an 
indication of madness or at least serious psychiatric  turmoil.93
These excerpts suggest that Western society, at  the very least, has long thought that 
hallucinations involve delusions. Second, if we consider the fact that discussions of 
perception have historically occurred in primarily epistemic contexts, we can see how 
delusions and hallucinations can seem to collapse: both result in a bad epistemic 
situation.
 But relationalism is not forced to choose between these two distasteful routes. 
This is because both views begin by assuming that hallucinations are cases that do not 
involve perceptual contact but which have the requisite perceptual phenomenology. If 
hallucinations are indeed like that, then the only two routes of maintaining a relational 
view is either rejecting such hallucinations, or finding a special object to be related to 
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91  Excerpt From: Oliver Sacks. “Hal lucinat ions.” iBooks. ht tps: / / i tunes.apple .com/WebObjects /MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?
id=616A22ECB53B33BE125F87DBEFD3959E
92  Excerpt From: Oliver Sacks. “Hal lucinat ions.” iBooks. ht tps: / / i tunes.apple .com/WebObjects /MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?
id=616A22ECB53B33BE125F87DBEFD3959E
93  Excerpt From: Oliver Sacks. “Hal lucinat ions.” iBooks. ht tps: / / i tunes.apple .com/WebObjects /MZStore.woa/wa/viewBook?
id=616A22ECB53B33BE125F87DBEFD3959E
when hallucinating. However we can reject the assumption that hallucinations involve a 
mere appearance; a perceptual phenomenology without world-contact. We can think that 
hallucinations, like veridical and illusory states, involve perceptual contact with worldly 
objects.
3.4 Dualism, Hallucinism, and Illusionism
 To think that hallucinations do not involve mere appearances is to reject the idea 
that hallucinations are fundamentally different from the misperceptual case of illusions. 
This is not a denial of hallucinations, it  is the claim that we have exaggerated the 
difference between illusions and hallucinations. Hallucinations, along with illusions, lie 
on a single spectrum along with many perceptually  curious cases. And like illusions, 
hallucinations involve misleading appearances but not mere appearances. In general, 
there are three ways of thinking about the relationship between illusions and 
hallucinations. Recall the definitions
S undergoes an illusion as of o being F only if:
1- S in a perceptual state with a phenomenal character that presents o as being F,
2- S is in perceptual contact with o, and
3- o is not F
S undergoes a hallucination as of o being F only if:
1- S in a perceptual state with a phenomenal character that presents o being F, and
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2- S is not in perceptual contact with o or any  other object that has F (either 
because S is not in any  perceptual contact, or because they are in contact with an 
inappropriate object). 
Discussions of illusions and hallucinations in the literature suggest  at  least three different 
ways of construing the metaphysics of these two states, provided both are perceptual: (1) 
One may take illusions and hallucinations to be fundamentally different perceptual 
phenomena. (2) Alternatively, one might think they are fundamentally the same, and thus 
assimilate illusions to hallucinations, or (3) hallucinations to illusions. Although these 
three ways of dividing misperceptual cases remain largely  implicit in the literature, all 
three construals have emerged in it.
 On the first  construal, which we can call misperceptual dualism (dualism for 
short), illusions and hallucinations are fundamentally different states. Illusions are cases 
of perceptual contact  like veridical cases, but hallucinations are cases of lost contact. 
Many philosophers endorse or assume this view. We saw Siegel and Foster endorse it  in 
section 1, and we can see some others assuming it here
A.D. Smith: "In illusion, although a physical object appears other than it actually 
is, that very object is really perceived; in hallucination, “that” physical object does 
not exist."94 
James Genone: "Philosophers usually  divide misleading perceptual experiences 
into two categories: hallucinations—understood as experiences which lack a 
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mind-independent object of awareness, and illusions—understood as experiences 
in which perceived objects appear to have properties they in fact lack."95  
Benj Hellie: "…in a case of hallucination, intuitively, one's experience is "cut off" 
from one's environment"96
 Notice that  each of these philosophers accepts the relational view but thinks that 
hallucinations violate the core relational commitment. In each case the hallucinatory state 
has a phenomenology, a way things are for the perceiver, but without the need for 
perceptual contact. By distinguishing hallucinations through their lack of perceptual 
contact, these views commit  us to a mere appearance. Since dualism must appeal to mere 
appearances, it must give a particular construal of them, for instance as special objects we 
can be related to (e.g. sense data), or else as intrinsic characters of hallucinatory states 
(e.g. qualia).
 Aside from its endorsement by  philosophers, dualism seems to have an intuitive 
appeal. It helps us explain the distinction between certain types of misperceptual cases. 
For instance, consider these two cases
(1) Woman on LSD: In a perceptual state that presents a green lizard seen on the 
white wall before her.
(2) Man seeing the Zöllner illusion: In a perceptual state that presents nonparallel 
lines while looking at the Zöllner lines before him.
Intuitively (1) and (2) seem different. (2) puts the perceiver in perceptual contact with a 
worldly object, the lines, which appear a particular way, (1) seems not to involve any 
116
95 Genone 2013 p.25 (draft)
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lizards or lizard appearances. The perceiver experiences a lizard when the wall looks 
nothing like a lizard. Second, the lizard is something that only the woman can see, the 
distorted lines, by  contrast, are visible to everyone; they are public property. Dualism 
seems to explain this intuitive difference well: the first case, but not the second, involves 
a mere appearance. The intersubjective accessibility of the Zöllner illusion but not the 
LSD-induced lizard is explained by the fact that the LSD case involves a mere 
appearance, and since mere appearances are environment-independent but mind-
dependent, we have an explanation of why others don't  see the lizard. Or consider how 
the lizard seems to look nothing like the wall. If mere appearances are involved, and 
these appearances are internally generated, then that fact is easily explained. By  contrast, 
since illusions do not involve mere appearances, we can see how they would have to be 
related to the lines on the page, and why the illusion would be publicly visible. Dualism 
seems to capture the sense in which a hallucinator experiences something that “is not 
there”, while victims of illusion are merely fooled by what lies before them.
 The wide endorsement and intuitive appeal of dualism makes it a strong candidate for 
understanding the difference between illusions and hallucinations, but it is not the only 
candidate. On the second and third construals, illusions and hallucinations do not differ in 
kind, so either both involve mere appearances or neither do. The collapse can occur in 
either direction. We can call the view that makes endorses mere appearances for all 
misperceptual cases the hallucinist views, and the ones that denies mere appearances for 
both cases the illusionist views.  The first view thinks that both the arguments from 
illusion and hallucination establish mere appearances. As an example, the hallucinist  will 
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treat the Zöllner illusion as follows: (i) some part of the world - the parallel lines - fail to 
be presented. As such, perceptual contact with that property  is severed. And, (ii) 
nonparallel lines (or the property of being nonparallel) are merely presented. On this 
view, the Zöllner lines involve a property  perceived that does not depend on perceptual 
contact, and as such the lines involve a mere appearance. Hallucinism was once a popular 
view. The larger part  of philosophical history might be interpreted as accepting 
hallucinism insofar as both the arguments from illusion and hallucination were thought to 
undermine relationalism. As we saw there was a time when both the arguments from 
illusion and hallucination were thought to establish the need for intermediaries, and so 
many indirect realist views (e.g. from the early modern period, or sense-data views) 
assumed the need for mere appearances in all perceptual cases, and thus in illusory  and 
hallucinatory cases. 
 Unlike hallucinism and dualism, illusionism has not enjoyed any  period of 
dominance, but the view seems to be gaining more currency. One reason for this is that 
many relationalists are actively seeking an understanding of hallucinations that  does not 
violate the relational view. The problem with dualism (and hallucinism) is that it  forces us 
to accept mere appearances for hallucinatory cases, and this means that  hallucinations 
cannot involve world-contact. This is why we saw the eliminative strategy and the 
extraworldly object strategies emerge. More recently, the idea of hallucinations involving 
mere appearances at all has been questioned. For instance, Hellie casts doubt on the idea 
of such hallucinations which he spells out in terms of hallucinations belonging to a 
narrowly supervenient fundamental kind. He says: "I am not certain why we should 
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accept the [narrow supervenience] assumption: the alternative would be that the 
fundamental kind of a hallucination takes in its external conditions, such as its failure to 
be caused in a normal way by external conditions."97  Although he suggests that  the 
narrow supervenience assumption is made more plausible if we formulate the idea using 
experiential properties, and moreover registers the intuitiveness of the world-severing 
construal, he parenthetically states that these ideas are still contestable.98 Furthermore, 
Hellie himself endorses a view on which hallucinations themselves are a disjunctive 
category. This leaves open the possibility  that at least  some, and maybe all, cases of 
hallucination involve perceptual contact. Genone (2013) too registers a similar hesitation 
in discussing the illusion/hallucination distinction. He acknowledges the dualist 
interpretation, but then writes "If one surveys examples of perceptual illusions discussed 
by psychologists, along with familiar examples of hallucinations, mirages, and other 
related phenomena, it turns out that they preclude such straightforward [dualist] 
categorization."99 
 William Alston (1999), David Chalmers (2005), Shaun Gallagher (2008), and Dan 
Zahavi (2008), and Sebastian Watzl (manuscript) have all also endorsed illusionism to 
different extents. For instance Alston (1999) suggests three illusionist proposals, in 
passing, as possible responses to the problem of hallucinations raised for his theory  of 
appearing. He writes:
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If Macbeth’s hallucination of a dagger is to be handled by [the theory of 
appearing], we must find something actually existing that looked dagger- like to 
Macbeth. And what might that be? There are various candidates. One is the air 
occupying the region where the dagger appears to be. Another is the portion of 
space apparently occupied by the dagger. A less plausible candidate would be the 
part of the brain playing a causal role in the production of that  experience. Of 
these alternatives I prefer the first.100
Each of these three proposals is an illusionist proposal. The first takes hallucinations to 
be relations to the air or whatever else occupies the region in which the hallucinatory 
dagger appears, the second takes hallucinations to be relations to the space where the 
dagger appears, and the third takes hallucinations to be relations to one's own brain, 
specifically that part that  is causally responsible for the hallucinatory  appearance. As 
Alston points out, these views are not all on par. Some are less plausible than others, and 
this is why one might prefer one view over the others. Alston, however, does not think 
that all hallucinations can be explained this way. Here writes "But this account will not 
handle more total hallucinations or dreams, if dreams are to be put under the rubric of 
‘perceptual experience'."101 Instead he suggests relations to mental images, which given 
our framework would violate the core commitment to the commonsensical nature of 
relationalism. 
 Both Chalmers (2005) and Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) also consider illusionist 
proposals which they constrain to the case of envatted brains. In the context of discussing 
the movie the Matrix, Chalmers argues that the movie's scenario, which is one variant of 
the envatted brain, is not a skeptical scenario. Indeed no brain-in-a-vat case is. Instead, 
such scenarios are metaphysical scenarios. Chalmers writes  
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I argue that the hypothesis that I am envatted is not a skeptical hypothesis, but a 
metaphysical hypothesis. That is, it is a hypothesis about the underlying nature of 
reality.102
and then
The Metaphysical Hypothesis here tells us about the processes underlying our 
ordinary  reality, but it does not entail that this reality does not exist. We still have 
bodies, and there are still chairs and tables: it's just that their fundamental nature 
is a bit different from what we may have thought. In this manner, the 
Metaphysical Hypothesis is analogous to a physical hypotheses, such as one 
involving quantum mechanics. Both the physical hypothesis and the Metaphysical 
Hypothesis tells us about the processes underlying chairs. They do not entail that 
there are no chairs. Rather, they tell us what chairs are really like.103 
 Similarly, Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) ask "whether the notion of a disembodied 
brain (a brain in a vat) is at all intelligible"104 and then respond saying:
The brain-in-the-vat thought experiment actually shows that perception and action 
do require some kind of embodiment. Even the pure brain-in- the-vat requires 
absolutely everything that the body normally provides – for example, sensory 
input and life support. Indeed, the importance of the body can be measured in 
considering precisely  what it  would take to sustain a disembodied brain and the 
supposed experience that goes along with it. What is possible for a brain-in-the-
vat is only possible if it is provided with a properly balanced nutrition, a properly 
balanced mix of hormones and neurotransmitters, and a complex stream of 
sensory  information, properly  adjusted for the temporal differentiations that are in 
fact involved in intermodal binding. If we consider only the visual input, we 
would have to assume that any poking around in the visual cortex that would 
replicate our human visual experience would have to be so specified in its details, 
that an analogue or digital input mechanism would have to be as complicated, as 
chemically  complex, and as enactive as the human eye. That is, the full and 
extraordinary  support system that would be required to allow a brain-in-a-vat to 
experience things as we experience them, or in other words, to allow a brain-in-a-
vat to be phenomenologically in-the-world and not just physically in-a-vat, would 
have to replicate the bodily system that already supports our ordinary existence.105
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 Both these views accept illusionism for the case of envatted brains. Chalmers 
thinks that  in the envatted brain the perceiver is in perceptual contact with actual objects, 
albeit objects with a nature that is fundamentally different from the nature it  takes them to 
have. It think they are atoms, but instead they are data. Gallagher and Zahavi also take 
envatted brains to involve relations to digital inputs from the envatting apparatus. The 
envatted brain may use a different route to receive its inputs from the external world, but 
it nevertheless does receive such inputs, and it is these inputs that are perceived. 
 Finally, Watzl (manuscript) has argued for an illusionist view on which all 
hallucinations involve perceptual contact. We will consider his view and argument in the 




In this chapter I argue that we should accept an illusionist view of hallucinations. This is 
because illusionism is the most conservative position on hallucinations, and insofar as it 
can explain how all cases of hallucination are possible, we should continue to uphold it. I 
give four arguments for these claims. First, I begin by arguing that there are no good 
arguments for the idea that hallucinations involve mere appearances. I then argue that in 
general, the only  reason we have for thinking that  there is no perceptual contact in 
hallucinations is that we adopt a mistaken restrictive conception of what we can be in 
perceptual contact with when hallucinating. Third, I use Watzl's smooth transition 
argument to show that the arguments hold for all hallucinatory  cases, and not just  some. 
Finally, I supplement Watzl's argument with a discussion of different ways in which once 
can deal with the hardest hallucinatory cases.
4.1 Against Dualism and Hallucinism
 In the last chapter we saw that there are three ways of understanding the illusion-
hallucination distinction: 
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(1) Dualism: On which illusions and hallucinations are fundamentally different 
types of misperception, where hallucinations but not illusions involve mere 
appearances
(2) Hallucinism: On which all misperceptual cases involve mere appearances.
(3) Illusionism: On which all cases involve world-contact, just as with cases of 
illusion.
Why should we accept the illusionist view? One reason is that illusionism seems to be the 
most conservative and least  revisionary view of misperception. It is just as compatible 
with the commonsense observation of perceptual error as the other views. But it  is more 
compatible with the commonsense observation of perceptual contact because since only 
illusionism requires no  modification of our commonsense understanding of perception 
which motivates relationalism. We should abandon illusionism only  if we have reason to. 
But do we? Are there reasons to accept that hallucinations involve mere appearances? I 
think that at least  four arguments have been forward in defense of hallucinations 
requiring mere appearances. Those are the definition argument, the introspective 
argument, the conceivability argument, and the scientific argument. None of these 
arguments are convincing. If not, then we should accept illusionism. Consider:
Argument 1: The Definition Argument
 A first “argument” for interpreting hallucinations as world-severing is that this is 
just what the definition of a hallucination is, and so such cases are not up for debate. 
Consider A.D. Smith saying something to this effect
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In illusion, although a physical object appears other than it actually is, that very 
object is really perceived; in hallucination, “that” physical object does not 
exist….If you are misperceiving a part of the carpet as a pink rat, we have a case 
of illusion, not hallucination.106 
Smith is making two different points in this selection. One is that  the object of 
hallucination, in a sense, does not exist. Another is that the hallucinatory state is by 
definition not a case of misperceiving a part of the perceiver's surroundings.107  This 
second claim amounts to saying that hallucinations are by definition world-severing. 
Perhaps Smith can be more charitably interpreted as appealing to tradition rather than 
definition. It is also possible that he does not mean his words to imply the definitional 
existence of world-severing cases. But it remains instructive to consider his claim in a 
more loaded sense. This is because one can easily see how this is a possible reaction 
when confronted with the illusionist position: Aren't hallucinations by definition cases in 
which we fail to perceptually relate to the world?
 But this is easily objected to. If my  three construals of the illusion-hallucination 
distinction are not incoherent, it  cannot be that hallucinations are by definition world-
severing. The world-severing way of thinking about hallucinations is just one of two 
ways of thinking about them. To stipulate it amounts to accepting a substantive construal 
of hallucination. Moreover, even if it is incoherent to construe hallucinations in an 
illusionist way, there still remains the denial of perceptual hallucinations altogether. As I 
pointed out, Martin (2006) and Fish (2009) at the very least deny  that hallucinations are 
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107 These two claims are independent because one is about the ontological status of the hallucinatory object and the other is about how one comes to experience 
it. Whether the object exists or not one could think that one experiences it by being related to some part of the surroundings, or not. What I am against in Smith’s 
claim is his second idea, that we come to experience the object without being related to the surroundings. As we will see, I think Smith is right to say that the 
hallucinatory object is in a sense, nonexistent.
strictly speaking perceptual. They are rather cognitive and behavior effects which are 
usually  associated with perception but not themselves perceptual. Finally, even if we 
construe this argument as one that harks back to the philosophical tradition, as 
philosophers we do not just accept the tradition. It could be that this was the default 
definition of hallucinations for much of philosophical history, but the definition is no 
more sacred than the definition of knowledge as true justified belief turned out sacred.
Argument 2: The Introspection Argument 
 A much better argument, although still a mistaken argument, is the argument from 
introspection. It  states that one's introspective access to one’s own hallucinatory 
experiences establishes that they are world-severing. I can think of three distinct 
problems with this claim: First, introspection’s verdict is unclear. Second, introspection's 
verdict is fallible, particularly so when it comes to lived hallucinations. Third, lived 
hallucinatory experiences often occur when one against a veridically perceived 
background, and such hallucinations cannot establish that they  are world-severing even if 
introspection is trustworthy. Let's consider these.
 If introspection revealed the essence of perceptual states, the philosophy of 
perception would have more answers than it does. The essence of veridical cases - 
whether they are best understood in terms of a perceptual relation, representational 
contents, qualia, adverbially  modified  relations, or sense-data - is just not obvious from 
our introspective access into our own perceptual states. If this is the case with veridical 
situations, why would one expect introspection to reveal the essence of hallucinations? 
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Hallucinations have been variously understood as relations to extraordinary objects (e.g. 
as relations to sense-data), extraordinary relations to ordinary objects (e.g. as 
adverbialists might think), as nonrelational (e.g. as consisting in qualia), as nonperceptual 
(e.g. as “cognitive effects”), etc. None of these are clearly refuted by introspection. So 
introspection's verdict is simply unclear. 
 A second problem is that introspection’s verdict is, generally  speaking, fallible. 
Moreover it is particularly  fallible in cases of lived hallucinations. Real hallucinations are 
for the most part accompanied by cognitive deficiency. Hallucinogenic substances, sleep 
deprivation, fever, hypnagogic (the state immediately before falling asleep) and 
hypnopompic (the state as one is about to wake up) states, as well as various medical 
conditions are all accompanied by cognitive decline, or at least cognitive unclarity. In 
light of this, there's a a specific reason to worry about using introspection to discover the 
essence of hallucinations.  
 But perhaps it can be said that neither of the above arguments are conclusive. 
Introspection may not reveal the essence of hallucinatory states, but it might still reveal 
significant facts that have bearing on the hallucinatory essence. And, even if one cannot 
introspect during the hallucinatory experience, one might introspect on one's memory of 
having been in the hallucinatory state. In response to these we can raise the third and 
most difficult problem for the use of introspection to establish world-severing cases: 
actual cases of hallucination occur against a veridical background, and such cases are 
poor evidence for world-severing hallucinations. 
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 This is so for several reasons. First, as long as one is related to some real parts of 
the world, a variety  of phenomena can generate the appearance of a hallucination out of 
worldly objects. To see this, consider again Alston’s claim that hallucinations are 
relations to air or space. This sounds implausible on the face of it. But consider three 
facts along with his suggestion (for now I constrain myself to a visual case, but in chapter 
5 I discuss other modalities): (1) the fact that space and air are visually  transparent, and 
as transparent  they inherit  the qualities of the background. For instance a chunk of space 
or some air right in front of you will take on the color of whatever is behind it. If you 
focus on it, you find yourself seeing whatever color is in the background. So if the wall 
behind the empty space is yellow, the space itself will seem to inherit that yellow. 
Imagine painting this part of space. You would not do so by leaving the canvas empty, 
you would do so by  putting yellow there. We can call this phenomena “qualitative 
inheritance”. And we should note that it is not just true of color, but also of (visual) 
textures and shapes, as well as sounds. All those can be qualitatively inherited by empty 
space. (2) Along with this inheritance, consider the fact that the perceptual world easily 
allows us to mislocate objects and their qualities. Something distant and large might 
appear close and small, or vice versa. A good example is Ames Room in which the 
distorted perspective makes some people or objects in the room appear much larger than 
others despite being the same size. Another example is the surface of water which often 
displays a panoply of colors none of which are actually  colors of the water. Rather the 
colors are located elsewhere in other objects that are reflected in the water. Mirrors, of 
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course, do the same. Finally  consider the role shadows play in perceived location. Here 
are two images that make the point forcefully:
(3) Finally, along with inheritance and mislocation, consider the phenomena of “seeing-
in” which I will return to later. For now, we can think of it ostensively: one can see 
shapes and objects in clouds, in fires, and in chaotic distributions of color. For 
illustration, consider the image below which makes use of this phenomena (the man is 
seen in the collection of vegetables, flowers, and fruits):
In light of these, we can now consider a case of hallucinating while related to a 
background of perceived objects. Take Macbeth hallucinating the bloodied dagger against 
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a veridical background. Is it  so implausible to suppose that Macbeth saw the whiteness of 
a marble table, the black and red of a nearby curtain, mislocated their colors, and saw in 
the distribution a bloodied dagger given his state of mind? It seems to me the answer is 
no (more elaboration on cases like this will follow in the third and fourth chapters). It's 
also worth adding that though the phenomena I described and the example have been 
visual, similar phenomena and examples can be constructed with hearing. A silent room 
inherits the sounds from the neighboring room, sounds can be mislocated, and one can 
hear one sound in another, as when one hears a song or words in a cacophony of sounds.
 The example above makes tenable the idea that hallucinations against a worldly 
background need not  be world-severing, but the example is generalizable. For as long as 
their are objects, it will be difficult  to establish that a hallucination is world-severing 
since hallucinations can be construed as involving anomalous relations to worldly 
objects, or anomalous relations between worldly objects. If a perceiver suffers 
fluctuations in her perceptual apparatus, or her attention, or her wider state of mind while 
perceiving a fixed environment, the character of her state will vary unsystematically with 
the objects in her world but  systematically with her state. So the phenomenal changes 
will not be easily  traced back to the constitutively determining object. For all that, the 
perceiver will not have lost perceptual contact with her world. Moreover the object and 
the perceiver's state may both remain stable while changes in the surrounding 
environment occur. The strobing lights of a club or a rave can do much to the way an 
object appears even though the perceiver and the object remain as they are. 
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 So one diagnosis of the appearance of a strong distinction between illusions and 
hallucinations is that illusion, but not hallucinations, vary systematically with 
environmental changes. The pen may look bent when partly submerged, but drain the 
water and it no long appears that way. Similarly  erasing the arrows of the Müller-Lyer 
lines makes the lines appear equal again. Hallucinations seem are not to be like that. One 
hallucinates something out of the blue, without systematic relations to the surrounding 
environment, and this is why hallucinations appear world severing. So the idea is that we 
can infer from:
(a) hallucinations do not systematically vary with the worldly objects perceived
that 
(b) hallucinations are not relations to the worldly objects perceived
But one way to understand the examples I gave, and the anomalous relations I cited, is as 
demonstrating that one cannot move from (a) to (b). It may not always be easy to notice 
the changes that ground the hallucinatory appearance, but this does not establish that the 
hallucination is a mere appearance. Sometimes the states of the subject are responsible, 
other times the surrounding objects are responsible, and yet other times it is just the 
object itself that is somehow deceptive.
 At this point one might admit that it  is hard to establish world-severing 
hallucinations by appeal to hallucinations against veridically  perceived backgrounds, but 
what about total hallucinations without such a background? I will discuss these cases 
more fully  in the next chapter, but for now we can begin by noting that lived 
hallucinations of this sort  will almost certainly  be accompanied by  such radical cognitive 
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decline that it is likely  to be one of the worst cases to introspect on. Moreover, the most 
cited cases do not genuinely involve no perceived background. Dreams, and 
hallucinations like those had by  Charles Bonnet Syndrome patients do in fact involve 
perceiving a background, except that  it is with a different modality. A hallucination that 
does not involve perceiving a background must avoid do so in every  sensory  modality, as 
otherwise the hallucinated features may always be worldly-features received from 
another modality. This is just another example of an anomalous relation. Cases of 
multimodal illusions attest to this possibility,108 but so do conditions such as synaesthesia. 
In synaesthesia, for instance, a feature detected in one modality (e.g. a shape) makes a 
conscious impact elsewhere (e.g. by  generating a sound). The shape is therefore heard. 
This same mechanism might be exploited in unimodally  world-severing hallucinations; 
one might see what one hears or hear the pain one feels. 
 Perhaps there is one case that might be thought to fit the idea of a world-severing 
hallucinations, this is the case of dreams. Dreams are highly or exclusively  visual and 
they  involve no other sensory input being received by  the subject. This is true to an 
extent. There are interoceptive sensory inputs, as when one feel one's real thirst  in the 
dream, and there are exteroceptive inputs, as when sounds make their way into the 
dreamscape. But assuming that some dreams are such that no part  is veridical and are as 
such total, they  nevertheless lack features which would make them ideal to introspect on. 
First, unlike other perceptual states, they occur while asleep. This makes it  highly 
questionable that they  are even aptly  described as perceptual states and not, for instance, 
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imaginative states. Whether imaginative states are perceptual states or not is a 
controversial matter, so the appeal to dreams will require a considerable amount of 
background argumentation. Second, adding to the worry about their being perceptual 
states, dreams are not clearly phenomenologically indistinguishable from perceptual 
states. Although often immersive during the dream, they are almost always recalled as 
fragmented, hazy, and in general perceptually incomplete. This seems a feature 
reminiscent of imaginings (think of a daydream which is similarly incomplete and 
immersive) rather than perceptions or hallucinations. Finally, the experienced 
immersiveness during the dream contrasted with how hazy it seems in retrospect raises 
the strong suspicion that dreams are cases of radically hazy cognition. Such cases are 
hard to introspect on.
Argument 3: The Conceivability Argument
 We are now in a position to consider another important argument for world-
severing hallucinations. An important reason cited by many philosophers is that we have 
to admit world-severing hallucinations because they  are conceivable, not because there 
are actual cases.109 The contemporary philosophy of perception has its roots in Descartes 
who famously appealed to the conceivability of the evil demon scenario. A similar 
scenario is stipulated today in brain in vat (BIV) cases, and maybe this is what justifies 
the possibility of world-severing cases. But appealing to the conceivability argument is 
problematic for at  least  three reasons. First, there are the general worries about using 
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conceivability arguments to establish metaphysical possibilities. Second, one has to be 
sure that the content of one's conception is such that  it envisions the requisite 
metaphysical possibility. With the above scenarios, it is simply unclear that the content is 
of world-severing cases of hallucinations. To establish that metaphysical possibility  we 
need to conceive a hallucinatory state in which the perceiver is perceptually  severed from 
the world. But the conceived scenarios are always ones that involve an external entity 
feeding the subject some input. In the envatted brain scenario, one does not conceive a 
subject in a perceptual state and no external world, rather, one conceives the subject with 
a special external world; the envatting apparatus. This is what leads Gallagher and Zahavi 
(2008) to say "The brain-in-the-vat thought experiment actually  shows that perception 
and action do require some kind of embodiment. Even the pure brain-in-the-vat requires 
absolutely everything that the body normally  provides – for example, sensory input and 
life support."110 Similarly, in the evil demon scenario the demon plays the role of external 
world, it  feeds the perceiver false images. As long as this is so, it  is arguably the case that 
what one is conceiving is the envatted/demonized brain standing in a perceptual contact 
relation to the envatting apparatus/demon's acts. It is true that the brain being fed input 
while disembodied means that it is perceptually  related with an abnormal sense modality 
(some sort of direct stimulation), but this does not establish that it  is not perceptually 
related at all to its world. Of course to say  this is not to explain how this is so. The point 
is only  that the brain may be perceiving the demon or the apparatus, and it is not clear 
134
110 Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 p.131
that what we conceive rules out that possibility. The content of the conceivability 
argument does not clearly support world-severing hallucinations. 
 What about trying to construct a scenario that is unambiguously world-severing? 
It is not clear how that would go. What one would have to do is conceive a subject who, 
despite the complete destruction of the external world, or despite being in no perceptual 
relation to anything outside of itself at all, nevertheless continues (to be, and) to be in a 
perceptual state by sheer will or constitution. But if this is what we're conceiving, why 
think this is at all applicable to creatures like ourselves? In other words, why think this is 
a metaphysical possibility  for us? Here it seems to me that the being we conceive is so far 
departed from what we are that although we conceive the world-severing case clearly, we 
do so at the cost of not conceiving a perceiver clearly. Relationalism may not be true of 
the creature we conceive, but neither is it clearly the case that this is a perceiver at  all. 
Rather, this being seems to create its objects, generating a reality rather than perceiving 
or hallucinating it.
 Still, we might insist that in conceiving that being, we conceive a world-severing 
hallucination. If so, this brings us to the third problem with the conception: it seems to be 
an empirical matter whether our brains are indeed capable of entering a full-blown 
perceptual state without any input from the world, not a matter for conceivability. It 
would not be unfair to say  that this sort of dependence on the conceivability  argument is 
actually indicative of a general problem in philosophers’ attitude towards hallucinations. 
Philosophers seem to (at least until recently)111 have a magical theory of hallucinations, 
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where hallucinations are treated as if they lie outside the empirical sphere. With the 
conceivability argument's roots in Descartes’ demon scenario (which he constructed out 
of thin air in his study), philosophers seem to maintain the Cartesian conviction that 
hallucinations are best  considered and understood from the armchair without the need for 
empirical input. The result is that empirical work and distinctions are largely  ignored, 
current empirical hypotheses are never mentioned, and the varieties of hallucinatory  types 
never considered. Moreover, as they are conceived, hallucinations are treated as if they 
occurred in a mental vacuum, where multimodal interactions, conceptual differences, 
attention, memory, and the emergence of gestalt properties have no phenomenal impact 
on what one experiences at all. In this way, it is left to one's prior commitments to decide 
how one will characterize the essence of the hallucination, e.g. whether they will be 
cognitive effects or phenomenologically indistinguishable representations.
Argument 4: The Scientific Argument
 This brings us to the final argument in favor of world-severing hallucinations. 
This argument maintains that it  is not merely  conceivable that hallucinations are world-
severing, but rather scientifically  demonstrable. One way to understand this argument is 
as beginning with a conceivability  argument and then supplementing the conceived 
scenario with scientific evidence suggesting that the scenario is scientifically plausible. 
The conceived scenario is as follows: we imagine a subject actually  perceiving some 
worldly object, and then we imagine replicating the exact brain state of that subject in a 
subject who is not  actually  perceiving (for instance a blind/deaf/anosmic/etc. subject). 
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This, according to the scenario, should lead to a phenomenologically indistinguishable 
state, but this state would be a hallucination since by stipulation the subject is not in 
perceptual contact.112 Next, it is claimed that this is not merely a conceivable scenario, 
but that it has also been - to an extent - scientifically demonstrated. There are well-
documented cases in which various ways of directly stimulating the visual cortex has 
generated phosphenes and other basic perceptual phenomena,113  and this is proof that 
with a fuller replication we can induce a full-blown perceptual state.
 Despite the supplementation by  scientific evidence, I think this argument also 
fails to establish world-severing cases. First note that the argument inherits one of the 
failures of the conceivability argument, namely, that it does not show that the perceiver is 
not in fact standing in perceptual contact to the stimulation that is generating the identical 
phenomenal state. Again, how electrical stimulations can look like e.g. a cup, needs to be 
explained, but for now the point is that this is a possibility (later on I try  to explain how 
this is now only  possible but plausible) In any case, one might also respond to the causal 
replication argument in a different way: to claim that causally  replicating the brain state 
would replicate the phenomenology begs the question against the relationalist. 
Relationalists think that the function of perceptual processing is to reveal the world, not 
replicate it. Campbell (2002) has provided a helpful metaphor to understand the way 
relationalists and intentionalists understand the role of causal processing. Intentionalism, 
he says, models perception as a television set which constructs images from the 
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information input provided, which relationalism models it as a pane of glass which just 
reveals the world. He writes
Suppose we have a medium which, like glass, can be transparent. But suppose 
that, unlike glass, it is highly volatile, and needs constant adjustment and 
recalibration if it  is to remain transparent in different contexts. Suppose, in fact, 
that the adjustment required is always sensitive to the finest details of the scene 
being viewed. The upshot of the adjustment, in each case, is still not the 
construction of a representation on the medium of the scene being viewed; the 
upshot of the adjustment is simply that the medium becomes transparent.114
So replicating the causal factors replicates the phenomenology only if an appropriate 
object is revealed by  entering the state i.e. the perceiver stands in perceptual contact to a 
given object. To claim otherwise begs the question against the relationalist; it is to assume 
that the causal factors are alone sufficient to replicate the phenomenology.
 But one might respond, “Doesn't the generation of phosphenes prove that 
something like the television model is more correct?” I think this would be too hasty. For 
one thing, the phosphenes could just be the perception (in a strange sensory modality, no 
doubt) of the stimulation. For another, recall Campbell's metaphor of the highly volatile 
glass. It's open to the relationalist to say  that in this case, the “glass” loses some of its 
usual transparency because of the direct stimulation, and in doing so it ceases to be 
transparent and therefore world revealing. Could this lack of transparency have its own 
phenomenology? Yes, according to the relationalist. Recall that relationalism does not 
deny that there can be mediating conditions on perceptual contact, and moreover does not 
deny that these can have a phenomenological character as long as that character is 
distinguishable from perceptual contact with the object. It seems to me that  if one takes 
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for granted that these phosphenes have a phenomenology, they can easily be placed into 
this class of mediating conditions. 
 The responses to these arguments do not establish that there are no mere 
appearances. They do show, however, that the case for accepting the radical 
understanding of hallucinations is weak. Our first option should be to pursue the 
illusionist route for understanding hallucinations. Illusionism sits comfortably with our 
commonsense view of perception, and while commonsense is not infallible, when we 
have little empirical or theoretical reason to overturn its judgments we should not do so. 
To depart from it for the case of hallucinations seems needlessly  extravagant. Moreover, 
illusionism seems to provide a more substantive answer to the question of hallucinations 
than either hallucinism or dualism. This is because illusionism seems to burden us with 
actually substantiating our explanation of hallucinatory cases. When we make an appeal 
to a mere appearance, whether it is a content, sense-data, or qualia, our explanation of 
hallucinatory phenomenology  seems to involve nothing but the positing an entity that is 
supposed to do the explaining. This seems like a dormitive virtue explanation: we 
misperceive because perception has contents/sense-data/etc. that allow us to misperceive. 
The illusionist position differs in its explanation. It  does not appeal to a particular entity, 
but explains how the objects of the world can appear to us in this distinctive way. The 
illusionist carries the burden of explaining how something apparently  unrelated to our 
world can turn out to be a way in which the world appears to us, and no other view does 
this. (It  is true that dualism carries this burden in the case of illusions, but this still leaves 
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the most interesting cases, those of hallucinating and seeing “what is not there” with the 
dormitive virtue explanation.)
4.2 The Worldly Objects of Hallucination
 If we are to begin with an illusionism, the first  obstacle is explaining what we are 
in perceptual contact with in cases of hallucination. There are different types of 
hallucinations and a fully illusionist  view would have to explain how all varieties of 
hallucination depend on world-contact. This means that the illusionist is committed to the 
following claim about all hallucinations:
APPEARING: For any hallucinatory state P as of F, there is an appropriate object, 
o, perceptual contact with which accounts for F.115
APPEARING should hold true of four types of cases which are discussed in the 
literature. Fish distinguishes pure hallucinations which are “hallucinations that take place 
in the absence of any background experience of the world”116  from impure ones which 
are cases that do not occur in the absence of a background experience of the world. 
Genone distinguishes total from partial cases, writing 
First, the hallucination of one or more non-existent  objects in an otherwise 
normally perceived scene (a partial hallucination); and second, the hallucination 
of an entire scene, such that the subject’s experience bears no relation to her 
actual environment (a total hallucination).117
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116 Fish 2009 p.93
117 Genone 2013 p.26 (draft)
These are two different distinctions. The partial/total distinction is about how much of a 
perceived scene is hallucinatory, whereas the pure/impure distinction is about how the 
perceived scene is hallucinatory. A total hallucination occurs when one does not co-
perceive any worldly objects along with the hallucinatory objects, so that everything 
around one is hallucinatory. A partial hallucination, by contrast, entails that hallucinatory 
object is co-perceived along with other worldly  objects. A pure hallucination is one on 
which the “subject's experience bears no relation to her actual environment”, An impure 
hallucination does bear the  relation. These two distinctions cut across one another, with 
total pure cases being the hardest to deal with (they  most obviously involve a mere 
appearance), while impure partial cases are the easiest, often assimilated to illusions. But 
there are also pure partial hallucinations and total impure ones. A pure partial case occurs 
if, for instance, one eye is partially blind and a hallucination occurs in the blind part of 
the eye. A total impure case is one in which a perceiver with fully  functioning eyes 
nevertheless has an experience that is entirely  unlike what he is contact with. Altogether 
we get:
Pure Cases Impure Cases
Total Cases Total pure Hallucinations Impure Total Hallucinations
Partial Cases Partial pure Hallucinations Impure Partial Hallucinations
 According to dualists and hallucinists, APPEARING must be rejected in at least 
one of these cases. To evaluate this claim, we can start by considering impure cases and 
proceed to pure ones. Even if these cases seem easier, they are not entirely  easy to solve. 
For instance we can conceive hallucinating a cat against a background that has no cats or 
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anything resembling a cat. For those case, how can the illusionist  maintain 
APPEARING?
 The illusionist answer starts by explaining how objects can appear in a way that is 
radically different from the way they are, so much so that  the perceiver's hallucination 
seem independent the perceiver's actual surroundings. This can be done through two 
arguments. First, recall that  in the last section, it  became clear that systematic variation 
with environmental changes cannot demonstrate the presence of mere appearances. Some 
perceptual cases are such that they manifest a systematic variation. For instance adding 
the arrows of the Müller-Lyer lines makes the lines appear unequal, and subtracting them 
unequal. But others do not. A wall painted two colors can vary between looking like it is 
one color, and looking like it  is two colors, even if the wall and its surroundings are 
invariant. This is because some variation may be due to unperceived factors, such as 
variations in the perceiver’s mediating sensory apparatus. If a scientist were capable of 
activating color-blindness and deactivating it  in a perceiver, a wall's fixed color could 
appear to vary, and a wall with changing colors can look invariant. We can even conceive 
more sophisticated scenarios, for instance varying color-blindness mechanisms in part of 
the visual field but not others such that a a pattern emerges. So unsystematic variation 
does not demonstrate we are not in perceptual contact.
 Second, the impressions that cases of hallucination occur in the absence of 
appropriate objects is based on a false starting assumption. The assumption is that the 
properties we might be related to when hallucinating are relatively limited because there 
are only so many objects that can serve as the source of those properties. We can call this 
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the restrictive assumption. So for instance, consider a state in which a perceiver is related 
to o. The appearance constituting the phenomenology of the state is F. On the basis of F, 
the state seems to the perceiver to be of a particular object, x. x, the apparent object of the 
experience, and o, the actual object of the experience, must somehow match according to 
the restrictive assumption. The strongest version of this assumption is the result of the so 
called sense-datum inference, which states that if the experience seems to be of a 
particular thing with certain properties, then its object must be that particular thing with 
its properties. In that sense, x and o must be identical, hence the need for sense-data 
which are exactly as they appear. And while the sense-data inference is now largely 
unpopular, less restrictive assumptions seem to still be operative when hallucinists and 
dualists reject the APPEARING thesis. The problem is no version of the restrictive 
assumption is plausible, even in veridical and illusory cases. 
 We can see this if we consider different restrictive proposals for the 
appropriateness of the object in veridical and illusory  cases. Although the list of proposals 
I give is not meant to be exhaustive, and so does not demonstrate a principled bar on 
finding an acceptable restrictive condition, the list shows that some very plausible 
candidates fail. Without these restrictions, and in the absence of new suggestions, we 
should assume that finding an appropriate object to be related to is not  particularly 
difficult.
 As a first proposal, consider this:
KIND: If the state is as of an F, then the appropriate object must be of the same 
kind as F.
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This principle is obviously false. Consider a state as of perceiving a lemon. This 
condition says that if the state is as of a lemon, then the object it  is of should be of the 
same kind. Perhaps that kind is lemon, or maybe fruit. But the state can clearly be one of 
perceiving neither a lemon nor even a fruit. A plastic decoration, yellow lights projected 
on a lemon shaped cardboard cutout, a wax lemon, would all suffice for the lemon-like 
appearance. A different proposal is therefore necessary. Consider this one:
LOCATION: If the state is as of an F where the F is spatiotemporally located at L, 
then the appropriate object must have the same spatiotemporal location as F.
This proposal is much weaker than the first but fares no better. An object need neither be 
spatially  nor temporally (much less both) located in the place it is presented as being. 
Starting with spatiality, consider the following image:
Where these spheres appear to be depends on the shadows. But shadows can be 
misleading. Consider the shadows in the bottom image. They look like they are cast  by 
the spheres we see. However they  could be cast by  a straight line of horizontally placed 
spheres right under the light source and out of view. The same light source might also 
eliminate the shadows of the visible spheres. If this were to happen, we would take the 
spheres to be located at different heights (as  in the lower image) even if they are 
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positioned as they are in the first image. The below image depicts a case roughly like 
that, where the shadow is mistakenly attributed to an object that leads us to mislocate it:
Such cases also carry over to other senses, for instance auditory stereo illusions appear to 
move around even though the source does not.118
 The object need not be in the right temporal location no more than it needs to be 
in the right spatial location. A good example comes from an observation deployed in the 
time-lag argument.119 A perceiver looks at the night sky  and sees a star. But this star has 
long since perished. Whatever else might be happening in such cases, it is presumably 
true that the experience is not of a mere appearance. If it was, it would be a massive 
coincidence that we consistently hallucinate stars where real old stars used to be. So 
perceiving perished stars is a case of temporal mislocation. Similar comments apply to 
sound traveling (e.g. thunder).
 So the worldly object appropriate to a state is not constrained by kind or 
spatiotemporal location. What about  properties other than spatiotemporal ones? Consider 
this more general third proposal:
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PROPERTY: If the state is as of an F, then the appropriate object must posses the 
same cluster of properties as F.120
Like the above two principles, this one too is false. Objects perceived are affected by  a 
whole host of factors (namely, those discussed in chapter 2), and this means that the 
properties manifested often differ from the object's actual properties. A song heard 
underwater differs from the song head above water and an object's color differs because 
of the lighting (effects of the environment), an object's taste changes depending on what 
one has eaten before and the temperature an object feels to be depends on what one has 
touched before (holism effects), and finally  the distance at  which we see the object may 
affect how it looks (spatiality effects). So a white table can appear red, lukewarm water 
could appear cold, a plane might look like a speck, and so on. Combining these effects 
might make it so that we perceive an object as having the wrong shape, wrong color, 
wrong sound, wrong texture, etc. Should we think these are cases of failing to perceive 
the object?121  This claim requires that we twist the meaning of “perceive” in a strange 
way. Can one really say they do not see the plane in the sky  when they see the speck? 
They  might not see that the speck is a plane, but they certainly  see the plane. It is the 
plane that currently looks like a speck, and the speck is clearly visible. The fact that the 
speck does not share properties with the plane is therefore not an argument against 
perceiving the plane. 
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121 Michael Huemer (2001) seems to think so but his reasons seem to derive from the analogy he draws with beliefs. 
 The various factors that affect the appearance of an object should convince us that 
not only is the above PROPERTY proposal wrong, but  also two weaker related proposals 
are too. One might think we don't need a full intersection of properties but only some 
intersection, or one might insist that a single property should be shared. But it is not clear 
that there is a substantial intersection between a plane and a speck, and finding a single 
property  seems to weaken the restriction to the point of admitting that there is no 
substantially restrictive matching condition on what can appear as what. 
 What other constraints might we suggest? Perhaps minimally this:
NUMBER: If the state is as of a given number of Fs, then the appropriate 
object(s) must be of the same number as the Fs.
But even this is false. The problem is that there are many cases in which a multitude of 
objects are experienced as one, and conversely, one object experienced as a multitude. 
For instance two distinct cat parts can be placed on each side of a pole to look like a 
single cat partly  occluded. Similarly  a group of objects can be organized such that 
looking at them from a particular angle makes them all look like one object. A specific 
example of this is the Hurwitz Singularity installation.122 Just as multiple objects can be 
spatially  organized to look like one, one object can look like a multitude. Consider the 
following image:123
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In this image, it seems as if there a Rubik's cube on a white paper. But in fact there is 
simply  a white paper with an anamorphic image of a Rubik's cube on it. It looks 
something like this when not viewed from the right angle:
So, a single object can look like multiple objects too. This should lead us to conclude that 
NUMBER is also false. 
 Since these plausible restrictive proposals fail in veridical and illusory  cases, there 
is no reason to think that hallucinatory cases will fare better. Hallucinatory appearances 
can seem independent from the surrounding objects because the appearances and what 
they  are of can widely  diverge. Coupled with the possibility of unsystematic variation, 
most things can appear as something else.
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4.3 Watzl's Smooth Transition Argument
 Even if APPEARING is true of impure cases, why should we think that the 
argument will hold for pure cases? One reason for this is that many philosophers think 
that pure and impure cases lie on a spectrum. For instance, both Fish and Genone discuss 
their cases as being on a spectrum
Fish: As we become more inclined to classify  situations as cases of hallucination, 
the influence of the layout of the environment will disappear altogether and the 
explanation of why the false beliefs occur will have only a correlate of the 
cognitive disorder component. At the end of this continuum, we find pure 
hallucinations of the kind discussed in chapter 4124
and 
Genone: at least some cases of partial hallucination would seem much more like 
illusions in that the cause of the appearance of the non-existent object(s) is 
environmental rather than being a matter of deficiencies with or manipulation of 
the subject’s physiology.125
If hallucinatory cases lie on a spectrum and impure cases can be given an illusionist 
treatment, then we can show, through a sorites argument that pure cases can be too. Watzl 
(manuscript) presents such an argument in the only  explicit defense of illusionism (the I 
know of) in the literature. 
 Watzl's defense emerges in the context of defending particularist relationism. The 
view states:
Particularist Relationism Necessarily: You have a perceptual experience as of 
a particular object or even if and only if you are perceptually aware of some 
particular object or event (which need not be the one your experience as of) as 
being some way.126
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Particularist relationism does not, by itself, entail illusionism. The view is compatible 
with both dualism and hallucinism since the view only  commits us to the relational 
character of perceptual states, and we might be related to mere appearances like sense-
data. Watzl, however, adopts the illusionism in his response to a premise of the argument 
from hallucination that threatens particularist relationism.The premise states
2. Possible: (a) it seems to you that you are attending to some particular object or event, 
and (b) it is not the case that there is an object or event that is spatially  located and you 
are appropriately perceptually related to it.
To reject it, Watzl gives the smooth transition argument
Contemporary philosophers often consider the bad cases in isolation from the 
good cases. There is a tomato present in the good case, while there is no tomato 
present in the bad case. Thus, they  reason (using something like the spatiality 
principle), there is something to attend to and be aware of in the good cases, while 
there is nothing to attend to in the bad cases. But that is a mistake. There is a 
smooth transition from the good cases to the bad cases, i.e. a continuum of 
intermediary cases that lead from the good case to every bad case. Someone who 
rejects attentional relationalism would have to find some point in that transition 
where our perceptual attention ceases to have an object, where the perceptual 
relation ceases to obtain, and where we thus step from attending to something to 
merely seeming to attend to something. The smooth transition argument attempts 
to show that if we look at the transition with enough fineness of grain, we see that 
there is no plausible point where that  could happen. What we see rather is a 
physically continuous series.127 
Rather than going through each step of the smooth transition, I will divide the cases he 
considers into four types. The argument proceeds from cases of type 1 to 4
Type 1: one is related to a tomato
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Type 2: one is related to something qualitatively identical to a tomato (for 
instance, a wax tomato), ranging from ordinary  solid object to exotic objects like 
things made of light or magnetic fields. 
Type 3: one is related to multiple objects, located in different places, but arranged 
in such a way (with the help  of lenses, prisms, and other light dispersing objects) 
that they appear as a single object, a tomato, before one. 
Type 4: one is related to progressively  closer stimuli, first moving closer to the 
retina, then becoming direct stimulations of the retina, and finally penetrating the 
perceiver's body and becoming direct stimulations of various inner parts). 
Watzl argues that since there is no nonarbitrary line for where we are no longer related to 
a particular object, there can be no principled difference between objects of veridical 
states and the objects of hallucinatory states; both relate us to particular objects.
 The smooth transition argument does not entail illusionism. The argument only 
entails that veridical cases and hallucinatory ones are not essentially different, and that 
since veridical cases involve particulars, hallucinatory cases do too. This is still 
compatible with a hallucinist view. Watzl acknowledges this, writing
Particularist relationism can be accepted without accepting any  specific account 
of the nature of the particular objects and events we are aware of. In principle, it 
leaves open a wide variety of options. The smooth transition argument, though, 
strongly suggests that what you are aware of whether your awareness is veridical 
and or whether it is illusory is of the same fundamental kind. If we take as our 
starting point the veridical case, we will, thus, get the view that in all states of 
perceptual awareness you are aware of particular, spatiotemporally located, 
material objects and events. I shall call this The Natural View…128
151
128 Watzl (manuscript) p.45-46
On the assumption that we are related to spatiotemporally located, material, and 
particular objects and events in veridical cases, the smooth transition argument becomes 
an argument for illusionism. Watzl's the natural view excludes the possibility of mere 
appearances, and in so doing establishes the premise that turns the smooth transition 
argument into an argument for illusionism. Watzl considers two elaborations on the 
natural view, the physical space view, where we are placed in perceptual contact with 
regions of space, and the material view, in which we are are placed in perceptual contact 
with spatiotemporally located, concrete, mind-independent and existent material 
objects.129 The latter view is his preferred interpretation of the natural view, and as such 
hallucinators, through the smooth transition argument, are related to material objects. 
 The smooth transition argument rejects the possibility of pure hallucinations since 
every  case involves perceptual contact. The difference between pure and impure cases 
tracks a difference between cases of hallucination that respect the externality  principle 
and those that don't. Watzl defines the principle as follows
 (THE EXTERNALITY PRINCIPLE) Necessarily: If you are perceptually attending to 
an object or event, then that object or event is part of your external environment.130
Although Watzl notes that most cited cases of hallucination do not need to violate this 
principle, he thinks that some cases (like the LSD case) do, and in those cases it is okay 
to reject this principle. He writes
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The main problem for the externality principle is … [that] there is no clear line 
between what is external to the subject’s body and what is inside her body. Is, for 
example, the vitreous humor (the clear gel inside the eyeball) internal or external 
to the subject’s body? It seems completely arbitrary to say that whether there is 
something you attend to depends on whether photons are, say, randomly created 
inside or outside this gelatinous body. (By  straightforward generalization the same 
seems to hold of all other lines one might draw).131 
If so, then the difference between pure and impure cases is only  in whether the material 
particulars we are related to are internal or external. There are no hallucinations that 
involve no perceptual contact. 
4.4 Pure Hallucinations
 Watzl's smooth transition is convincing, but its solution to the problem of pure 
hallucinations is not fully  satisfactory. One worry is that it leads to the implausible 
sounding idea that in some hallucinatory cases, we are perceiving our own body parts, for 
instance, our brains. It  may be that  the distinction between inner and outer is gradual, but 
some cases are clearly outside the body, and others clearly inside. For the inside cases, it 
seems hard to see how our perceptual capacities can be putting us in perceptual contact 
with such internal objects when they do not usually do so. 
 Even if this is right, and we should be worried about the argument, there  are 
various other ways which help to explain the case of pure hallucinations. Pure cases of 
hallucination seem to involve a “gap” where a worldly  object should be. Gaps have been 
invoked in some accounts of perceptual states, notably Schellenberg's (2010, 2011) and 
Tye's (2011). If gaps occur in hallucinatory cases, then there will be no perceptual contact 
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with the world, and illusionism and relationalism will be mistaken. Watzl's solution 
eliminates the gap by filling it in with internal objects, but there are many others ways of 
filling gaps depending on the nature of the hallucination. 
 One way is to focus on partial cases, and use the objects around the gap to fill the 
gap. There are many such objects. In pure partial cases, any  of the objects co-perceived 
can be what we perceive when hallucinating. An example of such a case might involve 
hallucinating in a blind part of the eye while fully perceiving with the rest. Since where 
the hallucination appears and what properties it has are only loosely  connected to the 
location and properties of the object appearing, there is no obstacle to thinking that the 
hallucination occurs in the gappy location. Objects from other senses can also fill the gap 
in cases that are pure and total but constrained to a limited number of a perceiver's sense 
modalities. Perceptual phenomena in which this happens abound in the literatures. Casey 
O'Callaghan (2008) cites various cases in which visual and auditory processing interact. 
These include the McGurk effect in which the sound heard is affected by  the lip 
movement seen, the ventriloquist effect in which a sound is mislocated to its visible 
source, and the sound induced flash illusion in which a flash accompanied by  multiple 
beeps is perceived as multiple flashes. In 2001, a study was published noting that 
vestibular stimulation (stimulation of our interoceptive sense for balance, amongst other 
things) caused amputees to hallucinate phantom limbs even when they have not 
experienced phantom limbs before.132 A more recent study show that at least half of its 
participants could see their bodies when in full darkness through crossmodal 
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interaction.133  There are also synesthetic experiences. Synesthetic perceivers receive 
inputs from one sense modality  and process them in both the correct modality, and 
another modality. For instance, the seen object can be processed both visually and 
auditorily, Finally, there are also cases of using sensory substitution devices that allow 
perceivers to experience visual objects through bodily sensations. All these cases make it 
plausible to think that gaps can be filled in. 
 Another way of filling gaps is directed specifically  at total pure cases. This route 
begins by drawing a distinction between two types of gaps, those that involve the absence 
of perception, and those that accept the perception of absence. To see how this distinction 
works, we can begin by simplifying the case to a creature with a single sense. We can 
make this a visual creature and call it  Ocular. Ocular has eyes roughly  like ours, and finds 
itself in one of four situations:
(1) Eyes Shut: The creature closes its eyes, and when it does, no light from the 
outside enters.
(2) Dark Room: The creature finds itself in a completely dark room. 
(3) Blindness: The creature’s eyes are damaged and it can see nothing.
(4) Surgery: The creature’s eyes and visual system are surgically removed. 
It is reasonable to think that each of these cases involves a gap. When Ocular undergoes a 
hallucination in any  of these four conditions, it  counts as having a total pure 
hallucination. This is because its experience is entirely  hallucinatory, and its condition 
precludes perceptual contact with any object  in its surroundings. However there are 
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important differences between these cases. The first two are cases of perceiving absence, 
the third is underspecified, and the fourth involves the absence of perception. 
 Meditating on these cases reveals the distinction between gaps. In cases (1) and 
(2), it  is clear that Ocular is still a sighted creature. It does not lose its vision just because 
it cannot see under its current conditions no more than we do. Moreover, in both cases, 
Ocular continues to be in perceptual contact with the objects around it. What it cannot do 
is discriminate many features of the object. In (1) it is in perceptual contact with its 
eyelids, in (2) it  is in perceptual contact with the room and its objects. In both cases, the 
eyelids and the room look a particular way: they are completely  dark. This makes the 
phenomenal character of Ocular’s state the same in cases (1) and (2), and this is because 
the eyelids and the room look alike under certain lighting conditions. In general, all 
things that are entirely unlit  look alike for us. So two entirely dark scenes, regardless of 
the objects composing the scenes, will be phenomenally indistinguishable. The darkness 
which results from being in perceptual contact with the eyelids and the darkness of the 
room is the reason why Ocular “cannot see”. It cannot see in the sense that it cannot 
discriminate any details of the objects in its surroundings except for the one: that 
everything is dark.  
 One might think that this is not right. Ocular is not in perceptual contact with 
anything, it is not in perceptual contact with dark objects. But this seems wrong. Ocular is 
seeing in (1) and (2) because its state is perceptually sensitive to various changes in its 
environment. It sees darkness only as long as the the objects are dark. If the room it is in 
is lit, it  will notice the change perceptually. Similarly if it opens its eyes, or a bright flame 
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illuminates its closed eyelids. The dark objects also occlude other objects, for instance an 
unlit  object can block a pinhole light behind it. It  is hard to see why this would be if not 
because Ocular is seeing the objects dark surface. Apart from sensitivity to its 
surroundings, Ocular is also seeing in the sense that it can visually attend to different 
parts of the darkness around it. It can turn its eyes to look at this part of the room or that 
part of the room, or this side of its eyelids or that. Of course everything continues to look 
the same to Ocular, but this is because it  can't differentiate any feature but the darkness of 
the objects, and all dark objects look alike. 
 To make the idea that we perceive dark objects more plausible, we can compare 
the case of the gaps in (1) and (2) to a similar case that does not involve a gap. Consider 
Ocular in a state where everything in front of it is uniformly white. We can imagine a 
room designed and lit in such a way  that no part looks any more or less white than the 
other. In that room, Ocular is in a similar state as it is in when it is in the dark room. It is 
sensitive to changes in the room, and it can look around but everything looks the same. 
Any ganzfeld case, a case in which the perceiver is related to an environment dominated 
by one uniform quality  throughout (whether this is a single sound, taste, color, etc.), puts 
perceivers in a state that is like the one generated by the perception of absence. It may be 
that Ocular sees only red or only green. The only difference between darkness and a red 
or green ganzfeld is that in one case the ganzfeld consists of “positive” stimuli, whereas 
in darkness the ganzfeld is of “null” stimuli. 
 The idea that we perceive darkness or otherwise null stimuli like silence is not 
new. In his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book 2 chapter 8 section 3), 
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Locke writes “the idea of black is no less positive in his mind than that of white, however 
the cause of that colour in the external object  may be only a privation.” . More recently, 
Roy Sorensen has argued that we perceive absences in all the senses, and moreover that 
there are different sorts of absences like shadows and silhouettes.134 So Cases (1) and (2) 
give us one way of understanding the gap produced in total pure perceptual states. 
Significantly, this understanding of the gap is compatible with perceptual contact with 
worldly objects. The objects look dark because of the perceiving conditions, and the 
perceiver sees them in their dark state.
 How does the perception of absence help  the illusionist explain hallucinations in 
such cases? The answer lies in the phenomenologically  salient mediating conditions. One 
way to see that  such conditions exist is by introspection on our dark experiences. We can 
do this by entering a dark room or closing our eyes. The objects are uniformly dark, but 
out experience of the darkness is not. There are moving glimmers and shimmers strewn 
occur the darkness. They make patterns, seem to shift location, appear and disappear, and 
so on. Significantly, these stimuli and their changes are ones you can attend to. They are 
phenomenally salient properties of your perceptual state. You can choose to focus on the 
shimmers in a particular location or another, or you can choose to focus on the darkness 
ignoring the moving lights. Moreover you can exacerbate these phenomena in a variety of 
ways. You can step out and stare into the sun and come back to the dark room to have 
even more glimmering. You may  get up  very quickly and see distinct floating lights. 
Finally, you can also see these lights in other states, not just null states.  Afterimages are a 
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particularly salient example. They  are easily induced, we know that they are due to 
features of our visual system, and we can perceive those features when undergoing 
afterimages either against a null background or a lit  room. Along with afterimages we can 
see such phenomena even in brightly lit room in which we standing up too quickly, or 
while lacking sleep, falling asleep, or waking from sleep. This is not  unlike seeing things 
blurrily, undergoing double-vision, or hearing ringing from the loudness of a noise 
previously  heard. In each of these cases, what we perceive are the conditions that  mediate 
our perceiving of the objects of the external world. 
 Being in darkness, however, modifies the phenomenological impact of these 
mediating conditions. The reason for this is that in ganzfelds in general and dark 
ganzfelds in particular, there is very little else to attend to. When we are looking out  into 
the world there is a large number of stimuli that we can attend to. The world is littered 
with objects, these objects are lit, reflect their light, produce sounds, emit smells, and 
have shapes and textures. Each of these features can be attended to. In a ganzfeld there is 
nothing but the uniformly  distributed property broken up only by the mediating 
conditions. It  is much easier to pay  attention to mediating conditions in such cases. 
Moreover, attention has a profound impact on the mediating conditions. Just as focusing 
one’s attention on a particular voice in a crowded room makes what is being said by that 
voice clear and salient, and just as object’s in the center of our vision are more clearly 
detailed than those in the periphery, so mediating conditions that we attend to take on a 
detailed form. The fact that no other details surround them means that our attention is free 
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to be absorbed in the sole stimulus we find without occlusion or distraction. This is what 
gives the phenomenal character of total pure hallucinatory states.135
 One way to think of the above proposal is by  extending Campbell’s metaphor 
which I discussed in the last chapter. Campbell argued that relationalism thinks of brain 
processing on the pane of glass model (which is in contrast  to the television model). On 
that model, brain processing is required to make the highly  volatile glass transparent. 
When the calibration is successful, we perceive the world. When it is not, we either do 
not perceive or else perceive features of the now non-transparent glass. For instance, 
when walking into a regularly lit room from the sunlit outdoors it usually takes our eyes a 
few seconds to adjust our perception of the room. Prior to that the room looks more dimly 
lit  than it is. Campbell's metaphor can be extended with another metaphor dues to the 
1950s psychiatrist, Louis Jolyon West, recently cited by Dominic H. ffytche (2013) in a 
paper about Charles Bonnet Syndrome. Ffytche writes:
West provided the analogy of a man looking out of a window from a room 
containing a fire. In bright sunlight  (analogous to sensory input), the man sees 
only the world outside; however, as night begins to fall, the man begins to see 
things inside the room reflected on the glass. While the fire burns brightly 
(analogous to cortical arousal), the man sees the contents of the room as if they 
were outside the window, but when the fire dies down he sees nothing.136 
West was concerned with defending a particular theory of hallucinations (known as 
release theory). For us the point is to use the metaphor as a way of understanding how the 
mediating conditions become salient  when undergoing a null stimulus. The idea is that 
the mediating conditions are always present. Campbell's metaphor explains that this is 
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because they are always needed to make the glass transparent (unlike the fire), and so do 
their job by remaining transparent when perceiving objects and their details. However as 
the external world is drained of its objects and details, as happens with all ganzfeld cases 
including null experiences, these conditions become more perceptible. As they do, we can 
attend to them and their properties. These are not typical objects of perceptual states in 
two ways. First, what we are in perceptual contact with are dark objects. Second, the 
salient part of the state's phenomenology is due to the mediating conditions, not to the 
dark objects we are in contact with. In this way, we fill in the gaps without positing 
internal objects to be in contact with, and thus do not violate the externality principle.
 One may worry  that accepting these sorts of gaps amounts to accepting world-
severing hallucinations which would undermine illusionism. It may  seem so because we 
argued that  other accounts that appeal to gaps, like Schellenberg (2010, 2011) and Tye 
(2011)'s account, fail to procure world-contact. The response to this worry  is noting the 
difference in the role the gap plays in the state's phenomenology. The gap's presence is 
not merely  the absence of an object to perceive, but is itself a perceptual presence 
required for the resulting hallucination. Part  of the reason for why we can experience the 
mediating conditions at  all has to do with our not perceiving the positive qualities of the 
background. In this sense, gaps of this sort, unlike Schellenberg's and Tye's, enter into the 
constitution of the hallucination, and this makes the hallucinations widely individuated, 
as Hellie suggests. This also means that the gaps in this account clear us from the 
screening-off worry described by Martin (2004) and Fish (2009). The worry there 
focused on the possibility of mediating conditions that made the presence or absence of 
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the object we are related to irrelevant to the phenomenal character of the state. Both Tye 
and Schellenberg's views accept that the presence or absence of the object has no effect 
on the state's phenomenal character, this is what allows both to maintain that the veridical 
and hallucinatory  cases can be indistinguishable. The illusionist proposal, by contrast, 
does not allow for this indistinguishability. The mediating conditions do not screen off 
the object's presence, so the state is not phenomenally the same whether or not the object 
is there. The mediating conditions are perceivable in the way they are (and thus 
deployable for cases of hallucination) only when the perceiver is related to the null 
stimulus. When not, the mediating conditions have a different effect on the state; often 
just being transparent and allowing perception of the object. 
 This brings us to the final two scenarios that Ocular finds itself in. While the 
above solutions sought to do away with the gap, these last  two cases suggest  a different 
route in which the gap is embraced, but the perceptual character of the state is rejected. If 
we accept that some gaps involve a null stimulus, are the perception of absence, then this 
leaves other gaps in which there is no null stimulus. These cases are exemplified by the 
blind Ocular case, and Ocular's state after the surgery. If Ocular is blind, then it is 
reasonable to suppose that Ocular is not seeing rather than seeing nothing. However this 
will depend on the nature of Ocular's blindness. This is because Ocular might still be able 
to visually process its world by virtue of having the relevant visual processing, but its 
eyes may be damaged such that no input is ever received. But it may also be that  its 
visual system is damaged while its eyes are not, or it may be that both its eyes and its 
visual system are damaged. These cases differ, some of them involve a perception of an 
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absence, others the absence of perception. We can see this by considering a gradual series 
of (rather cruel) cases culminating in the case of Ocular's surgery. Consider an 
experiment in which Ocular has small opaque sheets placed on the retina of its eyes. In 
this case it is reasonable to suppose that Ocular continues to perceive, but perceives a null 
stimulus. Next these sheets are removed and instead the first few layers of sensory 
receptor cells are damaged such that they  act as an opaque sheet. It is still reasonable to 
think that Ocular continues to perceive, they are now simply barred from receiving 
anything but a null stimulus. This is because Ocular still processes information visually. It 
is merely  blocked from acquiring such information through its eyes, much as someone 
locked in a dark room permanently is. Next the experimenters remove or damage Oculus 
visual system itself, leaving the eyes intact in one case and not in the other. Either case 
now makes it seem less reasonable to maintain that Oculus perceives nothing. Instead, it 
seems that Oculus simply  does not perceive. It has become a creature without sight. We 
might think of this difference as the difference between a creature that has a sense 
modality  but senses nothing with it, and a creature that lacks a sense modality  and so 
senses nothing with it. As an example compare humans to bats: Under certain conditions 
bats do not receive echolocation information. When they do not, they experience 
(provided they have experience) a null stimulus. We however do not. We simply lack the 
relevant  system for echolocation information. As such, we lack the capacity  to receive 
such information, the bat only lacks the information. Similarly Ocular in case (3) may 
either lack the capacity or the information, while in case (4) they lack the capacity too. 
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 Assume that Ocular reports that it is having a visual hallucination while in cases 
(1) or (2), and it reports the same in case (4). Should we accept its reports on face value 
in all three cases? It seems to me that we should not. While in cases (1) and (2) it seems 
possible for Ocular to be undergoing a visual hallucination through the deployment of its 
visual capacities and its capacity  to perceive into the null stimulus it is receiving, in case 
(4) Ocular seems altogether incapable of visualizing. This is because by  stipulation, case 
(4) is one in which Ocular lacks a visual system. Whatever Ocular itself may think, what 
is going with it is not a case of perceptual phenomenology. It is barred from such a state 
because it lacks the relevant  mechanisms for the state. By  contrast, it is capable of being 
deluded. Since it has beliefs, it may come to believe all sorts of things about its state, 
however false they are. It seems to me that  cases of “hallucinating” with an absence of 
perception (rather than the perception of absence) are simply not cases of hallucinating at 
all. The principled reason for why this is so is that one is not even using any perceptual 
capacities. Such null-stimuli can be perceived into because they put us in contact with the 
world in such a way  that  we can attend to the phenomenologically salient mediating 
conditions for such states, and thus see things in them. By contrast the remaining cases 
involve the genuine absence of perception rather than the perception of absence. The 
illusionist denies that such cases are hallucinations. This is because such cases involve no 
perceptual processes by stipulation, and hallucinations are perceptual phenomena. Rather, 
errors of this sort are more aptly labelled delusions. Delusions affect the way we 




In this chapter I consider three problems that arise on the illusionist view of 
hallucinations, and answer them. These problems are specific to illusionism because 
unlike dualist and hallucinist  views that involve mere appearances, illusionist 
hallucinations involve world-contact. At least three features we associate with 
hallucinatory states and their objects become somewhat inexplicable if hallucinations 
relate us to worldly  objects. First, when we perceive, all the objects we perceive are 
actual, and are located around the perceiver. But the objects of hallucination can be 
nonexistent, or even impossible. Second, worldly  objects are public, but hallucinations 
seem private. Finally, hallucinations are perceptual errors, but if they involve relations to 
worldly objects, then it is not clear wherein the error lies. By answering these questions, 
we further develop the illusionist view of hallucinations. 
5.1 The Missing Object of Hallucination
 Illusionists think that hallucinatory phenomenology  consists in nothing more than 
perceptual contact with objects in the world. If so, then it is reasonable to suppose that 
hallucinatory objects are just ordinary objects in the world. The problem is that 
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hallucinatory objects seem different from worldly objects. For instance, when we 
perceive an object, that object exists, and is perceptually present to us. But when we 
hallucinate, the object perceptually  present to us may be an absent, nonexistent, or even 
impossible. An example of the first  is hallucinating a dead Roman Emperor, of the second 
hallucinating Pegasus, and the third Escher's staircase. While the earlier arguments for 
illusionism focused on explaining how hallucinatory objects are constituted out of 
worldly objects and their properties, the challenge here is to explain what the 
hallucinatory object itself is. 
 There are different views that one can have on what the objects of hallucination 
themselves are. Watzl (manuscript) discusses four different alternatives to the material 
view he endorses: the Sensibilia view, Meinongianism, Platonism, and Constructivism. 
The problem is that many of these views are incompatible with relationalism and 
illusionism. For instance the sensibilia view accepts sense-data, and sense-data are 
perceptual intermediaries incompatible with relational views. Meinongianism (for 
instance, in Smith (2002)) requires positing an extraworldly object of hallucination, and 
this should be unnecessary if hallucinations are no different than illusions and illusions 
do not require nonexistent objects. The same holds for Platonic objects.  This leaves only 
two alternatives to the illusionist: either hallucinatory objects are the worldly objects, or 
else they are objects that are constructed out of relations to those objects. 
 The first route is pursued by Chalmers (2005) and Watzl (manuscript), and I focus 
on Watzl's argument here. Watzl accepts this view as the best view of hallucinatory 
objects. On it the objects of hallucinations are material objects, albeit irregular ones at 
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times. They can be spatially  dispersed or unusually close. For instance, in the sixth step 
of the gradual transition argument Watzl considers the possibility of an electrochemical 
objects half of whose events take place in one location and half in another, but through 
lenses appears as a single object before the perceiver. In the eighth step  he considers the 
possibility of experiencing a tomato-like objects through electrically stimulating parts of 
the eye "in such a way this electrical simulation exactly matches the one that resulted 
from the optical stimulation in the previous cases."137 Despite the unusual nature of these 
objects, they are nevertheless material objects to which we are perceptually related when 
hallucinating. 
 Although this view of hallucinatory  objects is ideal for an illusionist because of its 
simplicity, material objects do not seem to be ideal objects of hallucination. While it is 
certainly the case that the properties of the hallucinatory object are the properties of 
things like spatially separated objects or electrical stimulations, it is less clear that the 
hallucinated tomato is itself those objects. On the one hand is the problem we began with, 
on which hallucinatory  objects can be absent, nonexistent, or even impossible. When the 
perceiver hallucinates a tomato, a unicorn, or Escher's stairs, that tomato, and unicorn, 
and staircase, are perceptually present, but do not exist. The material objects are present 
and exist. So the material objects cannot be the objects of hallucination. Another problem 
concerns the identity  of the hallucination across time. We can conceive of cases in which 
a hallucinatory object endures for its perceiver across various material objects. For 
instance someone can hallucinate a cat walking from one side of the room to another. The 
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137 Watzl (manuscript) p.33
experience is of a single hallucinatory object in motion, but the material objects in the 
background that provide the object's properties are changing. So the hallucinatory cat 
cannot be the material objects. Watzl acknowledges a further worry,138 writing
I agree with the intuition that … it seems strange to say  that I can attend (as one) 
to two tomato halves that are in fact 50 degrees of visual angle away  from each 
other. Against this intuition, it should be said that attentional relationism doesn’t 
require us to say that the object of your attention is the fusion of the two tomato 
halves. It  requires us to say  only that there is something to which you attend, 
which looks to be tomato-ish. Instead the “thing” you attend to might be the light 
that shines on your retinas. It is unclear what  the right thing to say here is, but in 
general it seems misguided to base our account of perceptual experience on such 
shaky grounds as our intuitions about what counts as one object.139
Although attentional relationism doesn't require saying that the hallucinatory object is a 
given particular, Watzl's material view commits him to saying that  we attend to are the 
material objects. For instance, he writes "Such a brain in a vat will be aware of a certain 
portion of her brain (or, if you like, an event in that brain) as appearing, say, tomato-
ish."140  If this view is right, then when hallucinators attend (and also refer) to their 
hallucinatory objects, their act fails to pick out what they think is being picked out, 
instead they attend or refer to mereological sums of material parts (those parts 
constituting the hallucination). While it may be that this is the best illusionism can do, the 
view is counterintuitive. A hallucinator seems to be in a particularly good position to 
attend or refer to the hallucinatory object, since the object is in some sense her own 
invention.
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138 Indeed Watzl suggests four alternative views, the Sensibilia view, Meinongianism, Platonism, and Constructivism. Since the first three of these problematize 
relationalism, I only consider the constructive view which I take to be exemplified in Johnston’s account.
139 Watzl (manuscript) p.39
140 Watzl (manuscript) p.48
 This suggests accepting the second route on which hallucinatory objects are not 
themselves material objects, but are rather constructed out of them. Watzl (manuscript) 
discusses this view as a strong alternative to the material view, and the strategy is pursued 
by Johnston (2004). Johnston (2004) says
we should distinguish primary  and secondary  objects of hallucination, where the 
secondary  object is determined by how the primary object immediately  strikes the 
subject. If the primary  object were not particular but rather qualitative, this would 
explain why, when it comes to particulars, hallucination cannot be an original 
source of de re thought. As a first pass, hallucination gets to be of or about 
particulars as a result as striking the subject as of or about those particulars. Its so 
striking the subject depends upon the subject’s existing repertoire of singular 
reference.141
On Johnston's (2004) view, hallucinations involve relations to uninstantiated properties 
only. Because of this, the primary object of hallucinations is purely  qualitative, and there 
is no object of hallucination perceived. This explains why hallucinations can be an 
original source of de re thoughts about properties but not objects. The hallucinatory 
object itself is, instead, a construct
Let the primary object incorporate everything about  which the hallucination could 
provide original de re knowledge. Then we should allow that  the particulars that 
are the secondary objects of the hallucination might be determined by two 
different mechanisms – the mechanism of anchoring or the mechanism of the 
primary object striking the subject a certain way.142 
The object is an interpretation of the the perceived properties, with the interpretation 
depending on anchoring to past nonhallucinatory encounters with objects, or else the way 
which the properties strike us. Because hallucinatory objects are constructions, Johnston 
is able to explain how they can be absent, nonexistent  or impossible, and how their 
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141 Johnston 2004 p.132-133
142 Johnston 2004 p.134
identity  can be preserved over time. In both cases, it is a matter of how the perceiver 
takes things to be, there are no hallucinator-independent matters of fact about what the 
object of a given hallucination is.
 While Johnston's constructivist  view explains features we associate with 
hallucinatory objects, the view raises other worries. For instance, Watzl, who is friendly 
to the view, says  "[Constructivism] gives an account of how we construct, or "create", 
mind-dependent particulars by attending. This is a view that I believe we should take 
seriously. It is a view that fits well with structuralism about attention.143" Nevertheless he 
rejects it on two grounds. The first  is that constructions would not be spatially located. 
Since the claim is that they are the objects of hallucination, and the objects of 
hallucination are things we perceive, then it seems that  we perceive something with no 
spatial location. But this seems contrary to how we understand perceptual states. The 
second worry is that given the smooth transition argument, constructivism for the 
hallucinatory cases would spread to veridical and illusory  cases. This would make 
veridical and illusory objects similarly constructed. This latter problem might be solved 
on a view like Johnston's on which the constructions fill in the gap  generated by the 
absent object in hallucinatory (since hallucinations are, unlike veridical cases, relations to 
uninstantiated properties), but a different route is needed on Watzl's or my own view.
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143 Watzl (manuscript) p.59
5.2 Perceiving One Thing in Another
 There is something attractive about both the material view and the constructivist 
view, yet each view has problems. The material view gives us perceptible hallucinatory 
objects which do not go beyond the view's material resources, but which thereby do not 
fulfill all our ideas of hallucinatory objects. The constructivist view's objects are more 
exotic  and so afford the variety  needed for hallucinatory  cases, but they  are not clearly 
perceptible, and they threaten to spread to veridical and illusory cases. Is there a way of 
taking what is good in each view? Here I will argue that the virtues of both views can be 
combined by accepting a special variant of the constructivist view, the perceiving in view, 
on which hallucinatory objects are wholly constituted by material objects, and perceptible 
because they are perceived in the material object. 
 In visual perception, it is a commonplace phenomena that we can perceive one 
thing in another. This happens to us when looking at natural objects, as when we see a 
train in the clouds, the shape of an animal in a shadow, faces in an old peeling wall, or 
reflections in the water. It also happens most clearly with art objects; paintings, 
television, cinema, and other objects we construct all afford cases of perceiving in. The 
notion of perceiving is usually discussed in the context of pictorial art. Richard Wollheim 
(2003).144  argues that seeing in, the visual case of perceiving in, explains how picture 
perception is possible. Picture perception involves a dual character in which one sees the 
medium of depiction and the content depicted. Both are perceived because the only way 
to perceive the content depicted is by perceiving the medium of depiction. (Whether or 
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144 In addition to Wollheim 2003, Jean-Paul Sartre (2012) discusses pictures and other images in the context of understanding the imagination. Like Wollheim, 
he think images may be applicable in cases of misperception.
not one is aware that one is perceiving the medium of depiction is irrelevant, what 
matters is that there is no way of perceptually  accessing the content without perceptually 
accessing the object depicting that content.) Wollheim even suggests that seeing-in may 
be of use for hallucinations. He writes:
This [seeing-in] special perceptual capacity  …allows us to have perceptual 
experience of things that are not  present to the senses: that is to say, both of things 
that are absent and also of things that are non-existent… 
If we seek the most primitive instances of the perceptual capacity with which 
seeing-in is connected, a plausible suggestion is that they are to be found in 
dreams, daydreams, and hallucinations…145
 Perceiving-in also seems applicable to other senses, for instance the sense of 
hearing. 146 Two examples that should immediately strike us are the case of hearing 
something said in a sound heard, and hearing a melody or tune in a sequence of sounds. 
Of the first an easy  case is that of taking a phrase or a word and repeating it many times 
over until the the sounds one is producing starts to be parsed differently  and so result  in a 
different word or phrase.147  A mundane example is repeating the phrase “Of lions 
quarrel” until it  becomes “A flying squirrel”. Another example involves hearing words 
uttered in one language (whether one knows that language or not) sound like another 
word uttered in a different language (which one does know). For instance one might hear 
the lyrics of a song or the dialogue of a movie and find a multitude of words that match 
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145 Wollheim (which book?) p.217
146 It is unclear to me that perceiving-in occurs in the other senses, but it is not necessary that it do so for the illusionist account to succeed since perceiving-in is 
only required to account for nonexistent objects. We can see this by considering a few examples. First, we can manipulate the subject's perceiving conditions e.g 
their sensory apparatus such that they smells, tastes, and touches appear differently. This can help us deal with many cases of hallucination tactile, gustatory, and 
olfactory hallucinations. For instance, in  Sacks' recent book Hallucinations, chapter 3 discusses olfactory hallucinations that depend entirely on smelling one 
thing as another. He quotes "In September tomatoes and oranges started tasting metallic and a bit rotten, and cottage cheese tasted like sour milk” Similarly, when 
we are sick food tastes and smells different. Finally, after burning a finger, we may experience one texture as softer or rougher than we once felt. Such cases of 
hallucination, because they consist in perceiving one property as another, can be explained without the help of perceiving-in.
147 A similar sort of phenomena is semantic satiation in which one hears nothing but the sound of a repeatedly uttered word.
what one is hearing. A final example is when we hear words in ordinary  sounds, as when 
we hear whispered words in the wind blowing through the trees. Similar to the cases of 
hearing something said in sounds heard or words uttered is the case of hearing a melody 
in one or more sounds. In these cases what is initially a series of unrelated sounds 
becomes a unified tune or melody. One might for instance hear the repeating sound of an 
insect or a frog turn into a melodic sound, or more commonly, one can hear a variety of 
different sounds be combined together to form a melody. An example would be hearing a 
tune in the hum of the air-conditioning, coupled with a repeated ticking of a clock, 
coupled with the sounds of a frog, and so on.
 Perceiving in requires only two minimal commitments, and so should be 
acceptable to most views. The commitments are:
(1) We perceive images. 
(2) Perceive one thing in another is not reducible to perceiving one thing, and 
perceiving the other.
Both should be uncontroversial. Anyone who denies (1) must carry the burden of 
explaining how it could be that we do not actually perceive images when there are 
pictures, paintings, and photographs all around us. To perceive images is just  to perceive 
those sorts of things. (2) is not  much more controversial, since the reductive alternative is 
implausible. If I see Nero in a picture, I do not see Nero, and see the picture. Nero is not 
there. At most I can say that I perceive Nero indirectly by  seeing the picture, and indirect 
perception is still not direct perception. Whatever our analysis of perceiving in, whether 
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we understand it as a case of indirect perception, or a sui generis type of perception, it 
will not be just perception (The implausibility of (2) is further demonstrated below).
We can explain how perceiving in is possible by starting with two concepts
Image (or image-object): A worldly object with the property of depicting 
something when perceived. The image is what we perceive-into. 
Content: The object  or scene depicted by the image-object. The content is what is 
perceived-in.
 We can say that an object counts as an image when the phenomenal character 
resulting from perceiving it allows the subject to perceive a content in it. Since we are 
working within the relational framework, it is an object's appearance that is the sole (in 
pure relationalism) or main (in impure relationalism) determinant of phenomenal 
character, and so the appearance which instantiates the property  of depicting something. 
To successfully depict, the object therefore needs (i) intrinsic properties that  allow for 
perceiving-in on some viewings of the object, and (ii) a an appearance that instantiates 
the property of depicting a content. (i) is necessary but not sufficient. An image-object, 
for instance a photograph, has various intrinsic features that allow it to instantiate the 
property  of depicting some scene, but unless the photograph is viewed in a way that 
makes these properties perceptible, the photograph cannot instantiate the property of 
depicting a content. Looking at the photograph in complete darkness, or looking at its 
back side will not reveal the content. This is why (ii) is also necessary. The object cannot 
merely possess certain intrinsic properties, but must also manifest these properties on a 
token viewing.
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 With this, we can see how perceiving in gives us an easy way of explaining how 
objects of hallucination can be constructed, yet perceived. We see the following in 
Waterhouse's painting of Nero:
The image-object  in this case is a sheet of printed paper or an LCD screen. Its content is 
Nero lying down full of remorse. Nero, with his expression, posture, and surroundings, 
are what we perceive-in the sheet, and the sheet is what we perceive-into. So:
(1) I see Nero in this printed paper. 
From which follows:
(2) I see this printed paper.
(3) I see-in it Nero.
(4) There is this printed paper (that I see).
(2) follows from (1) because if I see Nero in the printed paper, then I see him by  seeing 
the printed paper. In this sense, my perception of Nero is indirect, I see Nero's features by 
seeing the paper and the ink on the printed paper. (4) follows from (2) since perception is 
factive. (3) follows because the content of this printed paper is Nero. But notice that from 
(3), (5) does not follow:
(5) There is Nero (that I see). 
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This is because seeing Nero is not the same as seeing Nero in something. While we might 
casually respond to someone who shows us this picture by saying "I see Nero" or "I see a 
man" , what we are saying is shorthand for saying one of two things:
(6) "I see an image of Nero” 
or 
(7) "I see Nero in the image" 
(6) is just to assert that we see the paper which is an image of Nero, (7) is to say we see 
the content of the image. Neither of these commit us to the existence of Nero, and this is 
simply because we accept a nonreductive account of perceiving-in.  
 If we consider these features, we can make three interesting observations. First, 
when we see Nero in this image, we do so wholly  by seeing the printed paper and its 
features. This is because of the dual character of perceiving in, one sees the content  by 
seeing the object instantiating the content. As such, the experience is distinctively 
perceptual. Second, Nero is not himself there. Even if the experience is of Nero, it is only 
so because the experience is of an image, and the image depicts Nero. What we perceive 
is the depiction of Nero (the image), not Nero. So we perceive something absent (Nero) 
by perceiving something present (the image). Third, Nero, or whatever else is depicted, 
can be absent in a multitude of ways. They  may be absent now, they  may altogether not 
exist, or they  may be altogether impossible. The same is true of hallucinatory objects. 
What makes these features interesting is that they are the features we are seeking in 
hallucinatory cases. We want to say that hallucinatory  objects are perceived by perceiving 
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worldly objects, and we want to say that  hallucinatory  objects can be absent in a 
multitude of ways. 
5.3 Images in the World
 Is it plausible that cases in which we hallucinate an object are cases of perceiving 
in? Given how pervasively we perceive into the objects of our world, the answer is 
plausibly yes. We pervasively perceive into the world for at least three reasons:
1- Almost any object or collection of objects, regardless of its specific visible 
properties (its shape, size, color, etc.), can be organized alone or along with other 
objects in a way  that allows us to perceive it  as an image. So, image-objects are 
easily made out of objects. 
2- There are many types of images, ranging from the more forceful to the less 
forceful. This means many  images are hard to avoid, and so some objects are 
primarily image-objects.
3- Objects can be attended to in a way that reveals images, and not only organized 
in a way that does. 
The examples below illustrate these.
Single Object Cases:
 Single-object cases are cases in which we perceive into a single object. Some 
instances of these are photographs and printed paper, and an example is the picture of 
Nero we began with. There are countless ways in which such images vary from one 
another, but here I will focus on three variations that produce interesting complications 
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with these images. A first variation  depends on the artificiality of these images. In some 
cases the image-object is artificially  prepared to transmit its content, and the content is 
placed their purposefully. For example, painters use canvases stretched on a wooden 
frame, where that canvas has various properties that make it suitable to be painted on 
with given materials. The painter then takes his painting materials and purposefully 
places marks in a way  that  will be content-depicting. But this artificiality is not essential. 
One might have an object that is not prepared for content-depiction, such as when an 
artist makes use of a rock to paint on. And the content itself might also been depicted 
naturally, as when the marks accidentally occurring on a wall allow us to perceive a man 
in them. As an example, consider the case below which is completely natural because the 
object is natural (it is a cat) and the content is similarly natural (the cat's fur pattern 
depicts a cat):
A second variation is also illustrated by the cat: image-objects vary in the material 
making them up. The image-object is not a paper or a canvas, but an animal. Other 
variations are also possible such as being made of matter that is in a different state. This 
means that contents may be depicted on the surfaces of solid objects, but also on liquids, 
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gases, and plasma. These depictions will also differ in ways that depend on the features of 
the object, much as the content painted differs depending on whether one uses water-
based color or oil-based ones, or paints on paper or canvas. 
 To take a particularly  interesting example, consider the still surface of water. Still 
water reflects objects in the surroundings, and which objects are perceived depends on 
the viewpoint from which we look at the water. Should we think that such cases of 
reflection (and refraction), which occur with water, mirrors, glass, metal, plastic, and 
other materials, are cases of perceiving-in? I think so. Reflective (and refractive) 
materials are not very different from televisions, cinema, and paintings. In both we have a 
pattern of properties on an object's surface which, so organized, instantiate the further 
property  of depicting a content under certain viewing conditions. In some case the objects 
are artificial, as with the mirrors we construct, in others this is natural, as with the surface 
of a pond. But this of course makes no difference for image-objects. 
 One might think that the case of reflected images seems different because the content 
is not absent in the way it usually is in images, but this is a misplaced worry. First, while 
it is true that objects reflected in a surface usually exist, it  is not  true that they always do. 
We can see this by  analogy to the time-lag argument where a distant object can be seen at 
a time in which it has ceased to exist. If such an object can be seen, then nothing prevents 
that object from also being reflected in the water's surface. But this means the object 
reflected (the content) does not exist, even though the reflection (the image) does. 
Second, even when it is the case that there is an existing object being reflected in the 
surface, it is usually the case that the object reflected and the reflection are not located in 
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the same place. We can construct cases in which the content and what the content is of are 
located in the same place, but these require elaborate setups, the norm is that the image 
object depicts its content  in a place other than that  of the object depicted. This is not to 
deny that reflections are not at all different from other cases in which we perceive-in, just 
that the differences are not differences in perceiving-in. So reflective (and refractive) 
surfaces, regardless of their state, are objects that allow us to see one thing in another.
 A third variation of interest focuses on the relationship between the image and the 
content. In many cases, the image and the content do not  share interesting properties. The 
object will neither be of the same shape, nor the same color, nor the same size as its 
content. In other cases, these properties will coincide, as with the cat above (the image is 
a cat and the content is a cat), or when an object is painted blue to depict blue skies 
(image and content have the same color property). In some cases, this coincidence can 
make it difficult to distinguish the object and what is perceived in it. For instance 
consider the following case:
Alice meets the white rabbit: Alice is lying down on the grass near the pond. In 
the water is a duck that dives under water and then slowly resurfaces its head. 
Alice has just turned to look at  it, and since she is lying on her side, she see the 
duck's head sideways, which roughly looks like this:
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This duck/rabbit case is a case of seeing-in. Alice sees a content, the rabbit's head, in the 
duck's head. She does so because the duck's head is an object which naturally possesses 
properties that allow it to realistically  depict a rabbit's head under certain viewing 
conditions (specifically, the condition of viewing the duck's head sideways). In this case, 
part of the reason the duck's head depicts the content is that the rabbit's head (the image) 
and the duck's head (the content) share a common shape (the same shape is rabbit-like 
under a sideways viewing orientation, and duck-like when viewed upright), and common 
features (e.g. the eye). 
 One might worry that this is not really a case of seeing-in. The hesitation comes 
from thinking that the duck's head is seen as a rabbit head, and seeing something as 
another is not the same as seeing something in another. Whether seeing-in and seeing-as 
are different notions is a substantive issue, and I cannot hope to settle it here. However, 
we can put the worry aside by noting that regardless of whether this is a case of seeing-as, 
and regardless of whether seeing-as and seeing-in differ in important respects, this is 
most certainly  a case of seeing-in as I have defined the notion. This can be made clear by 
considering the difference between the image above and what Alice actually sees. The 
picture I have placed above is purposefully  constructed. It is an image on printed paper 
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(or displayed on an lcd screen), and its content is a duck/rabbit. The lines its author has 
placed are not meant  to be of a duck, or of a rabbit, but of both, one for each orientation. 
Alice's scenario differs in that the image for her is not a piece of paper or a screen, but the 
duck's head itself. This is not unlike the case of the cat above. The main difference is that 
the cat as an image-object does not share the dimensions of the content it depicts, only 
part of the cat's body contains the depiction. Not so with the duck, its whole head is 
required to depict the rabbit. So the artist's depiction is in fact different from Alice's 
experience. In fact, it would not be wrong to say that  the content of the artist's depiction 
is Alice's perceptual experience. Finally, let us note that Alice's case is only one variant 
from a whole class of image-objects that bear contents which they resemble in some way. 
Some examples include cases of seeing a duck-facade in a duck, or seeing a duck in a 
duck because an actual duck may be painted in a way identical to itself.  All such cases 
involve perceiving-in. 
Multiple Object Cases:
 Just as we can see a single object as a single image-object, so we can see multiple 
objects as a single image-object.148 It is easy to see that this is so. Consider the printed 
picture of Nero. If it  is cut in half, half of the content  - Nero -  will be on each paper. 
Placing the two sheets side by  side will therefore depict the full content, and so the two 
sheets form the image of Nero. Here is a case like that (the ship is depicted in three sheets 
of paper):
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148 To avoid worries about how we can individuate objects due to the fact that most if not all single objects we think of are actually a conglomerate of smaller 
objects, in all the follows I assume that multiple objects are separated from one another such that one can be moved or otherwise affected without moving or 
affecting the other.
Seeing something in multiple objects is essentially  the same as seeing into a single object, 
but images made of multiple separated objects present their own interesting variations. 
Not only does each object vary  in the ways listed above making for some interesting 
cases, but multi-object cases also have features original to them.
 To begin with, when multiple objects are involved, the variations that affect an 
image made out of one object continue to affect multi-object images except that in these 
cases, each object constituting the image-object can undergo its own variations. This is to 
say that for every object  that goes into making the image-object, that object will be either 
natural or artificial, be made of some material and be in some state of that  matter, and 
will bear a specific relation to the part of the content it depicts. In that sense, multi-object 
cases are like mixed media artworks by contrast to single object cases which are like art 
constructed out of a single medium. As an example, consider a case I used in chapter one:
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The man we see is the content of the image-object that is constructed out of the large 
variety of fruits, vegetables, and flowers. For any  given object, say, the pear out of which 
the man's nose is constructed, we can say  various things about that object and how it 
successfully  plays its role in depicting the content. The pear, for instance, is a natural 
object, made of solid material, where the shape of the object largely resembles the shape 
of a human nose.
 Aside from the variations that multi-object cases share with single-object  cases, 
there are at least four interesting variations exclusive to multi-object images. These are all 
due to the fact  that multi-object  cases involve an organization of separated objects in a 
way that single-object images do not. These organizations, which are spatial 
arrangements of objects that allow the content to be perceived, can vary in several ways. 
First, they  vary in whether they are accidental or purposeful. For instance, one might 
arrange fruits purposefully  to look like the man above. Second, an arrangement can be 
more or less fleeting, and so the image-object can be more or less enduring. Consider this 
natural but fleeting arrangement depicting an eye: 
The fleeting arrangement of bubbles, draining water, and the sink appear as an eye,  so 
with their disappearance the eye depicted disappears and with it the image-object. Third, 
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arrangements vary in their capacity to depict  a content  from multiple viewpoints. In some 
cases, the content will be visible from a wide variety of angles, as might be the case when 
one sees something in the clouds, and continues to see it even as they drive across the 
countryside. In other cases, the content will be visible from a much more limited vantage 
point, as with the image below:
Here the content is that of a woman picked up by the head by  an oversized statue, but this 
appearance is only possible when standing at a particular distance and angle from the 
statue. Fourth and finally, multiple-object images can, in some cases, be perceived as 
moving images. Such cases occur when changes in one or more of the objects 
constituting the image are consistent with certain motions of the content. For instance, 
consider the following image:
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The image's content is of a statue blowing out clouds. But we can imagine that on this 
windy day the clouds are moving rapidly away  from the horn they  appear to be blown out 
of. Because of this the content seems animated: we see a scene in which a statue blows 
out clouds that move away from their source. Of course more elaborate animations are 
possible since we can construct moving imagery. 
 Accepting the perceiving in account as an account of hallucinatory objects gives 
various advantages. First, because the argument for hallucinations involving perceiving in 
depends on the prevalence of perceiving in, it is clear that the problem of hallucinatory 
objects is not brought about ad hoc to deal with hallucinations. Rather, it depends on a 
well entrenched way of thinking about the objects of the perceptible world. Second, 
because of the features of perceiving in, Watzl's two concerns are misplaced about 
constructivism are misplaced. On the one hand, the constructs in perceiving in cases are 
distinctively perceptual since they  are experienced by perceiving a particular object. On 
the other hand, there is no worry about the constructivism spreading to other perceptual 
cases. This is because perceiving-in can happen in all perceptual cases, and in general, 
every  object is self-depicting. This is because every object can be seen as a perfect image 
of itself, and thus every object has the reflexive property of depicting itself. Third, by 
making use of perceiving in, the illusionist can explain how a worldly  object with one set 
of properties can generate a different object with its own properties. We can see this 
through the example below:
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This is the shadow illusion, and it is supposed to demonstrate how we can misperceive 
two identical colors (the colors of A and B) as being one lighter than the other because of 
other cues (namely, the shadow). In this case, note the following facts about the image-
object's colors:
(1) the pigment used to paint A is the shade of gray, g1
(2) the pigment used to paint B is the shade of gray, g1. 
(3) the pigment used to paint C is the shade of gray, g2. 
And the following facts about the content's colors:
(4) In the image's content, the checkered surface, A is a shade g4.
(5) In the image's content, the checkered surface, B, is the shade g5.
(6) In the image's content, the checkered surface, C, is the shade g5. 
From these facts notice the following: 
(7) the pigment gray g1 can be used to represent shades g4 and g5 in the content 
of the image.
(8) the pigment grays g1 and g2 can be used to represent the shade g5 in the 
content of the image.
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What this tells us is that a single pigment on an image-object can represent  two different 
colors in the content, and two different colors on the image-object can represent the same 
color in the content. This does not depend on the fact that this image is thought to be 
illusory. Rather, the fact that a given property of an object can represent a different 
property  in the content  is a feature typical of images. For instance Nero's garb in 
Waterhouse's painting is painted using multiple shades of red, yet when we see Nero in 
the picture, we see him wearing a garb of a uniform shade of red. This is so even though 
Waterhouse's painting is not in any substantive sense an illusion. Moreover such cases are 
not constrained to color properties. We also perceive two dimensional shapes painted on 
surfaces as three dimensional shapes in the content (for instance when we see the flat 
image in the shadow illusion as a checkered surface with a certain thickness, or the flat 
green shape as a cylinder), and we perceive one texture as another (as when we see the 
textures and shadings used in Waterhouse's painting as being of metal, marble, and cloth 
textures). All of these cases are ones where one property is perceived as another.
 A final advantage of the view is that it does not undermine relationalism. One 
might worry that it it does because of its appeal to contents. Perceiving in view is 
reminiscent of an old form of indirect  realist form of intentionalism on which we perceive 
mental images which depict or represent the external world. But from a relational point of 
view, this sort of appeal to contents is acceptable. What relationalists must reject is a 
certain conception on which entertaining representational contents is sufficient for being 
in a perceptual state. In this case, the reverse is happening. It is being in perceptual 
contact with a worldly object that  is necessary for entertaining the content. The 
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relationalist need not reject this idea. Without any other obstacles, the illusionist  should 
adopt this view to explain hallucinatory objects.
5.4 The Privacy of Hallucinations
 Along with the problem about what the object of hallucination itself is, another 
problem that the illusionist account encounters is the problem of the apparent publicity  of 
illusionist hallucinations. Hallucinations involve perceiving worldly objects and 
perceiving into them. But the objects we perceive, and the contents they depict, are 
public. We can point out the object  and the content for others to see, as we do with 
paintings, movies, and clouds. We do not usually  think that the same is true of 
hallucinations, hallucinations seem private or specific to the subject that  experiencing 
them. We might think it is impossible to get another to attend to our hallucinatory object, 
so illusionist hallucinations, and the perceiving in account are poor candidates for 
explaining hallucinations. 
 This problem is informative because it focuses on a central difference between the 
way illusionists think about hallucinations and the way alternative views do. Hallucinists 
and dualists both accept that  hallucinations involve mere appearances. With such a 
nature, hallucinations acquire a private character in two senses: first, hallucinations are 
entirely  independent from their surroundings, and so any explanation of the hallucinatory 
object need not appeal to the surroundings. Second, hallucinations are specific to the 
mind of their subject, and so are not objects publicly available to others. The illusionist 
cannot match this level of subjectivity. As we know, the illusionist must always relate 
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hallucinations to the world, and things are no different in this case. The illusionist has to 
deny that hallucinations are subjective in any  substantial sense. They are as subjective as 
veridical experiences are, for the most part. Veridical cases can seem subjective at times, 
and so can hallucinations. 
 But hallucinations can seem more subjective or private because of two features 
they have: 
(1) They depend on perceiving objects and properties that are accessible only 
from limited vantage points, and 
(2) Hallucinations involve images, and some images  have content  that is hard to 
see.
 (1) is true because hallucinations involve objects appearing a particular way. As we 
saw, there are a variety of factors that affect the appearance of an object. In some cases 
these are environment dependent, but in other cases perceiver dependent. So while in 
some cases a particular appearance of the object will be accessible only  by spatially 
locating oneself in a particular place (e.g. the top of a hill), in other cases it will only be 
accessible given certain mental states (e.g. being on LSD). The city will appear a 
particular way from the top of the hill, and the room will appear a particular way when 
perceived on LSD. These latter vantage points are relevant for the apparently  private 
nature of hallucinations because they dependent on the perceiver being in a particular 
state. They range from appearances that are only accessible if one's vision is of a certain 
level of blurriness, or suffering double vision, or paying attention to particular features of 
an object, to cases like having a particular chemical balance indicative of lack of sleep, 
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schizophrenia, or being on LSD. Given that most cases of hallucination occur under such 
special mental conditions like those induced by sleep deprivation or hallucinogenic 
substances, we can see why many hallucinations appear entirely subjective: they are 
simply  not accessible to others who do not occupy the same limited vantage point. Still, 
this level of subjectivity  is not fundamental. If two perceivers are roughly  processing 
things in the same way, in the same mental state, and the same spatiotemporal location, 
then illusionism predicts that they could show one another what they were hallucinating. 
The process may not be easy, but in principle illusionists think that it is possible.
 (2) supplements the case for apparent subjectivity  by noting that insofar as some 
hallucinations involve images, and images differ in how easily accessible their contents 
are, then some cases will seem particularly subjective. We can see this by noting that 
depiction can be  done in many way. It can be realistic or impressionistic, more or less 
abstract, more or less detailed, more or less representational, and so on. These differences 
affect the ease by which the contents are accessible. We can think of this as a scale 
ranging from those images that are unavoidable to those that are, in an important sense, 
imaginative or require a specific conceptual repertoire. The scale tracks how inviting 
images are. Consider the following four examples:
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The first painting - Waterhouse's - depicts a content that is hard to resist because it is 
maximally inviting. When we look at the image, it seems almost impossible to not 
immediately see Nero lying down on a bed in a room with various objects around him. 
One has to draw one's attention away to going to the paint brush strokes are. In this sense, 
Waterhouse's painting is a maximally forceful image, one sees the content and almost 
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misses the object despite seeing the content by seeing the object. By contrast, consider 
Leonid Afremov's painting of a street. This image does not quite as forcefully force its 
contents upon us even though it too is such that it is difficult to not see the street, the 
houses, and the lamps. An image like this one is however not as forceful as Waterhouse's 
even if it  is quite inviting. Certainly it is so compared to Franz Marc's Stallungen 
(Stables) where the contents of the image become even harder to grasp. With the help of 
one's imagination and careful attention to some of the details (in specific, the curves), it  is 
possible to see the shapes of horses in the image. The content, however, is not nearly as 
inviting as Afremov's painting. In this sense that  the image is somewhat imaginative, it 
requires that we look carefully, but also that we let our imagination wander across the 
details we perceive. Finally  consider the fourth painting by Mirza Zupljanin which is a 
maximally imaginative image. In this picture, it is hard to see any objects at all. One 
might fail to see the image-object  and instead see a merely colored and textured object, 
for instance if the image occurred in an inconspicuous location such as markings on a 
wall on some street. However looking at this image more carefully, and with the help of 
one's imagination, various things can become visible. One might see figures, or most 
centrally (for me, at any rate) a face just to the left of the center of the image. A case like 
this is not only harder to see into, but  is also harder to show into. A perceiver can fairly 
confidently  expect others to see Waterhouse's Nero and Afremov's street but will be much 
less confident in being able to convey the horses or the face in Marc's and Zupljanin's 
paintings respectively. By noting such differences in images we can start  to see how 
hallucinations can seem even more subjective. Not only can they  depend on mental 
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states, but they  can also be constructed out  of image-objects that are less than maximally 
inviting. 
5.5 Hallucinations and Deception
 A final worry  about the illusionist account of hallucinations is that the view makes 
it unclear how hallucinations are perceptual errors. On hallucinist  and dualist views, 
hallucinations are distinctive because they  involve mere appearances. But if illusionist 
hallucinations involve  nothing but relations to worldly objects, then it is not clear 
wherein the hallucinatory error comes from. The response to this problem illustrates a 
further difference between illusionist hallucinations and dualist and hallucinist ones: they 
are not fundamentally different from illusions. According to the illusionist, hallucinations 
are deceptive in the same way illusions are. Illusions involve objects appearing a 
particular way, where the perceiver misconstrues his perceiving conditions, and on that 
basis takes the appearances to indicate some object other than the one in fact present. 
Hallucinations do the same thing. While there are many interesting features that occur in 
hallucinatory cases, none of them are definitive of hallucinations. Since this is so, 
according to illusionism there is no cohesive category of hallucinations. Hallucinations 
simply belong on a spectrum with other illusory cases. 
 To begin with, consider the following envatted brain case
SCIENTISTS: Scientists decide to test the possibility of envatted brains. They 
surgically remove brains and place them in vats. The human whose brain is 
envatted perceives itself to occupy a city in which it leads an ordinary life
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What features can we detect in SCIENTISTS? The first thing to note is that the scenario 
is clearly like an illusory case. In it 
i- the scene before the perceivers does indeed look like a city. 
ii- The perceiver misconstrues its perceiving conditions (it thinks it is in a city, not 
an envatting machine)
iii- The scene before the perceiver is more typical of looking at a city, given the 
assumed perceiving conditions.
In addition, SCIENTISTS seems to have the following features too:
(a) - The perceptual route is special: the envatted brain cannot be seeing since it 
has no eyes. Instead, it has a different way of detecting its surroundings.
(b) - The brain state is special: the brain is envatted and so is not in the same state 
as a normal brain. 
(c) - The object is special: the brain is in perceptual contact with electrical 
stimulations, but these are not ordinary objects.
(d) - The case involves perceiving in: since the brain is in perceptual contact with 
the machinery or its electrical output, the city  that seems to surround the perceiver 
must be an object perceived in the machinery or its electrical output. 
Are any of these further features definitive of hallucinations?
 The answer is no. The four additional features are not necessary to be in a 
hallucinatory state, and we can see this by considering different cases that are arguably 
hallucinatory yet do not possess these features. Against (a) and (b), consider the 
following case 
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ROBOTS: Robots rebel against human rule. They  place living human bodies in 
special vats. Every human so placed perceives itself to be occupying a particular 
city and leading an ordinary life.
Like SCIENTISTS, ROBOTS is plausibly  explained as an illusion. But unlike 
SCIENTISTS, it does not involve a special perceptual route. If the envatted person 
perceives anything, it does so through its ordinary perceptual capacities. So it  cannot be 
definitive of hallucinations that they involve extraordinary perceptual routes. Moreover, it 
is less plausible to think in this case that the brain state is special, since the brain is an 
ordinary  body that is receiving inputs. One might think that the inputs are special, but this 
does not entail that the processing is. So special brain states are not definitive of 
hallucinations. Against the second two cases, we can consider this typical hallucinatory 
case:
LSD: A man is given LSD, and sees color patterns on the wall.
LSD differs from the previous cases in focusing on internal rather than external 
manipulations, but like the two previous scenarios, it is a typical case of hallucination. 
The first thing to note is that like the previous cases it can be explained as an illusion:
i- the scene before the man looks like one in which there are various color 
patterns. 
ii- the man misconstrues his perceiving conditions (i.e. that he is on LSD)
iii- The scene before them is more typical of looking at a wall with color patterns 
rather than a will without, given the assumed perceiving conditions.
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Unlike the previous cases, however, LSD does not involve either special objects or 
perceiving in. While it  is plausible to think that the patterns involve properties of our eyes 
(for instance, the firing in a particular layer of the eye) or a similarly  internal object, it is 
also plausible to think that the object perceived is simply  the wall. Just as a brain can 
calibrate well to its surroundings, it can miscaliberate. This happens, for instance, when 
we walk into a dimly lit room after being in the brightly  lit  outdoors. For a few moments, 
everything looks dimmer than usual because one's visual system has not yet recalibrated 
to the surroundings. The man on LSD may be construed as suffering a more radical 
miscalibration. Rather than adjusting to the surroundings, his pattern of firing 
continuously changes, and so continuously perceives parts of the surroundings 
differently, hence the colors. Since this is a possible construal of the case, and since the 
wall is not a special object, then hallucinations do not need to involve special objects. 
Moreover, since the hallucination involves only  colors, then the hallucinator is not 
perceiving into the objects around him. He would only need to do so if he was perceiving 
some depicted object. So hallucinations do not necessarily involve perceiving in. 
 None of the four proposed features help  us distinguish hallucinations from 
illusions, so a reasonable proposal is that hallucinations are not different. Like many other 
perceptual cases, hallucinations deceive us and can do so radically, but none of this 
depends on them involving a special feature. Instead, they are like illusions. They are a 
diverse category  of perceptual phenomena that have the power to mislead us. In some 
cases, the ones which we can call biological hallucinations, we have a state that deceives 
us by involving a distortion of the perceiver's brain processing. In other cases, the ones 
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that allow us to perceive what is “not there”, the states deceive us by involving 
perceiving-in. And in yet other cases, the states deceive us either through the exotic 
nature of the object they relate us to, or through using a special perceptual route. What is 
clear is that  in each case we have a distinctively perceptual error, since the error involves 
perceiving things in a particular way. So, for the illusionist, hallucinations are not best 
understood as representations, nor as relations to special objects, nor as nonperceptual 
phenomena. They  are instead cases of perceiving the ordinary  objects of the world in 
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